US Army War College

USAWC Press
Articles & Editorials
7-2008

Global and Functional Strategic Issues
Antulio J. Echevarria II

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials
Part of the American Politics Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, International
Relations Commons, Leadership Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Other
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Administration Commons, and the Public Affairs Commons

Recommended Citation
Echevarria II, Antulio J., "Global and Functional Strategic Issues" (2008). Articles & Editorials. 456.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials/456

This KSIL Document is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles & Editorials by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST

July 2008

Visit our website for other free publication downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.

*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the
SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report
also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s homepage address is:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

ii

CONTENTS
Foreword......................................................................................................................... v
Global and Functional Strategic Issues.....................................................................1
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

Global War on Terror ......................................................................................1
Homeland Security/Homeland Defense/Civil Support ..........................  2
Military Change............................................................................................... 4
National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy ............................ 6
Landpower Employment................................................................................7
Landpower Generation and Sustainment.................................................... 8
Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture..................................... 9

Regional Strategic Issues........................................................................................... 12
I. Evolving Regional Security Matters in Africa........................................... 12
II. Evolving Regional Security Matters in the Middle East
		
and Islamic World..........................................................................................13
III. Evolving Regional Security Matters
in the Asia-Pacific Region ............................................................................14
IV. Evolving Regional Security Matters in Europe......................................... 15
V. Evolving Regional Security Matters in South Asia...................................17
VI. Evolving Regional Security Matters in Central Asia................................17
VII. Evolving Regional Security Matters
		
in the Western Hemisphere .........................................................................18
VIII. Other................................................................................................................ 19
War and Society...........................................................................................................  20
I. American Society........................................................................................... 20
II. International Society...................................................................................... 21
Strategic Studies Institute Subject Matter/Regional Experts.............................   22
Expanded Topic List....................................................................................................23
	Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1.......................................23
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2.......................................29
		
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command.......................34
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3.......................................37
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4.......................................49

iii

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6.......................................53
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8.......................................56
Joint Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5................................58
United States Africa Command........................................................................... 59
United States Central Command.........................................................................64
United States European Command.....................................................................70
		
United States Army Europe (USAREUR) and 7th Army.........................74
United States Joint Forces Command (J-2)......................................................... 78
		
United States Army Forces Command....................................................... 79
North American Aerospace Defense Command
		
and United States Northern Command .....................................................85
United States Pacific Command.......................................................................... 89
United States Southern Command......................................................................99
United States Special Operations Command...................................................103
		
United States Army Special Operations Command............................... 104
United States Strategic Command ....................................................................113
		
United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/
Army Forces Strategic Command............................................................. 118
		
The Defense Intelligence Agency.............................................................. 120
United States Transportation Command......................................................... 124
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command................................. 127
		
United States Army Combined Arms Center.......................................... 133
United States Army Materiel Command .........................................................139
United States Military Academy....................................................................... 150
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers...........................................................................155
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.....................................................................156
National Guard Bureau.......................................................................................161

iv

FOREWORD
The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) offers military and civilian researchers a ready
reference of topics that are of particular interest to the Department of the Army and the
Department of Defense. The KSIL performs a valuable service by linking the research
community with major defense organizations which, in turn, seek to benefit from
focused research. It thus forms a critical link in an ongoing research cycle.
With the publication of the AY 2008-09 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and
the U.S. Army War College invite the research community to address any of the many
strategic challenges identified herein. Further information regarding specific topics
can be obtained by contacting SSI faculty or relevant KSIL sponsors.

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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GLOBAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES
POC: Dr. Robert H. Dorff (717) 245-4126
Robert.Dorff@us.army.mil
I.

Global War on Terror
1.

Reconceptualizing the “war” on terror: is it a war, and, if so, what is its
nature and how should it be prosecuted?

2.

Revising U.S. global strategy for the war on terror; reassessing the
ends, ways, and means

3.

Understanding challenges confronting the coalition in Afghanistan and
developing appropriate responses

4.

What coalitions, partnerships, and alliances should the U.S. be
building and supporting?

5.

What measures of effectiveness should be applied to the larger war on
terror?

6.

Countering ideological support for terrorism through domestic and
foreign means

7.

Recognizing progress in counterinsurgency operations, and reinforcing
it

8.

What proportion of U.S. land power should be focused on
counterinsurgency operations and how should it be organized, trained,
equipped, and deployed?

9.

Training international security forces (military, paramilitary, and
police)

10.

Balancing political, economic, and military tools in counterinsurgency
operations

11.

Challenges and opportunities of employing militias in
counterinsurgency efforts

12.

Should the war on drugs be integrated into the war on terror?

1

13.

What should be the military role in the collection of foreign intelligence
in areas of interest and the linkage to, and collaboration with,
nonmilitary collection?

14.

Is there a clash of perspectives between the U.S. focus on the Global
War on Terror and the priority placed by our partners on other
security issues (e.g., human security in Africa), and, if so, how should
we address it?

II.	Homeland Security/Homeland Defense/ Civil Support
1.	Does the U.S. homeland have a center of gravity?
2.	Assessing, countering, and responding to WMD threats
3.

Identifying intelligence collection requirements and restrictions in
homeland security and whether there are any likely and/or possible
implications for information/intelligence sharing and warning

4.

Information sharing among intelligence, law enforcement, and other
federal, state, and local agencies, and the likely and/or possible
impacts on warning and our homeland defense/security effectiveness

5.

Strategic implications of missile defense as a component of homeland
defense.

6.

Active and reserve components’ roles in homeland security

7.

Combining federal, state, and local resources for combating homeland
threats

8.

Identifying and protecting DoD and/or non-DoD critical infrastructure

9.

Implications of the North American Defense Agreement (U.S., Canada,
Mexico)

10.

Implications of dual Title 10 and Title 32 responsibilities for State
Adjutants General given operational control of federal assets for local
event support. Likewise: Implications of dual status (Title 10 and Title
32) responsibilities for active duty officers under USC Title 32 section
315 given operational control of non-Federal National Guard soldiers
to support domestic incidents
2

11.

Interagency planning for pandemics

12.

Strategic implications of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the
Western Hemisphere

13.

What is the impact of under-equipped active duty and reserve units
responding to WMD or natural disasters, or other Civil Support
missions?

14.

How should U.S. Northern Command be organized and resourced,
and how should it be composed (ratio of AC to RC and service
composition) to better support its Homeland Defense and Civil
Support missions?

15.

Should changes be made to either the Posse Comitatus or Enforcement
of the Laws to Restore Public Order Act to facilitate the use of National
Guard or AC in support of Homeland Defense and Civil Support?

16.	What are the second- and third-order effects of mass evacuations?
17.

Establishing Operational Interagency information exchange
environments: National directives call for the development of a
domestic and international information sharing mechanism among
Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support entities.

18.

Integration of the private sector in response to a public health
emergency (e.g., information distribution, mental health counseling,
goods, accountability for employees)

19.

Cyberspace Operations: Determine if the operational framework being
pursued by the DoD for cyberspace operations is the most effective
for all warfighters. Will it be sensitive to Geographic Combatant
Commanders’ needs or will they be required to standup their own
cyberspace operations capability? Should there be a sub-unified
command that consolidates all cyberspace capability? Should all
Service and Agency capabilities be aligned to USSTRATCOM?

20.

Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Standardized
Tracking. How can the DoD standardize a method for tracking critical
infrastructure and what should the tool look like?

3

III.

21.

Rules of Engagement in Cyberspace: What are they, and are they
relevant and/or appropriate?

22.

National Guard: Operational or Strategic Reserve? Effects on
Homeland Security and Civil Support

23.

Advantages and disadvantages of moving all U.S. territory (specifically
Hawaii, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico) under USNORTHCOM as the
lead combatant command for expertise in Homeland Defense

24.

Interagency coordination and cooperation in Homeland Security/
Homeland Defense

25.

Should DoD and non-Federal National Guard have dedicated Civil
Support capabilities to respond to natural and manmade domestic
disasters?

Military Change
1.	Understanding revolutionary change in warfare
2.	Analyzing developments in contemporary warfare
3.	Historical responses to unexpected technological breakthroughs
4.	Alternative paths for transforming the U.S. military
5.

Preparing for fog and friction on the future battlefield

6.	Land force requirements for full spectrum dominance
7.	Future force capacities for peacekeeping and stability operations
8.

		
		

Networks and Warfare:
a.	Leadership in a network environment
b.	Command and control (Battle Command) in a network
environment

9.	Strategic implications of future operational concepts:
a.
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and family of Joint
concepts
		
b.
The Army in Joint Operations, and Army future force
operational concepts
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10.	Evaluating the themes in the Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance:
a.
Assessing force proficiencies against irregular challenges
		
b.	Assessing force capabilities for stability operations
		
c.	Assessing force capabilities to dominate in complex terrain
		
d.	Assessing force capabilities for strategic responsiveness
		
e.	Assessing the Army’s Global Force Posture
		
f.	Assessing force capabilities for Battle Command
11.	Impact and fundamental requirements for interdependence
12.

Information, misinformation, and disinformation. How can DoD
manage these in an information-rich world?

13.

Inter- and intra-theater mobility requirements for a transformed
military force

14.

Transforming logistical support for U.S. Army, allies and coalition
partners

15.

Transforming OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Service staffs

16.

Transforming the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve

17.

Women in combat: laws and norms

18.

Modular force performance within existing and/or emerging Joint
doctrine

19.

The mix of heavy, medium, and light elements in future forces, both
AC and RC

20.	Savings and costs of the Future Force, both AC and RC
21.	Transformation in light of OIF and other ongoing operations
22.	The risk of technology maturation versus stable investment strategies
23.

 esource conflicts between operational and institutional
R
transformation

24.

Advantages and disadvantages of transforming toward lean efficiency
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25.	Does ARFORGEN meet the Army’s needs for extended combat
operations?
26.

Operating in cyberspace

27.

Streamlining the business of DoD’s business: Is DoD’s governance
responsive enough in today’s fast-changing world?

28.

Strategic implications of outer space as a theater of war

29.

Army equities in nuclear warfare

30.

U.S. Africa Command as a case study for interagency integration—
implications for other commands and agencies, measures of
effectiveness, roles and responsibilities, etc.

31.

Impacts of increasing role of theater security cooperation activities
(building partner capacity, etc.) on the force. Is it competing with/
undercutting warfighting readiness?

32.

The need for larger pools of Foreign Area Officers and offices of
security cooperation in the Joint community.

IV.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy
1.

Assess the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and/or U.S. National
Military Strategy (NMS); how/where should the next administration
prioritize its efforts?

2.

Alternative American grand strategies, their costs and benefits

3.

Determine strategic implications of irregular, traditional, and hybrid
challenges

4.

Deterrence and dissuasion in U.S. national strategy

5.

Proliferation and counterproliferation in a globalized world

6.

Integrating military and nonmilitary tools to achieve strategic
objectives and avoid or resolve potential conflict
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7.	The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st
century
8.	Implications of U.S. missile defense for allies and potential adversaries
9.	Implications of preemptive and preventive war doctrines
10.

Responding to the collapse of strategically significant states

11.	Long-term stability, support, reconstruction and transition operations
12.	Post-Cold War security assistance and its utility
13.

Alternatives to the spectrum of conflict model and alternative strategic
futures

14.	Is a full-spectrum force required for the future; is it possible to sustain?
15.	Strategic net and risk assessment in a multipolar system
16.	Examining the relationship between energy and security
17.	“Global warming” and U.S. national security
V.

Landpower Employment
1.

		
		

The Army and irregular challenges:
a.
Given some success in defeating IED challenges, what other
measures might insurgents or terrorists take?
b.
What steps should U.S. forces take to minimize the effectiveness
of those measures?

2.	Requirements for counterinsurgency operations
3.	Requirements for military operations in complex terrain
4.	Assess the importance of information superiority in military
operations
5.

Conducting combat operations, security operations, and stability
operations concurrently: how to transition, where to focus?
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6.
		
		

Changing landpower roles in stabilization, reconstruction, and
humanitarian operations:
a.	Information and intelligence sharing between military and
coalition partners
b.	Integrating military and civilian logistics
c.
Definitions and policies for establishing a “safe and secure”
environment

7.

Improving Joint, combined, interagency, NGO and IGO cooperation in
humanitarian and counterinsurgency operations

8.

Evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy execution by
combatant commanders and country teams

9.	The international criminal court and American military operations
VI.

Landpower Generation and Sustainment
1.

Changing requirements versus legal constraints for military and
interagency mobilization

2.

Assessing the effectiveness of the War Reserve Materiel Program

3.

Impact of force protection requirements on power projection and force
employment

4.

Globalization’s impact on the military-industrial base

5.

Strategic implications of implementing base closures

6.

Overcoming anti-access and area-denial strategies

7.

Planning for operations in areas with primitive and austere
infrastructures

8.

Tradeoffs with respect to power projection, prepositioning, and
forward stationing

9.

Planning for protracted conflicts

10.	Logistics for dispersed/distributed combat operations
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11.

Expanded roles of civilians in defense operations and the impact on
force structure

12.

Adapting the Reserve Components to continuous mobilization

13.

Landpower’s role in seabasing as a logistical and operational concept

14.

Sustaining a modular, capabilities-based Army

15.

Establishing a single Army logistics enterprise

16.

Managing support for Joint, Interagency, and Multinational (JIM)
commodities

17.

Incorporating LOGCAP and other augmentation agreements into DoD
and DoS strategies

18.

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model’s implications for
manning, equipping, and sustaining functions in and specific impacts
on:
a.
The generating force’s roles and missions
b.
Title 10 requirements for generating capabilities for the Joint
Force Commander
c.	Exporting generating force capabilities to JIM partners
d.	Support for the modular Army concept
e.	Generating forces to support the long war

		
		
		
		
		

VII.	Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture
1.	Retention and readiness of active and reserve forces
2.	Developing forces and doctrine for expeditionary operations
3.

Developing forces and doctrine for security cooperation, assurance,
dissuasion, and deterrence

4.	Developing soldiers and leaders for the future force
5.

Teaching strategy for 21st century conflict

6.

Changing the continuum of service
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7.	Assessing the gap between civilian and military cultures
8.
		

The U.S. military and American society:
a.
Demographics: who is in it, and who fights?
b.	Civilian control over the military in the 21st century

9.

Identifying, managing, and sustaining the Army’s intellectual and
technological talent

10.

The status of the Army as a profession

11.	Sustaining public support for the U.S. armed forces
12.	How the Army develops and responds to “lessons learned”
13.	Obtaining Joint synergy despite different service cultures
14.	Establishing and maintaining a culture of innovation
15.	Implications of adopting commercial best business practices for the
military
16.	Managing changes in temporary end strength
17.

Implications for the All-Volunteer Force fighting the “long” war

18.	Implications of DoD reorganization initiatives and military reform
19.	Managing deployed civilians and contractors
20.

Managing nondeployable soldiers

21.	Strategic purpose and effectiveness of the Individual Ready Reserve
22.	Examining the pre-commissioning program
23.	Revising the military decisionmaking process
24.

Determining the difference between dissent and disloyalty with
civilian oversight

25.

Analyzing the impact of repeated deployments on families
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26.

How will the fact that fewer members of Congress have served in the
armed services affect future Defense policy?

27.

Implications of full knowledge enablement on traditional hierarchical
organizations.

28.

Implications of interagency integration on the professional military
education, career progression, and other human resource management
practices; how should DoD facilitate the implementation of the DOSled Interagency Management System?

29.

Discuss the utilization of foreign area officers in ODC and DAO
positions within the Senior Defense Official (SDO) concept.
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REGIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES
POC: Dr. Steven Metz (717) 245-3822
Steven.Metz@us.army.mil
I.

Evolving Regional Security Matters in Africa
1.

Africa and the war on terrorism

2.	Lessons learned from the recent insurgency in Chad
3.	Implications of HIV/AIDS on the ground forces of African partners
4.	Strategic implications of Chinese activity in Africa
5.

Analysis of regional African infrastructure and its impacts on how
African nations provide for their own security. (e.g., the Zambezi River
Valley or the Great Lakes nations or the Trans-Sahel)

6.

U.S. strategy toward the Trans-Sahel

7.

U.S. strategy toward the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and its impact on its neighbors

8.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea subregion—threats,
challenges, and solutions

9.

U.S. strategy toward the west Indian Ocean nations (Comoros,
Mauritius) and southeast African coast

10.	Nexus of security and development in Africa—why they go hand-inhand
11.	U.S. military roles in human security issues in Africa
12.

The impacts and risks of mass migrations and refugee flows in Africa

13.	The role of the African Union in African peacekeeping operations
14.	Army international activities programs in Africa
15.	Professional development of African militaries
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16.

The stability and security role of Africa’s regional powers: Nigeria,
Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa

II.	Evolving Regional Security Matters in the Middle East and the Islamic
World
1.	U.S. interests with respect to a stable, sovereign Iraq
2.	Changing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf
  3.

		

Security issues created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

4.

U.S. strategy toward Iran

5.

U.S. strategy toward Libya

6.

U.S. strategy toward Syria

7.

Implications of a nuclear Iran

8.	The impact of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) on U.S. national
security
9.	Strategic implications of a changing Egypt

10.

The future of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the smaller Gulf monarchies in
Middle Eastern security

11.

Strategic implications of fully or partially democratic, but anti-U.S.
governments, mass movements, and political parties in the Middle
East

12.

Strategic implications of increasing Chinese interests in Middle East
oil, and arms sales and economic aid in the Middle East

13.

Future role of external powers and security organizations in the
Middle East

14.

Emerging and evolving military relationships among Middle Eastern
states including counterterrorism relationships.

15.

Strategies regional states have for dealing with the United States and
its allies in the Middle East
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III.

16.

Regional security strategies in the Middle East.

17.

The nature of politically-oriented Islamic militancy and salafi jihadism,
and their implications for U.S. and regional security

18.

U.S. strategy toward Lebanon

19.

Efforts to contain and moderate violent ethnic and sectarian conflicts
throughout the Middle East

20.

Dangers of “spillover” problems from Iraq, and the activities of
regional states within Iraq

Evolving Regional Security Matters in the Asia-Pacific Region
1.	Balancing U.S. security interests in China and Taiwan
2.	The future of the Japan-U.S. security relationship
3.	Implications of China’s growing economic and military power in the
region
4.	Security concerns in Southeast Asia and implications for the United
States
5.	Strategic response to North Korea’s intentions and capabilities
6.	Evolving Republic of Korea-U.S. security relations
7.

Evolving Japan-U.S. security relations

8.

Japan’s relationships with Asian nations

9.	Future of ASEAN and U.S. strategic posture in the region
10.	The role of the U.S. military on the Korean Peninsula
11.	Future of the U.S. alliance with Australia and New Zealand
12.	Sources and dimensions of anti-Americanism in Asia: policy
		
implications
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13.

Chinese-North Korean relations

14.	Politics of history and memory in South-North Korean relations
15.	Role of nationalism in Asia and implications for U.S. policy
16.	Role of ideology in Asia and implications for U.S. policy
17.	China’s regional and global grand strategy
18.

China’s military transformation

19.	Russia’s interests, policy and actions in Asia
20.	Transformation of U.S. forward deployment in Asia
21.

Toward U.S. energy security strategy for Asia and the Pacific

22.	The strategic implications of China’s growing space capabilities
23.	Organized crime and security in South Asia
24.
IV.

India as a rising Asian power and the expansion of its overall
capabilities and interests

Evolving Regional Security Matters in Europe
1.

U.S. Army roles in future Balkan security

2.	A roadmap for future security in the Balkans
3.

The revival of the Russian military

4.	Prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense cooperation
5.	Russia’s future relationships with Europe and the United States
6.	Russia, the Middle East, and energy security in Europe
7.	Democratization and instability in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus
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8.	Impact of growing Muslim populations on European security policy
9.

 trategic implications of reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in
S
Europe

10.

Implications of a changing NATO

11.	U.S. leadership in NATO: Does/should the U.S. Army still play a role?
12.	NATO and EU defense capabilities: new or just repackaging the old?
13.	EU civil-military cell—a useful model for Joint/interagency
operations?
14.

Is the U.S.-Europe military capabilities gap still growing; are U.S.
technology transfer rules helping or hindering?

15.

Implications of OIF for European cooperation in the war on terror

16.

EU expansion while excluding Turkey from membership

17.

Strategic implications of drawing down U.S. forces in Europe

18.

Will ISAF break NATO?

19.

Should the U.S. encourage handover of OEF to NATO and allow
CENTCOM to focus on OIF?

20.

EUCOM’s future role with the Maritime Analysis and Operations
Centre - Narcotics (MOAC-N) located in Lisbon, Portugal (7 nation
regional center)

21.

Discuss coordination across the COCOM SEAMS: The unique role
that Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) plays in the EUCOM
AOR to combat cross-Atlantic illicit narcotics trafficking
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V.	Evolving Regional Security Matters in South Asia
1.	Balancing U.S. security interests between India and Pakistan
2.	Role of India in world events and U.S.-Indian military-strategic
relations
3.	Maintaining stability and security in Afghanistan
4.	Long-term implications of maintaining the OIF coalition
5.	The evolving American security relationship with Pakistan
6.

The global response to state failure or internal conflict in South Asia

7.	Organized crime and security in South Asia
8.

 The risks, benefits and implications of poppy eradication in
Afghanistan

9.

Iran: A potential partner in stemming illegal Afghan drug flow. Should
the coalition seek to engage Iran in mutually beneficial border control
to stem the flow of illicit narcotics?

VI.	Evolving Regional Security Matters in Central Asia
1.	Growing U.S. security interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia
2.	Russian-China-U.S. competition in Central Asia
3.	Implications of energy development in the Caucasus and Caspian
regions
4.	Synchronizing security cooperation and political reform in Central
Asia
5.	The role and structure of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia
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VII.	Evolving Regional Security Matters in the Western Hemisphere
1.

U.S. interests in Caribbean security issues

2.	Hemispheric security forces (military and police) and new threats
3.

Improving security ties with Brazil

4.

Lessons from the Colombian insurgency

5. 	Immigration and people smuggling as a security issue
6.	Ungoverned space and implications for territorial security
7.	Gangs and other transnational crime as a threat to the area
8.	Venezuela as an exporter of political instability
9.

Narco-funded terrorism networks

10.	Instability and disenfranchised indigenous and poor populations
11.
12.
		

Implications of the rising threat of populism in the region; the
difference between populists and the “responsible left”
How to address the fundamental disconnect between the U.S. and
Latin American visions of current threats to the region

13.

Long-term implications of Chinese engagement in Latin America

14.

Implications of economic integration such as the Central America
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR)

15.

Impact of the American Serviceman’s Protection Act of 2000 (ASPA) on
hemispheric security relations

16.

Maintaining the viability of hemispheric security forces during a time
of declining budgets

17.

Implications for U.S. security of a post-Castro Cuba
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VIII.

18.

Forming a North American Security Community

19.

Improving security ties with Mexico

20.

Improving security ties with Canada

21.

Impact and desirability of forming sub-regional security organizations
like the Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas (CFAC)

Other:
1.	Revising the boundaries of the geographic Combatant Commands
2.

Integrating regional security cooperation plans and basing and
presence policies

3.	Environmental issues as a basis for enhancing security cooperation
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WAR AND SOCIETY
POC: Antulio J. Echevarria II, Ph.D. (717)245-4058
Antulio.Echevarria@us.army.mil
I.

American Society
1.	Balancing individual civil rights and national security requirements
2.

Debating America’s place in the world

3.	America’s changing perceptions of other nations
4.	The purpose of war: historical interpretation and debate
5.	The U.S. media and political and social mobilization
6.	American civil-military relations in wartime
7.

Changing notions of liberty and freedom

8.	Role of religion and faith in the American way of war
9.

Changing views of patriotism in America

10.	Strategic implications of public perceptions of who serves, and who
		
dies
11.

The impact of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq on U.S. civil-military
relations

12.

Civilian control of the military and the duty to provide military advice
effectively

13.

 Political boundaries for general and flag officers, active and retired
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II.

International Society
1.

Rethinking the “Clash of Cultures” debate

2.	Strategic implications of the “unipolar” moment
3.

Anti-Americanism and U.S. foreign policy

4.

International views of the United States

5.	Understanding centers of power in other societies, cultures
6.

International ramifications of American exceptionalism

7.

Establishing trust with our partners and our emphasis on ‘strategic
communication’—a proper need or risk-inducing exercise?
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EXPANDED TOPIC LIST
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1
POC: Dr. Michael Drillings (703) 695-6761
michael.drillings@us.army.mil
1.

Investigate future trends (up to 2020) in American population (ages 17—42)
that will impact recruiting for Army Components and recommend courses of
actions that maintain recruiting success. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

2.

Review, investigate, and recommend an appropriate set of recruiting quality
standards that predict operational mission success; are understandable and
acceptable to the public and national leadership; and achievable within
the projected 17-42-year-old American population. (Mr. Spara, DMPM,
703-695-7693)

3.

Investigate performance of Soldiers recruited from 2001 to 2007 who enlisted
with high school diploma vs. those who did not; who enlisted with moral
waiver vs. those who did not; whose who enlisted with and without a
medical waiver. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

4.

Analyze performance of non-U.S. citizens who enlisted in the Army from
2001 to 2007. Recommend legislative/recruiting policy changes based upon
analysis. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

5.

What is the value of the high school diploma to military service? (Does
possessing a high school diploma upon entry onto active duty equal a better
soldier? Should the military, like most of society, view a GED [General
Education Development]the same as it views high school diploma?) (Mr.
Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

6.

Outsourcing for Combat Power: Is there an overreliance on contractors? (Mr.
Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

7.

Mobilizing the Elements of National Power for the War on Terror (the long
war). (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

8.

What defines “quality” in the Army of the future (2010 and beyond)? (Mr.
Spara, DMPM, 703-695-7693)

9.

What are the effects of the DoD Business Management Modernization
Program (BMMP)/Investment Review Board (IRB) certification process for
Human Resources Management (HRM) Domain’s information technology
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systems? Has the certification program provided any cost savings or cost
avoidance to the domain or the Army? How can the HRM Domain make this
certification process more efficient or effective? (LTC Barrington, CIO)
10.

Identify the changes and efficacy of Army bonuses and incentive programs
in maintaining an all volunteer force during wartime. How do current
enlistment retention bonuses stack up historically with previous wars? What
do results of such study imply on initiatives to grow Army end strength by
20-30K? (LTC McSherry, PR)

11.

Identify the marginal cost and benefit curves for recruiting’s main levers
such as advertising, recruiter strength, and financial incentives. Can the
lever’s impact be captured in an equation? How strong is the correlation?
Example: # additional recruiters = # additional recruits. What is the optimal
mix? (LTC McSherry, PR)

12.

Investigate and recommend ways for reducing the divorce rates of female
enlisted soldiers in the Army (holding for no additional funding and no
change to the Army’s missions). Identify reasons for the increasing trend
in female enlisted divorce rates and determine why this particular group
has higher rates than male soldiers and female officers? What are the most
effective services, according to soldiers, that the Army provides to reduce
divorce rates for its officers and enlisted soldiers? (Dr. Betty Maxfield, HR,
703-696-5128)

13.

Conduct a review of the current naturalization process for service members
and veterans to determine why applicants are waiting extended periods of
time for their citizenship. In reviewing the process, special attention should
be paid to the impediments to the process such as current laws, policies, or
bureaucratic procedures. (Dr. Betty Maxfield, HR, 703-696-5128)

14.

What does “right” look like as it relates to Army workforce diversity for all
components of the Army? (COL Tony Reyes, HR, 703-696-5114)

15.

How effective is mentorship in today’s Army? Is the current voluntary
mentorship program sufficient to meet the needs of tomorrow’s leaders or
do we need to structure our program in the same manner as is found in the
corporate arena? (LTC Jay Carlson, HR, 703-604-0623)

16.

Implementing and operating a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Program (SAPR) in a deployed environment. What are the challenges of
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operating a SAPR Program in a deployed theater, and what are possible
methods to overcome them? How should the hand-off of cases/victims after
redeployment be managed? (Ms. Carolyn Collins, HR, 703-693-0764)
17.

What is the relationship between unit cohesion and high risk behaviors,
specifically drug and alcohol abuse, in the Army? Data from the Army risk
reduction program (RRP) in conjunction with the reintegration unit risk
inventory (RURI) could be used to examine unit risk behavior, the high
risk units can be identified from the RRP and RURI data (data are available
from the Army Center for Substance Abuse Programs). The nature of the
interrelationship among cohesion and high risk and their developmental
dynamics needs to be examined. Of particular importance will be the
identification of the precise conditions under which social cohesion can
become detrimental or beneficial for unit performance. Moreover, it will
be interesting to see how deployment plays a role in unit cohesion (e.g.,
measuring cohesion before, during, and after deployment). (DAPE-HRS,
703-681-5557).

18.

Implementing and operating an Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) in
a deployment environment. What are the challenges of operating an ASAP
in a deployed theater, and what are possible methods to overcome them?
(DAPE-HRS, 703-681-5557)

19.

What is the role of junior leaders in developing and exercising personal
leadership skills with soldiers to help prevent and mitigate high risk
behaviors such as substance abuse, suicide, sexual assault, harassment, and
child abuse? An ideal doctrinal and training package would consist of what
elements? (DAPE-HRS, 703-681-5557)

20.

The soldier life cycle includes recruiting, training, and, ultimately, separation
and retirement. How effectively does the Army strategically communicate
with the soldier and spouse and prepare them for retirement? To what
degree are soldiers and spouses taking the initiative to begin planning for
retirement years prior to their actual date of retirement? What can be done to
enhance strategic communications in this important life cycle process? (Mr.
John Radke, HR, 703-325-2699)

21.

The Secretary of Army has directed that the Army needs to incorporate
continuum of service as part of the Human Capital Strategy. What are the
most significant obstacles, in policies, laws, regulations, etc. that must be
addressed in order to achieve continuum of service? (LTC Jeff Sterling,
DMPM)

25

22.

Complete a review of the Officer Candidate School (OCS) selection process to
identify the reason(s) College Option OCS graduates have a low propensity
for service beyond their initial active duty service obligation (ADSO).
Does the selection process adequately screen candidates for the qualities of
“officership”? How does the performance of College Option OCS graduates
in Basic Officer Leadership Course II/III (BOLC) compare to their peers
from other sources? What are the reasons this population decides to become
Army officer? Are there biases in the branching and/or assignment process
that impacts career satisfaction? What could be done to market continuum of
service to these officers after they have entered the Army? (COL Paul Aswell,
DMPM)

23.

How can the Army better recruit Reserve Component officer and retain those
officers at a higher rate?” (COL Paul Aswell, DMPM)

24.

What are the characteristics of organizations where pay for performance
concepts worked over time? Right now, pay for performance seems to
work well in lab demonstration projects. What does the literature say about
implementing such a system in a broad, heterogeneous environment like
the total civilian Army? What kinds of interventions are called for and
when should they take place in order to create an environment that fosters
cooperation and trust, even within a concept that, on the surface, seems to
reward competition within groups? (Ms. Jeannie Davis, CP)

25.

Life Cycle Manning and the Global War on Terror: Will it work? Will the
GWOT interfere with Life Cycle Manning? (HRC-EP)

26.

Is there a need for increased civilian education opportunities? What is the
need and/or requirement of the Army’s human capital for increased civilian
education programs for the Army of 2010 and beyond? (LTC Kenneth Chase,
HRC)

27.

Impact of combat-related stress on unit personnel readiness (LTC Kenneth
Chase, HRC)

28.

Impact of deployment OPTEMPO on Army family divorce rates (LTC
Kenneth Chase, HRC)

29.

Analysis of changing trends in personnel nondeployable categories (LTC
Kenneth Chase, HRC)
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30.

Qualitative analysis of reasons captains elected not to take CSRB, yet remain
in service (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

31.

Impact of high unit OPTEMPO on counseling/mentorship provided to
junior officers (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

32.

Is their a relationship between deployment experience and successful
performance? (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

33.

What effect does PCSing to PME courses have on family stability? (This
counts as dwell time even though the family life is potentially disrupted.)
(LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

34.

Impact of deployment OPTEMPO on the academic performance of Army
children (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

35.

How do soldiers (customers) perceive the quality/timeliness of personnel
services provided under PSDR structure? (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

36.

Has the officer shortage resulted in leaders holding officers to lower
performance standards out of fear of attrition? (LTC Kenneth Chase, HRC)

37.

How will the ARFORGEN model impact soldier dwell time? (HRC-EP)

38.

What are the capabilities and limitations of the Modular (plug and play)
Army? (HRC-EP)

39.

What are the disconnects between ARFORGEN and the monthly accessions
mission? (HRC-EP)

40.

Assess current RC policy to determine if the numerous categories of soldiers
are needed and how we can effectively track, monitor, and use the categories
when needing the IRR soldiers? (HRC-TAGD)

41.

Assess the Defense Business Board’s recommendation to the SECDEF to
outsource all military postal operations and outline a plan of how postal
operations could be contracted throughout the Army to include during
wartime. (HRC-TAGD)

42.

Assess the effectiveness of the command and control relationships of the
Human Resource Sustainment Centers with the Theater Support Commands
and the HR companies. (HRC-TAGD)
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43.

Analyze the readiness reporting nonavailable and nondeployable criteria and
make recommendations to reduce the number of soldiers nondeployable.
Evaluate and make recommendations to the DoD policy and the Physical
Disability Agency’s practice that allows nondeployable soldiers to be found
fit for duty and retained in the service. (HRC-TAGD)

44.

Analyze alternatives for One DoD Postal Budget and recommend how to
handle shortfalls if the budgeted amount is less than the bills. (HRC-TAGD)

45.

Analyze alternatives for One DoD Postal Organization with organizational
chart and positions for each level within the organization. (HRC-TAGD)

46.

Analyze alternatives for postal planners to be integrated into the COCOMs
from MPSA or stand-up a Joint Postal Cell for contingency operations. (HRCTAGD)
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Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2
POC: Mr. Nicholas Aleshin (703) 695-4159
Nicholas.Aleshin@us.army.mil
I.

II.

Global War on Terror:
1.

What economic trends would indicate a long-term inability for the U.S.
to continue prosecuting the war on terror?

2.

Are there any national financial and trade policies that support or
undermine the Long War?

3.

Is combat information and intelligence integrated effectively down to
the tactical level in the war on terror?

4.

How can defense and counterterrorism intelligence integration be
maximized in the war on terror?

5.

Conventional deterrence theory states that a credible threat is essential
to challenging enemy designs. Can nihilistic, nonstate actors be
seriously deterred from committing mass casualty events with such
techniques (e.g., by holding at risk key geography [e.g., Mecca, Qom]
or loved ones)?

6.

As DoD intelligence and the FBI have to synchronize and integrate
activities with respect to international and domestic terrorism, how or
will the respective cultures adjust for information sharing purposes?

7.

At what point should GWOT no longer be considered a “war,” but
instead a series of law enforcement operations?

Homeland Security:
1.

How have new Homeland Security policy, regulations, doctrine and
executive orders affected U.S. military intelligence operations inside
the U.S.?

2.

What is the impact on homeland security of the growing influence of
al-Qaeda in Central and South America?

29

III.

3.

To what extent should the U.S. military be used inside the homeland
for either natural disaster or attacks?

4.

How should the American people, the U.S. Government, and the U.S.
military balance domestic counterintelligence and rights to privacy?

Regional Strategic Issues:
1.

Will the continued manipulation of the yuan-dollar relationship
combined with increasing Chinese exports to Latin America countries
have an effect on the security and stability of Latin American
governments and their relations with the U.S.?

2.

Will continued manipulation of the yuan-dollar relationship combined
with increasing Chinese fossil fuel requirements have an effect on the
relationships between Southwestern Asian countries and the U.S.?

3.

Would a dramatically reduced Western reliance on fossil fuels lead
to an altered set of security and stabilization norms in southeast or
southwest Asia?

4.

What effect would a power projection-capable China have on U.S.
relations with U.S. allies and other states throughout southeast and
southwest Asia?

5.

Could the expansion of U.S. technology and telecommunications
throughout southwest Asia assist in developing a U.S.-led or U.S.participating regional security regime?

6.

Is the current level of intelligence focus on Latin America sufficient for
meeting policy maker needs in the region?

7.

Looking to the time between 2015 and 2025, what estimates can be
made about changes in the global political and military environment
(to include threats and capabilities of likely adversaries)?

8.

What regional security implications are developing due to the
changing nature of the U.S.-Republic of Korea military relationship
and reduced U.S. ground presence on the peninsula?

9.

Which states will be added to those strained by food shortages, and
what U.S./allied policies could be changed to lessen the strain?
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IV.

Military Change:
1.

What techniques have produced the most efficient use of the military
linguist in support of combat operations?

2.

What techniques have proven successful in integrating civilian
linguists into military operations at the tactical, operational, or
strategic levels?

3.

Has the new national intelligence architecture affected defense
intelligence?

4.

What techniques have proven successful in allowing tactical users to
leverage strategic intelligence capabilities?

5.

Does the modern battlefield require a different intelligence construct
from the traditional delineations of tactical, operational, and strategic
intelligence?

6

How will networked robotics across all warfighting functions shape
future doctrine?

7.

Are there any identifiable emerging technologies or technique trends
in denial and deception campaigns targeting U.S. or allied forces?

8.

How can the ELINT expertise of Army Military Intelligence be
leveraged to build capabilities and strategies for protecting air defense
and fire support radars against ground and air based EW threats?

9.

Has the CENTCOM implementation of the JIACG concept proven
successful in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how could this
and other “fusion” concepts be combined to coordinate intelligence
activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, host nation and third
country intelligence services in combat zones?

10.	Does the U.S. Government need a Constabulary Force for future
conflicts?
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V.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
1.

How have the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 and the PATRIOT Act impacted Army intelligence activities?

2.

Has the establishment of a cabinet-level Director of National
Intelligence significantly changed the roles and interactions among
members of the intelligence community?
What would a large-scale asymmetric attack on the U.S. by a state
opponent look like, and what would be its possible indicators?

3.
VI.

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.

Could a specific operational deployment rate result in “breaking” the
Global War on Terror’s requirement for low density, high demand
linguists?

2.

Recognizing the great potential for error, what techniques and
procedures should be utilized in the selection, training, and
employment of interrogators and interrogation units?

3.

Which evolving missile technologies are most likely to mature and
become disruptive against Army modernization and acquisition
priorities?

4.

What type of fuel should power Army vehicles, aircraft, and
equipment beyond 2025, and what are the investment and
infrastructure implications?

VII.	Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
1.

If the U.S. military, and specifically the U.S. Army, regressed to a
conscripted force, what changes would be necessary in leadership
selection, education, and retention of the military intelligence corps?

2.

What should be the role of the Military Intelligence Branch and its
officers in the development and operations of tactical, operational, and
strategic electronic warfare forces?

3.

Have past strategic and operational intelligence failures, especially
recent instances such as the Iraq WMD NIE, created a demand by

32

senior warfighters for evidence, rather than intelligence from the
intelligence community; if so, what are the implications of this in
providing warning as well as intelligence support to operations?

VIII.

4.

Are there secondary effects to the consolidation of a full civilian
intelligence force structure dedicated to strategic intelligence?

5.

Does the Army culture toward psychological counseling need to
change?

War and Society:
1.

What influences U.S. civil support for the war on terror, and how can
this support be measured?
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United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
POC: Mr. Thomas Stokowski (703) 706-1066
Email: Thomas.stokowski@us.army.mil
I.

Analytical Considerations:
1. 	Using facts, assumptions, and data sets from previous combat
planning processes, determine if using the Systemic Operational
Design would have resulted in an improved assessment of the
battlespace/environment versus that of MDMP.
2.	Is Arab nationalism a spent force? How does nationalism affect the
human terrain in the Middle East?
3.	Has international cooperation truly increased as a result of the Global
War on Terror? Is cooperation episodic or enduring? In what ways can
we improve cooperation and collaboration in the military intelligence
sharing arena? What level of support should we expect or depend on
in the future?
4.	Is there a struggle in the Islamic fundamentalist community for the
title of “revolutionary” Islam? How does this affect the relationship
between Sunnis, Shi’i and other regional/systemic actors?
5.	What are the near-term (5-10 years) prospects of the Europe Union
fielding an expeditionary military force and how will this affect
U.S. foreign and military policy? What lessons have been learned in
trying to overcome cultural, language, and operational obstacles to
integration?
6.	How will recently renewed Japanese nationalism affect stability in
Asia?
7.	Do recent trends in Central Asia and Eurasia threaten U.S. interests?
Do recent efforts at military transformation, collaboration and
cooperation between regional powers indicate a change in strategy or
simply the pursuit of individual interests? Determine the relevancy of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
8.	What are the potential consequences of Russian withdrawal from its
bi- and multilateral arms limitations treaties?
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9.	Over the past half-dozen years, much has been said about the
technological revolution that has been transforming Army Intelligence.
Has any real change occurred? Has it been revolutionary, as
proponents suggest, or evolutionary? More importantly, what has
been the pay off of any change for the Army?
II.

Operational Considerations:
1.

How should MI be postured and structured to exploit the human
dimension of the Long War?

2.

Does MI have the right capacity and balance across the Army (in the
right component AC/RC) to support ARFORGEN?

3.

Since Fusion Centers transcend the modular build, what should we as
an Army/JTF plan for in the future?

4.

What adjustments, if any, to the existing national, interagency,
military, and coalition capabilities are needed to sufficiently address
the requirements associated with Complex Environments?

5.

How should the Army and INSCOM meet and get ahead of
requirements for obscure or dialectical language requirements?

6.

Is there enough nonmilitary (economic, political) policy training in MI
schools to allow analysts to understand the goals, methods, and intent
of nonmilitary U.S. policies?

7.

How do we achieve global cultural awareness, and how do we fix this
for the Long War view in our education process?

8.

Are we training MI soldiers appropriately, on political, social,
economic, information, infrastructure issues, cultural awareness, and
Red Teaming? How do we train CDRs and non-MI staffs?

9.

How do we handle detainees who are suspected terrorists and what is
their ultimate disposition?

10.

For the Long War, do we have appropriate rules governing biometrics
and cyber warfare?
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11.

Do our relevant policies allow us to retain the moral high ground, both
in fact and in perception?

12.

How do we keep the spirit of flexibility and adaptiveness alive and
proactive? How do we incorporate nonenduring capabilities (e.g., site
exploitation, certain ISR sensors, etc)?

13.

Will the introduction of persistent surveillance require INSCOM
to staff a larger analytical force to meet the demands of analytical
resource management versus that of collection management (i.e.,
focusing on analysts instead of collection assets)? How will this affect
operations and cooperation?

14.

Are we out of balance in manning ISR systems, as compared to lethal
systems?

15.

How should military intelligence support the fight against terrorist
financial networks and the proliferation of WMD?
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Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3
POC: MAJ Alexander D. Stephenson (703) 614-5339
alexander.stephenson@hqda.army.mil
I.

The Age of Persistent Conflict:
1.

Can emergent and improved space-based surveillance techniques be
applied to monitor terrorist activity around the globe? What are the
most promising technologies/techniques and how should they be
applied?

2.

What metrics should be used to gauge progress in the age of persistent
conflict?

3.

How can assessments be used to identify the root causes of instability?
Can they be integrated with the Military Decision Making Process?
(Many development agencies such as USAID or DIFD have developed
conflict assessments to facilitate long term development strategies).

4.

Conducting Personnel Recovery missions in an asymmetric
environment.
a.
What is the role of DoD in support of Inter-Agency Personnel
Recovery operations?

		
		

b.

U.S. Government justification for conducting unilateral
operations in the recovery of isolated, missing, detained, or
captured (IMDC) individuals in sovereign nations

5.

Assess the military capability to conduct Stability Operations in
support of US Government Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in multiple theaters.

6.

In the Age of Persistent Conflict, what are the implications of applying
a Task Force Odin capability to the future force structure of Army
Aviation and/or Military Intelligence?

7.

Identify ways and means essential to meet train, advise, and assist
(TAA) mission sets and examine the requirements associated with
building partner capacities (BPC) and how each service can leverage or
complement their unique capabilities.
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II.

8.

In order to develop greater interoperability with other government
agencies such as the State Department and USAID, what joint doctrine
needs to be developed? Should employees be trained in self-defense
tactics and armed when deploying as part of a civil-military team such
as a PRT?

9.

Does the Army currently possess the correct mix of lethal and nonlethal capabilities to operate in the full spectrum of conflict against
asymmetric threats in this era of Persistent Conflict?

10.

How can the intelligence community provide continuously refreshed
and current, combating WMD situational awareness information
to USSOCOM and other Combatant Commands and their Service
components of Combatant Commands conducting CT operations?

11.

How should conventional forces train and equip in order to support
counterterrorism operations?

Homeland Security:
1.

What space capabilities do Civil Support Teams need to have rapidly
employed to support their operations?

2.

Can space-based capabilities facilitate the interoperability and
interaction of military and civil first responders? Which space-based
capabilities offer the most benefit for doing so?

3.

What is the potential for development and our associated susceptibility
to home grown extremists similar to those increasingly seen in Europe?

4.

What are the challenges in Domestic Consequence Management
(DCM) efforts to support Homeland Defense/Homeland Security?

5.

Given the recommendations given in the 2008 Report of the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, should Congress
adjust legislation to allow the DoD (and the Army) to train, man, and
equip units whose primary mission is consequence management, not
warfighting?

6.

What should DoD’s DCM response be in the future? What can DoD
do internally to make its response more effective and efficient? Should
DoD have an increased or decreased role in DCM?
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7.

8.
III.

VI.

Tactical forensic collection and biometric matching has proven very
successful. What benefits and challenges would there be to apply
these lessons learned to Civil Support Teams and the overall Domestic
Consequence Management (DCM) efforts?
What is the realistic approach for use of Army forces in a domestic and
OCONUS quarantine situations?

Regional Security Issues:
1.

Can cooperation on space-based programs with allied and coalition
partners improve the net capabilities and the overall collaboration
between U.S. military forces and their allies/coalition partners?

2.

Can integrated architectures comprised of complementary space
systems/capabilities operated by several nations in a coalition improve
partnership, data sharing and the overall persistence and availability
of communications and surveillance in a given region of the world?

3.

Assess the effectiveness of cultural-based human behavior
representations, models and simulations, in preparing a combatoriented force for stability operations.

4.

How can the US enable other NATO nuclear forces (UK and France)
to assume responsibility for providing NATO with its nuclear
capabilities?

5.

What Interagency process should lead planning for pandemics and
other large scale events (earthquake, hurricane, etc)?

Military Change:
1.

What responsibilities and overlap should exist between Military
Intelligence, Signal Corps and Space Operations personnel within the
U.S. Army? Where and how should the synergy between these three
areas of expertise be developed to the benefit of the Future Force? Are
there opportunities to exploit these synergies to improve the Army’s
overall engagement across and influence on the overall National
Security Space community?

2.

What is the way ahead for Irregular Warfare capabilities and capacities
in the Army?
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3.

How should the Requirements Validation process integrate combat
development recommendations with acquisition and programming
considerations to ensure force modernization proposals are feasible
and affordable?

4.

How should the Army’s family of strategic guidance documents
be structured to support Army force modernization within an
increasingly prescriptive (top-down) DoD system that includes joint
operational concepts, a joint capability lexicon, and joint investment
portfolios?

5.

DoD’s emerging Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP) environment
(Aldridge Study 2004/Institiutional Reform & Governance Roadmap)
drives integrated modernization investment decisions to the
Department level. How should the Army organize and utilize organic
analytic capacity to optimize Army participation in Joint validation
and development of required capabilities?

6.

Assess the military’s capability to participate in long-term nationbuilding operations.

7.

How should acquisition and programming be adjusted to take external
rapid acquisition development (REF, JIEDDO) and integrate it into
the Army Requirements Validation Process?” Rationale: Since the
stand-up of JIEDDO and the Rapid Equipping Force, items have been
developed for the Warfighter that are not within the programs of the
Services. Given this fact, Services wrestle with how to support the
rapid acquisition development while supporting current programmed
development.

8.

How should regionally based, tactical and operational level Army
organizations obtain cyberspace operations support?

9.

What is the utility of expanding language training across Army
specialties beyond intelligence? Consider providing regionally
oriented military forces with the requirement and ability to obtain
basic and advanced language skill training for a fraction of their most
common military specialties as additional skill identifiers?
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V.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
1.

How should tactical exploitation of the national capabilities program
(TENCAP) evolve in a period of increasing synchronization of DoD
and intelligence community support to deployed forces? What are the
new opportunities for TENCAP to continue leading the way in the
sharing of technology, capabilities and techniques between DoD and
the intelligence community?

2.

How should Title 10 and Title 50 change to improve space situational
awareness and support rapid, effective employment of space control
negation capabilities?

3.

Should terrestrial-based offensive space control capabilities be given
priority and focus instead of space-based offensive space control
capabilities as the former are less provocative internationally than the
latter? Are there advantages to U.S. National Security by assigning
such a priority?

4.

Should U.S. National Security Space Policy embrace the idea of an
evolving set of “rules of the road” to establish space navigation
“best practices” instead of pursuing a series of negotiated treaties to
constrain activity in earth-orbital space?

5.

What are the implications of global warming and energy security
through a national security lens, specifically implications for military
force planning?

6.

What are the military force planning implications for a rising power of
China?

7.

Who should lead in US Government efforts in orchestrating security
cooperation and partner activities? How does this orchestration unify
State Department and DoD, Combatant Commands’ efforts for a
common objective?

8.

Who should lead DoD efforts in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Elimination during all phases of conflict and how should efforts be
divided between military force roles and missions and contractor
provided functions?
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9.

Does the Combating WMD policy structure of three pillars
(Counterproliferation, Nonproliferation, and Consequence
Management) and the Supporting eight Joint Mission Areas (Offensive
Operations, Active Defense, Passive Defense, Interdiction, Elimination,
Consequence Management, Security Cooperation and Partner
activities, and Threat Cooperative Reduction) need to be revised
to reflect how a Joint Force Commander would plan and execute
operations either regionally or globally?

10.

What is the most effective method to link Army Security Cooperation
Assessments to the achievements of strategic guidance?

11.

What is the best method to link Army Security Cooperation
Assessments to changes in resource allocation?

VI.	Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
1.

Human Resources Command and Managing Personnel: Is this the
center of gravity?

2.

How many Senior Service College Fellowships should the Army have
and why? Provide an analysis of the type of fellowships, including
academic content and standards, required for tomorrow’s Army.

3.

Describe the application of leadership and decisionmaking to achieve
mission success, in the absence of “a fully capable network.” In an
environment where net-centricity is the goal, consider the character
of leadership and decisionmaking, given a catastrophic failure of the
network.

4.

With respect to the behavior of an adversary, post “operational or
strategic event,” compare the pre-event modeled outcome to the postevent ground truth. Considering the elements of PMESII (political,
military, economic, social, information and infrastructure) effects
modeling, describe the lessons learned for future cultural modeling
initiatives.

5.

Address how biometrics as an enabling technology will impact our
business and tactical systems and the means by which we determine
access to our facilities and systems. How could this change or impact
the military culture?

6.

Given the enduring requirement for specific skill sets provided by
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Army civilians and contractor personnel, should they be managed
in an ARFORGEN like process or should they be formed into unit
formations and managed in the ARFORGEN process to ensure a ready
pool of those given capabilities?

VI.

7.

How best should the Army implement the National Security Personnel
Development (NSPD) program? Military and Army civilian personnel
must be developed to successfully perform in the Joint, inter-agency
and multi-national environment. How can the Army best identify and
enhance existing national security professional development programs
and infrastructure, and establish new programs, as necessary, in order
to fulfill its mission to educate, train and employ security professionals
consistent with the National Strategy.

8.

What steps need to be taken in order to sustain and improve the allvolunteer force in an era of Persistent Conflict?

9

How should military technical expertise in combating weapons of
mass destruction be cultivated across the Services for availability in
missions across the spectrum of military operations?

Landpower Employment:
1.

How can space control be relevant to tactical units under current
policy restrictions?

2.

What level of assurance would the Global Information Grid require
for delivering ISR and missile warning capabilities to deployed forces
using CONUS-based processing?

3.

Assess Army capability to manage the Warfighter’s airspace, given the
current and future employment of myriad unmanned aerial systems
and manned aviation systems.

4.

How are contingency plans affected by USTRANSCOM restrictive
policies on transit into CBRN contaminated areas?

5.

How does USSTRATCOM integrate the Geographic Combatant
Command Army Service / Joint Service Land Component Command
into conventional and nuclear global strike planning?

6.

How should Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination (WMDE)
missions planned and coordinated for execution by nonmilitary/
contractors?
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VIII.

7.

What are the expected vulnerabilities of digitized forces using
commercial of the shelf technologies to electromagnetic or other
energy based disruption?

8.

Can Army forces obtain better chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear (CBRN) readiness through providing platforms with built in,
detection, protection, warning, and decontamination features?

9.

Can existing CBRN sensors be digitally linked to provide continuously
updated, automated situational awareness in command and control
systems?

10.

How can the Army’s lighter and more dispersed forces recover from
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear contaminating events?

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.

IX.

What are the design considerations for a comprehensive Force
Modernization & Integration process that identifies, evaluates,
prioritizes, resources and delivers capabilities to current and future
Operational Commanders through the dynamic ARFORGEN planning
model. How should the Army modernize a force in contact? (ACP
Decision Point 82)

Other Questions:
1.

The future strategic environment portends to be one of persistent
conflict with increasingly technologically empowered nonstate actors
and proxies challenging traditional military capabilities. Will this
change the role of U.S. landpower in the next 10-20 years? If so, how
and what implications does this have for our current strategic efforts in
force modularity, design and basing?

2.

What are the roles and missions of GPF and SOF in the current and
future force? If tasks should migrate from one to the other, how should
the force organize and train to effectively accomplish the mission?
How can JFCOM and SOCOM field an integrated SOF-GPF force to the
Global Combatant Commanders when an irregular warfare themed
operation requires it?

3.

What is the historical record for successful stability operations, by
DOTMLPF, in the 20th century?
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4.

How will the Army evolve its processes to address comprehensive
DOTMLPF net-centric capabilities at a pace that meets the needs of the
Warfighter?

5.

How can the Army align and synchronize its decision processes to
address the evolving Joint needs and enablers?

6.

What activities are required to achieve fully integrated, synchronized
net-centric capabilities and what is an appropriate model for
resolving technical, architecture, interoperability, and technology shift
challenges?

7.

How will the Army measure its improvement in warfighting under the
construct of net-centricity?

8.

What is the strategic impact of linking the Global Information Grid to
the unit level (battalion/ship/squadron and below)?

9.

What are the operational impacts, at the brigade level and below,
of Joint integration of C4I through large scale programs such as the
Network Enabled Command Capability?

10.

How do evolving Biometric applications affect (a) maneuver
warfare, (b) stability operations? What are the implications for Battle
Command?

11.

What are the operational/strategic impacts of the LandWarNet
concept on Battle Command?

12.

How will full implementation of Battle Command on the Move affect
the Army strategically?

13.

A major impact of rapid fielding of new COTS and other capabilities
to theater has been that material solutions have “outrun” doctrine,
organization, training, leadership (education), personnel and facilities.
Is this transformational? How can the Army best synchronize all
elements of DOTMLPF to capitalize on these innovations?

14.

The management and execution of National Security Space has again
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become the focus of multiple studies both congressionally directed
and DoD initiated. In light of the emerging recommendations, how
should the Army best engage across this community for the purpose of
shaping and informing space policy, strategy and acquisition efforts?
15.

As the Army transforms to become increasingly expeditionary,
how should the Army mix its architecture of capabilities across the
terrestrial, aerial and space domains in order to provide the right mix
of complementary capacity and risk mitigation?

16.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has a plan for realization of
capabilities to establish a global ballistic missile defense shield. What is
the Army’s associated vision for its integral support to this roadmap?
What capabilities must or should be associated with the Army as lead
service and why.

17.

The relationship between the Missile Defense Agency and the
Services is particularly strained when considering the transition
of responsibilities for components of the BMDS from the spiral
acquisition approach of the MDA to the JCIDS based development
approach required of the Services. How well will newly proposed
business rules help to bridge the differences between these two
approaches and how can the Army improve these transitions?

18.

Should a military service be designated as the Executive Agent or Lead
Service for Global Ballistic Missile Defense?

19.

With the onset of the Joint Operationally Responsive Space Office and
the emergence of viable, relatively inexpensive small satellites, should
the Army consider its own acquisition of small satellite capabilities to
mitigate land Warfighter gaps and needs?

20.

What is the role of the Army and its operational forces in the
protection of space-based capabilities?

21.

How deep into the Army tactical echelons should organic access
and payload control of space-based ISR and MASINT capabilities
be pushed in order to provide the required level of assuredness,
responsiveness and timeliness for those capabilities to be tactically
relevant?

22.

As technology evolves, should the Army develop, field and
operate high altitude unmanned aerial systems to provide Joint
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communications and ISR platforms, or should that capability be
assigned to another service?
23.

Is there a “Battlefield” Consequence Management (BCM)?

24.

How is mission space defined for Army support to Foreign
Consequence Management and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief (HADR)?

25.

Examine and develop methods to improve the use and rapid
dissemination of biometric data and match results to the end user/
Warfighter.
Examine ways to enhance and optimize the implementation
of biometric capabilities in counterinsurgency and intelligence
operations.

26.

27.

Examine and develop methods for the use of biometric capabilities in
stability and reconstruction activities.

28.

Stability operations are now equal to offensive and defensive
operations for MTOE development; what assets and/or force structure
changes do maneuver platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades
need to be successful in stability operations?

29.

How should human intelligence assets be integrated into the modular
force at brigade level and below to effectively manage, integrate, assess
and act on intelligence collected by soldiers and junior leaders?

30.

What tools have been the most successful in conducting stability and/
or counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

31.

What approaches and tools should AFRICOM use in Africa? How can
the military effectively meet expressed local needs while achieving its
stated objectives?

32.

What are the impacts of creating an Operational Reserve Component
on Total Army Force Structure and its ability to meet both Combatant
Commander and Homeland Security requirements? Are there
alternative force structure solutions for the Reserve Component?

33.

Examine effective uses of Phase 0 operations to shape destabilizing
regions.
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34.

Examine how stability operations executed in Phase 0 can
preempt ideological (terrorist) strongholds.
(1)
AFRICOM
(2)
CENTCOM
(3)
PACOM
Examine the military’s role in establishing local governance as
a required first order effect during Phase 0 through Phase III
and how best to integrate local traditions, legal and religious
expectations.

Does the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information,
Infrastructure (PMESII) construct adequately describe the current
environment? FM3.0 adds two additional elements; physical
environment and time. Are there additional elements that should be
considered to adequately visualize the operational environment?
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Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4
POC: Mr. Mark A. Turner (703) 614-0919
Mark.alan.turner@us.army.mil
I.

II.

III.

Global War on Terror:
1.

What are the readiness implications of the Global War on Terror on
logistics/sustainment strategy for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force?

2.

What are the issues related to coalition support (reliance and
dependence) for the Joint Force? What are the logistics implications of
a coalition force?

3.

What are the issues related to logistics support for special operations
forces in their global commitment to the war on terror? Have we
provided better support since 9/11?

Homeland Security:
1.

What should be the Army’s concept of logistics/sustainment support
in defense of the homeland? What are the implications regarding
the integration of local, state, federal, and commercial logistics
capabilities?

2.

What is NORTHCOM’s relationship to the Army’s logistics
capabilities, and what is the concept to ensure effective command and
control of logistics/sustainment operations?

Regional Security Issues:
1.

How can we leverage the commercial capabilities that are already in
place across the globe to facilitate logistics/sustainment support for
regional operations?

2.

Are there opportunities to develop regional sustainment platforms
that can support the Joint Force? What are the implications on Service
logistics and Title X responsibilities?
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IV.

Military Change:
1.

How can we best leverage and communicate, both horizontally and
vertically, emerging strategic technologies/capabilities to enhance the
capability of the Joint support and sustainment process?

2.

What does “modularity” mean to Army logisticians?

3.

Compare and contrast DoD vs. commercial business sustainment
planning and operations. What are the key similarities and differences?
What are the major conclusions; provide recommendations as to
how the DoD and the Army should proceed in areas of organization,
business processes, interoperability, associated information
technology, and resourcing.

4.

Research the background and identify the challenges of achieving
interoperability of DoD data standards, and its impact on Army
Logistics and Logistics C2.

V.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

VI.

1.

What are the support and sustainment capability implications of
long-term commitments to Sustainment Replenishment Operations
(SRO), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and the GWOT, CONUS, and
OCONUS?

2.

How can the Joint Force leverage the concept of a sea base, and enable
a more globally flexible sustainment capability? How does the Army
Prepositioned Stocks (APS) strategy fit into the concept?

3.

Are the Army’s current readiness assessment systems capable of
accurately portraying the Army’s preparedness to execute the National
Military Strategy across the entire Spectrum of Conflict? Does the
ability to execute at the highest level of the Spectrum of Conflict
indicate the ability to execute all missions at a lower level on the
spectrum?

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.

What are the sustainment implications of the simultaneous
deployment and employment of the Joint Force?
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VII.

2.

What are the challenges in implementing the Army logistics enterprise
and what is its role in LANDWARNET?

3.

Implications for sustainment in the current operational environment

4.

Commander’s intent—distribution planning and executing—
developing unity of effort

5.

How will an integrated Life Cycle Sustainment Strategy guide Army
capital equipment investments, skill development, and training
requirements?

6.

Given the current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model, is the
current force structure capable of conducting protracted warfare at
the high end of the Spectrum of Conflict? If not, what additional force
structure would be required?

7.

How will institutionalizing the RESET process support the
ARFORGEN cycle? Can this be sustained financially?

8.

From an Army supply chain perspective, what does a “supply chain”
process architecture reveal about relationships, processes, ownership,
and interfaces with the Joint and OSD communities of interest?

Force Management and Leadership:
1.

How can we best forecast and determine the cost to sustain and
support a specific force capability over time in an operational
environment (multiple intensity and threat scenarios)? As part of this
discussion, how can we quickly determine, validate, and verify known
resource requirements in near-real-time as agile force structure and
operational requirements change?

2.

What are the force management and leadership implications, gaps,
shortfalls, risks and challenges that have been identified during the
expanded use of contractors for support and sustainment operations?
How much contracting is enough?

3.

Research and address how the POM process can be streamlined to
better ensure balanced Army transformation in order to implement an
optimal Army sustainment strategy.
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4.

What are the essential skills, knowledge, and expertise that Army
logisticians will require to function effectively in a network-centric
future logistics environment?

5.

What force preparation and force management capabilities will be
required in the future network-centric environment to generate
logistics capabilities through ARFORGEN, and how are these
capabilities integrated with the larger Joint Force Management (JFM)
initiative?

6.

What are the implications of the GWOT on logistics human resources,
training of “core skills” and competencies for total force requirements
across the warfighting and business support and sustainment
spectrums, for global support and sustainment of qualified personnel:
military, government and commercial enterprise in the short, mid and
long-term?

VIII.	Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational:

IX.

1.

What are the implications for supporting JIM and what can we
learn from past operations? Have we taken advantage of the lessons
learned?

2.

How can we best leverage and improve the fusion and operational
distribution, protection, and utilization of resources data in order to
enhance support and sustainment capability for the COCOMs, JTFs
across DoD’s joint warfighting and business enterprises and our
strategic partnerships across the National and International Logistics
Sustainment Base? Does this justify a Joint Logistics Command?

Other:
1.

How can DoD and the Army transform logistics concepts into
capabilities faster and more effectively? Address the background,
status and recommendations. How do these recommendations
enhance the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS)?
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Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6
POC: Mr. David Raes (703) 602-7111
david.raes@us.army.mil
I.

II.

Global War on Terror:
1.

How can the Army achieve a balance for information sharing among
agencies across the full spectrum of engagement (local, state, federal,
and international) with protection of information?

2.

What is the Army’s role in the emerging Cyber Operations missions?

3.

Is global plug and play merely an enabler or a critical capability to the
warfighter?

4.

What changes in acquisition policy will enable the rapid fielding of
COTS solutions to the warfighter while still ensuring the products
delivered are capable of operating in the intended environment?

Homeland Security:
1.

Identify the physical, cultural, and legal barriers that prevent the
sharing of information in classified networks and databases among
DoD, other federal agencies, and state governments? What changes
need to be made to enable information sharing?

2.

Assess the current and future use of biometrics technologies for
identity management in support of the war on terrorism.

3.

Communications support. In reference to the Active Army (Title X)
providing national disaster support, what are the challenges of a
Title X agency providing support in the Title XXXII (National Guard)
environment, and what are some potential solutions to overcoming
these legal barriers? What should be the role of the new 7th Army
Signal Command Theater in CONUS as it relates to Homeland
Security?

4.

How should spectrum be managed in light of military and interagency
needs and priorities?
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III.

IV.

Regional Strategic Issues:
1.

Western Hemisphere, specifically CONUS. Assess the roles and
missions of NORTHCOM in light of the war on terror and recent
regional natural disasters.

2.

Is it practical to achieve theater network architecture in CONUS,
similar to that found in the OCONUS theaters with all the elements
of the institutional Army and generating force operating in CONUS?
What should the construct be to deliver Army Enterprise Services
effectively?

Military Change:
1.

How can the Army achieve a balance between the needs of nearterm information technology insertion requirements and long-range
investment strategy?

2.

Achieve DoD’s netcentricity vision of assured access sharing of
information, and collaboration, in light of the cultural biases among
people and organizations to control information.

3.

Data Strategy: What are upcoming on the horizon methods, protocols
and techniques that will aid in achieving national data standards to
accomplish true interoperability between inter- and intra-service, joint
and coalition command and control systems?

4.

Knowledge Management Strategy: What steps must the Army take
to create a culture of collaboration where good ideas are valued and
rewarded with the ultimate aim of creating a knowledge enabled
force?

5.

How can the Army rapidly leverage the latest commercial wireless
technology to expand the network down to the soldier—latest 802.11
series, 802.16, 802.20, and 802.21?

6.

Currently IT is spread across all of the Program Executive Group
(PEG) with ineffective governance at the CIO level. Should the Army
create an Information Technology or Network PEG?
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V.

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.

What are the implications of migrating everything over Internet
Protocol (EoIP)?

2.

Soldier vs contractor operated and maintained tactical equipment.
Are the new soldier systems so “high tech” that we cannot fight wars
without contractors on the battlefield?

3.

Should every soldier be equipped with a hand-held radio, cell phone
or Personal Data Assistant (PDA) on the battlefield?

4.

What is the impact of high tech IT equipment on recruiting the next
generation of soldiers and civilians? How can the Army retain rising
stars rather than lose them to competitors/industry?

5.

Are commercial-off-the-shelf IT solutions actually putting warfighters
at risk as globalization expands the IT market?

6.

What impact will CAC-restricted networks have on the Army’s
extended family (retirees and family members) in terms of personnel
services? Will this cause a secondary impact on the QOL of deployed
Soldiers?

7.

Will implementation of thin client technology launch the Army closer
toward achieving a total net-centric environment or cause regression
back to the age of mini-computers?

VI.	Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
1.

What is the future of telecommuting in the Army and its implications
on performance and productivity?

2.

On Shore, Off Shore. Where should the United States invest human
capital in technology?

3.

Every soldier is a shooter-sensor-communicator. Is the training and
compensation commensurate with the requirements and expectations?
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Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8
POC: LTC Karla Briscke (703) 695-7406
Karla.Briscke@us.army.mil
1.

How do we determine an Army investment strategy, appropriately defined,
that is most likely to succeed in a competitive market across the Services and
on Capitol Hill?

2.

How can the Army synchronize JCIDS and Army capabilities (either
organizational or system specific) to analyze acquisition and programs of
record that are feasible, affordable, and sustainable?

3.

Are the current JCIDS products and decision points adequate to facilitate
synchronization with acquisition and programming?

4.

How could the JCAs be incorporated into the POM to better link the Army’s
organization into the Joint decisionmaking process?

5.

How do we incorporate supplemental programs into the PPBE process to
ensure sustainment of these rapid initiatives across the program and in the
Force File?

6.

What are the implications of a continuous resource process vice the current
POM process?

7.	How does the defense transformation affect force management?
8.

What is the role of the force management officer in stabilization, humanitarian,
peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency missions?

9.

What should be the force management doctrine for expeditionary operations or
for the Future Fforce?

10.

What is the changing role of force management functions within the RC?

11.

How do FA50s (Force Management Officers) integrate combat capabilities?

12.

What is the ideal mission, roles, functions and structure of the Force Management
Division (FMD) in the ASCC?

13.

How does ARFORGEN affect the duties of the Force Management Officer at the
strategic level?
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14.

What adjustments or adaptations must the Army make to address the changes
required in the force management processes as the role of the Generating Force
becomes more operational?

15.

What are the best modular packages for the Army, and how are we going to use
them?
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Joint Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5
POC: LTC Sewaphorn (Noy) Rovira (703) 695-6515
Sewaphorn.rovira@js.pentagon.mil
1.

By what metrics should progress in the war on terror be measured?

2.

What are the policies and actions the U.S. Government needs to establish and
support in order to shape conditions for regional security?

3.

When regional security fails, what are the policies and actions the U.S.
Government needs to establish (process and procedures) to achieve rapid
building and sustaining of coalitions?

4.

What should be the long-term strategy for Iraq?

5.

What should be the long-term strategy for North Korea?

6.

What should be the long-term strategy for India/Pakistan?

7.

Would an interagency “Goldwater-Nichols-type” initiative enhance
integration of all U.S. Government elements of power? What would such a
program or process look like?

8.

How can we better focus U.S. Government long-term security assistance
efforts? Currently there is no coherent focused methodology for coordinating
security assistance efforts and resources across the interagency arena based
on U.S. Government priorities.

9.

What should long-term U.S.-Russia strategic relations look like?

10.

What should long-term U.S.-European Union relations look like?

11.

Has the post-9/11 government reorganization been effective? Are we safer
and more effective in countering threats to national security as a result of the
establishment of DHS/NCTC/NC/HSC/ODNI, et al.?

12.

How effective is interagency IA coordination in responding to the terrorist
threat? Is there a need for Goldwater-Nichols type legislation to spur IA
coordination?
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United States Africa Command
POC: COL Tom Galvin 011-49-711-729-4992
Thomas.galvin@africom.mil
I.

II.

Global War on Terror:
1.

What areas are appropriate to synergize the efforts to counter
international terrorism with those efforts to counter international drug
trafficking?

2.

What sources of funding exist to support terrorism and what could/
should the Army do to reduce them?

3.

What should the Army/Joint community be doing to proactively affect
emergence of terrorist environments?

4.

The emerging north-south clashes between Muslim and Christian
segments of society within trans-Sahel and some sub-Saharan nations

5.

Is there a clash of perspectives between our focus on the Global War on
Terror and the priority placed by our partners on other security issues
(human security in Africa)?

6.

Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and its impacts on regional stability

Economic Development:
1.	Security issues and challenges impacting oil-producing countries
2.

Diamonds, gold, etc.—Competition for access to Africa’s mineral
wealth and the use of that wealth to finance armed movements from
the warlord to state level.

3.

How, when, and where to invest in air safety infrastructure (airports,
radar, communications nodes, etc.)

4.

Optimizing air transport in Africa (cargo, personnel) either
intracontinent or intercontinent
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III.

Regional Security Challenges:
1.

Prospects for continued conflict in Darfur and the Sudan/Chad border
regions, and its impacts on Chadian domestic security

2.	African contributions to peacekeeping operations
3.

Long-term regional security impacts of the growth or nongrowth
of African regional organizations such as the Maghreb Arab Union,
COMESSA, ECOWAS, etc.

4.	Libya’s future security role in the African Union
5.	Security interests by North African states in Sub-Saharan Africa.

IV.

6.

Border control efforts by North African and Sahelian states (to combat
trafficking in arms, humans, drugs, etc.).

7.

Mediterranean security issues and North African states (illegal
emigration, smuggling, etc.)

8.

Impacts of drought or other environmental stressors on Saharan and
Sahelian security

9.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs in
Africa: successes, failures, and lessons learned

10.

The Swahili coast and Mozambique—a strategic maritime corridor

11.

Assessment of Regional Economic Commission efforts (e.g., ECOWAS)
at peacekeeping efforts in Africa

Third-Party Interests in Africa:
1.	Chinese security and economic agendas in Africa
2.	Inian security and economic agendas in Africa
3.	Russian security and economic agendas
in Africa
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V.

4.

Future changes in the Euro-Meditteranean (or “Barcelona”) process,
and their impact on North Africa

5.

Bilateral security cooperation between European and North African
states (e.g., Italy-Libya, France-Algeria)

6.

Impacts of relationships between former colonial powers and their
colonies as they affect U.S. national interests

7.

Successes, failures, and lessons learned from intergovernmental
interventions in Africa (e.g., World Bank activities)

Societal-Cultural Issues in Africa:
1.	The future of Arab nationalism in North Africa
2.

Inflaming ethnic animosities to instill fear and solicit support for
unscrupulous leaders

3.

Breaking the cycle of corruption in Africa

4.

Balancing the trade-offs between maintaining stabilizing relationships
with long-standing authoritarians versus the push to democratize
Africa

VI.	African Military and Building Security Capacity:
1.

Security impact of improved LOCs (highways, air routes, etc.) within
Africa (e.g., between North and Sub-Saharan Africa)

2.

Evolution of professionalism in African militaries

3.

The future of force modernization in African military forces (ground or
naval)

4.

Do African nations need highly-capable air forces and for what?
Border security? Peacekeeping? Maritime security support?

5.

Information sharing and interoperability among African military
forces and their respective European and Trans-Atlantic partners
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VII.

6.

Can AU, UN, and EU peacekeeping operations mature enough to
improve stability over the next seven years in Africa’s hot spots?

7.

Public health capacity in African countries and militaries

8.

Are efforts to address HIV/AIDS among southern African militaries
doing any good? What can be done?

National Issues:
1.

Central African Republic: How to end the strife and build a foundation
for lasting peace

2.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Options for extending government
control throughout its large land mass and attaining a peaceful
solution to conflict in the eastern region

3.

Ethiopia/Eritrea: Finding solutions that help prevent a border war

4.

Kenya: Lessons learned from the post-election crisis

5.

Libya: Impacts of the succession of Qadhafi on Libyan allies and aid
recipients

6.

Nigeria: A looming failed state?

7.

Somalia: What are the dynamics leading to state collapse and what
internal and external factors are required for stability and state
building?

8.

South Africa: Implications of the success or failure of the 2010 World
Cup on overall African security, stability, and development

9.

Sudan: Implications of the potential north-south break-up of Sudan

10.

Western Sahara: How to resolve the territorial dispute and impacts on
the region

11.

Zimbabwe: Way ahead post-Mugabe
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VIII.

U.S. Africa Command:
1.

Achieving long-term objectives in Africa while balancing demands for
“quick wins” by the command’s stakeholders

2.

The interagency structure of the command, its applicability in other
unified commands, and its impacts on other U.S. government agencies

3.

Partnering with international organizations, non-governmental
or private volunteer organizations, or private industry to achieve
objectives

4.

Implications of the command’s emphasis of “Phase Zero”1 operations
as it affects traditional campaign planning processes and other
common joint business practices

1. The term “Phase Zero” is not popular with the command. A pending article on “Active
Security” seeks to provide an alternative approach and definition.
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United States Central Command
POC: Lt Col Phillip Devoe (813) 827-4389
devoep@centcom.mil
GLOBAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES
I.

Global War on Terror:
1.	The role of the nationstate in the war on terror
2.

Balancing democratic reform and internal security: Short- and longterm implications for the war on terror. Transition to democracy is a
fragile and often unstable period—what level of instability is expected
and/or tolerable when transitioning from an autocratic regime to a
democratic form of government? General and specific [individual
nationstate] case studies

3.

Countering ideological support for terrorism through domestic and
foreign means

4.

Implications of expanding war on terror to state-sponsored terror
groups: Iran and the Lebanonese Hizballah

5.

The role of the war of ideas, especially radical religious ideas, in the
war on terror

6.

The role of perception management as it relates to worldwide
perceptions of U.S. power and actions

7.

Lessons from the “War on Drugs” that apply to the war on terror

8.

Evaluation of U.S. SOCOM’s, USSTRATCOM’s, and USJFCOM’s roles
in the war on terror

9.

Is there a need for a “strategic” counterinsurgency doctrine? Are there
separate principles for “strategic” COIN?

10.

Balancing political, economic, and military tools in counterinsurgency
operations
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II.

11.

What should be the military role in the collection of foreign intelligence
in areas of interest and the linkage to, and collaboration with,
nonmilitary collection?

12.

Developing a “whole of government” approach to counterinsurgency

13.

Developing and assessing the importance of strategic communication

14.

Balancing the principle of war associated with Mass against the
implicit vulnerability associated with convoys and logistics

Military Change:
1.	Future force capacities for peacekeeping and stability operations

2.	Evaluating the themes in the Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance:
a.
Assessing force proficiencies against irregular challenges
		
b.	Assessing force capabilities for stability operations
3.

 esource conflicts between operational and institutional
R
transformation

4.

Assessing the capabilities and allocation of resources of U.S.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets associated with
counterinsurgency operations

5.	Reducing U.S. military dependence on foreign energy sources
III.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
1.

Integrating military and nonmilitary tools to achieve strategic
objectives and avoid or resolve potential conflict

2.

The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st
century

3.

Responding to the collapse of strategically significant states

4.

Long-term Stability, Support, Reconstruction and Transition (SSTR)
Operations
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5.

Examining the relationship between energy and security

6.

Mapping “whole of government” National Implementation Plan
activities and responsibilities to National Security Strategy objectives
and effects

7.	Interagency strategy for transnational insurgency
8.
		
		

Improving the planning and execution of national strategy for the war
on terror:
a.
Structure
b.
Process

9.	An update of the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols
10.
		
		

11.
IV.

Operationalizing the interagency process—converting policy decisions
to interagency operations:
a.
Role of the Joint Staff and role of the Combatant Command staff
in interagency integration and planning
b.
Integration of other Executive Branch Departments (DoS,
DoJ, DoT, etc.) into security operations (planning phase and
operational phase)
Role of strategic communications in prosecuting activities in
USCENTCOM AOR

Landpower Employment:
1.	Requirements for counterinsurgency operations
2.

Conducting combat operations, security operations, and stability
operations concurrently: how to transition, where to focus?

3.

Changing landpower roles in stabilization, reconstruction, and
humanitarian operations:
a.
Information and intelligence sharing between military and
coalition partners
b.
Integrating military and civilian logistics
c.
Definitions and policies for establishing a “safe and secure”
environment

		
		

4.

Improving joint, combined, interagency, NGO and IGO cooperation in
humanitarian and counterinsurgency operations
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5.
		
		
		
		
		
V.

Evaluation and recommendations for individual and collective cultural
awareness training in support of COIN/stability mission deployments:
a.
Precommissioning, especially language requirements and
major/minor fields (area studies, history, international relations)
b.
PME (especially ILE, SSC, JPME)
c.
NCOES
d.
Predeployment collective training
e.
Feasibility/desirability of establishing advisor training similar to
that used for personnel assigned to advisory duty in the RVN

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.

Changing requirements versus legal constraints for military and
interagency mobilization

2.	Globalization’s impact on the military-industrial base
3.	Planning for operations in areas with primitive and austere
infrastructures
4.	Adapting the Reserve Components to continuous mobilization
VI.	Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
1.

Developing forces and doctrine for security cooperation, assurance,
dissuasion, and deterrence

2.	Developing soldiers and leaders for the future force
3.	Examining the pre-commissioning program
REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
VII.	Evolving Regional Security Matters in North Africa, the Middle East, and the
Islamic World:
1.	U. S. interests with respect to a stable, sovereign Iraq
2.	Regional security strategies in the Middle East and North Africa
3.

The nature of politically-oriented Islamic militancy, Salafi Jihadism,
and their implications for U.S. and regional security
67

4.

Efforts to contain and moderate violent ethnic and sectarian conflicts
throughout the Middle East

5.

The ability of willing states to control the flow of illicit trade, weapons,
and people across borders

6.

The ability of willing states to control ungoverned territory

7.

The implications of the youth bulge and options for expanding
economic opportunities with respect to the youth bulge

8.

With the coming uncertainty in Egypt, what are the possible scenarios
in a post-Mubarak Egypt, and what can be done to help shape and
contain the uncertainty?

9.

What will violent extremists look like in the future? And what are the
trends and influence opportunities?  (taking into account 2nd and 3rd
order effects)

10.

How will the shifting demographics (i.e. the “youth bulge”) in the
Middle East/Central Command AOR affect the region over the next 20
and 50 years?

11.

Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation (EM). Is it the new national
security strategy for Pakistan? Arguably, all major policy priorities are
related to Musharraf’s vision of enlightened moderation (economy,
education, political reform, economic development, western influence,
federalization of tribal areas in NWFP and Baluchistan). Is EM more
than just a path to moderate Islam for Musharraf?

12.	The strategy and future role of the PRC in Central and SW Asia
13.	The strategy and future role of India in Central and SW Asia
14.	The strategy and future role of Russia in Central and SW Asia
15.

Analysis of the interrelationships of the logistic train for narcotics
trafficking, WMD, weapons, and people trafficking

16.

Developing a democracy in the Middle East in the 21st century: What
roles should the military play?
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17.

Viability and implications of an OSCE-like organization/process for
the Gulf Region (to include Iran and Iraq)

18.

Given limited U.S. resources, is a “pivotal states” strategy for the AOR
feasible and acceptable?

19.

Plans, programs, and policies to help Pakistan, KSA, and Egypt help
themselves:
a.
Military
b.
Economic
c.
Political

		
		
		
20.
		
		
		
		
		
		

Nuclear Iran:
a.
Ways to deter going nuclear
b.
What is Iranian strategy following the achievement of nuclear
capability to do if/when Iran does go nuclear?
c.
How do Iran’s neighbors react in terms of capabilities?
d.
Strategy for deterring Iran following its achievement of nuclear
capability
e.
What does a nuclear weapon capable Iran look like? How does
the international community react/respond?
f.
If Iran does acquire a nuclear weapon, how does the
international community ensure these weapons do not
proliferate, either intentionally or unintentionally?
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United States European Command
POC: LCDR David Walt DSN 314-430-7930
David.Walt@eucom.mil.
I.

Global War on Terror:
What methods are most appropriate for breaking the synergy between
international terrorism and international drug trafficking?

2.

What sources of funding exist to support terrorism and what could/
should the Army do to reduce them?

3.

What should the Army be doing to proactively affect emergence of
terrorist environments?

4.

Terrorism:
a.	The spread of Islamic fundamentalism within Europe
b.
How nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are used to
provide funding to terrorist groups
c.
Iranian intelligence’s use of NGOs to conduct intelligence
activities
d.
Case study: Iranian intelligence double agent operations against
other intelligence services
e.
How Iranian intelligence uses businesses to conduct intelligence
activities
f.
How Iranian intelligence uses businesses to forward dual use
technology to Iran
g.
Is Iran trying to build a nuclear bomb and how close is it?
h.
What level of cooperation is the IRGC/QF, MOIS and senior
leadership of the Iranian theocracy giving to the terrorists in Iraq
i.
Case Study: How the Iranians have quelled internal opposition
since the 1979 revolution and ended with the disqualification of
thousands of reformist parliamentarian candidates in February
2004
j.
Iranian dissident operations (assassinations, intimidation,
infiltration) around the world since 1979
k.
MOIS and IRGC/QF support to the Palestinian rejectionist
groups and Hizballah
l.
Will Israel attack the Iranian nuclear facilities as they did with
the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in the early 1980s?

		
		

1.
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II.

Eurasia:
1.	Generational changes of attitude in the Caucasus
2.	Long-term Iranian interests and objectives in the Caucasus
3.

Crime networks in any or all: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Armenia

4.

Corruption networks in any or all: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Armenia

5.

Progress toward and prospects for European or NATO integration for:
Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan

6.

Russia-Asia relations (especially China)

7.	Implications of Russian demographic changes
III.

Balkans:
1.

Role of Serbia in regional stability

2.

Impact of Kosovo final status on Balkan stability

3.

Influence of Islamic extremism in Bosnia-Herzegovina

4.	Impact of Albanian nationalism on regional stability
5.

Influence of Islamic extremism in Kosovo and Macedonia

6.	Threat of Balkan organized crime on Europe
7.	Future stability of Kostunica minority government in Serbia
8.

Influence of organized crime on Balkan society

9.	Integration of Balkan States into EU and NATO structures
10.	Impact of Union of Serbia-Montenegro split on regional stability
11.

Influence of organized crime on Albanian governmental institutions
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12.	Role of clan demographics on Kosovo and Albanian democratic
		
institutions
13.	Future of Dayton implementation by EUFOR on Bosnia-Herzegovina
14.
IV.

V.

The role of Albanian transnational crime and drug trafficking
organizations in regional stability.

Kurds (Kongra Gel/PKK):
1.

Case study of the potential impact and implications, both to Turkey
and to the Kongra Gel/PKK, of the transition of the Kongra Gel from
an insurgency to a political movement supporting the Kurdish cause

2.

Case study of factors enabling the Kongra Gel, as a Marxist insurgency
made up of primarily of Muslims, to mitigate pressures to adopt more
of a radical Islamic agenda and maintain its focus on the basic Marxist
(secular) tenets of the organization

3.

Case study of Kongra Gel/PKK insurgency from the basis of its ability
to avoid/prevent serious schisms or splintering, even after its leader’s
imprisonment, at least up to the current potential split. What are the
potential implications of the apparent division of the Kongra Gel into
“reformist” and “hardline” camps?

4.

Case study of the effectiveness of Turkish Jandarma paramilitary
police forces in combating the Kongra Gel/PKK

5.

Case study of the effectiveness of Turkish military operations against
the Kongra Gel/PKK inside northern Iraq from the 1990s to present.
Were these operations successful in disrupting the KGK/PKK, for
the long term, short term, or has there been little actual disruption to
Kongra Gel operations?

NATO:
1.	Should NATO have a JIC-like organization?

 	

2.

		
 	

In a peacetime environment, how can NATO best provide intelligence
for out of area operations?
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3.

Role of U.S. intelligence support to EU and Eurocorps in and out of
NATO operations

4.

Future application of bilateral/multilateral intelligence systems in
EUCOM AOR to support existing information sharing agreements as
well as the war on terrorism

5.

Cross-command intelligence security cooperation (engagement) in an
increasingly complex allied/coalition environment

6.

The impact of NATO expansion on the intelligence/information
sharing environment of old members

7.

Moving NATO intelligence beyond reliance on the member nations:
NATO collection assets needed?

8.

Multinational coalition intelligence architectures and intelligence
sharing: How do/should NATO, CENTCOM, ISAF, interact?

9.

NATO Intelligence: Does it function?

10.

Intelligence sharing with NATO partners in non-NATO and out-ofarea operations

11.

Intelligence support to operations: How can NATO best do this?

12.

Develop a “dream” intelligence architecture and intelligence
community structure for the NATO of tomorrow; where should it be in
10 years?

13.

Assess the impact of demographic changes on the long-term viability
of NATO.

14.

What are the proper authorities and relationships among EUCOM,
NATO, the U.S. NMR to NATO, and the JS given the current security
environment?
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United States Army Europe (USAREUR) and 7th Army
COL Stephen M. Townsend DSN (314) 377-4151
stephen.townsend@us.army.mil
I.

NATO:
1.

What should the future NATO Command Structure look like? Should
Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), report
directly to SACEUR? What Joint Force and Component Commands are
required?

2.

How could NATO best adopt a joint/common users logistics structure
for expeditionary operations? Is overall common funding a desirable
future approach, or is the current national responsibility approach best
suited for expeditionary operations?

3.

Are the EU and NATO redundant or complementary?

4.

How does NATO avoid donor fatigue in Afghanistan? Is the concept
of minimum military requirement (MMR) still useful in articulating
capabilities requirements?

5.

What are the possible effects of Joint Task Force-East (JTF-East)
training rotations on the relationship between NATO and Russia?

6.

What effects could the renewed call by France for developing a
European Security and Defense Identity have on the NATO alliance?
Will Germany support this call?

7.

What effects do national caveats have on the success of NATO outof-area operations? How will adopting a two-tiered policy (those
countries that contribute forces for full-spectrum operations and
those that are not willing to provide soldiers for out-of-area combat
operations) affect the future success of the NATO alliance?

8.

What are the implications of including Russia in the NATO alliance?
Would including Russia in the alliance make NATO ineffective?
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II.

III.

Army Service Component Commands:
1.

Are our proposed ASCCs postured correctly to support the GCCs’
overall requirements to perform their three missions: be the Title
10/Theater ARFOR; provide Army Service Component Command
support; and being trained and ready to conduct expeditionary, full
spectrum operations and serve as a deployable C2 headquarters?

2.

Are ASCCs correctly structured and resourced to support GCCs’
theater security cooperation requirements?

3.

What size should the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) be
for AFRICOM? What difference in scope (if any) should the ASCC for
AFRICOM have from other ASCCs?

4.

Should the U.S. Army make do with a current available ASCC to
support AFRICOM, or establish a new command to provide the ASCC
support to AFRICOM?

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC):
1.

Are ASCCs correctly structured and resourced to support GCCs’
theater security cooperation requirements?

2.

What is the best way for the U.S. Army to inform Congress and the
American public about the importance of TSC engagement to build
today’s and tomorrow’s coalitions?

3.
		

What should be done to restructure the funding procedures for TSC
engagements between U.S. and allied military forces, in order to
increase existing multinational training opportunities?

IV.

Europe and Eurasia:
1.

What are the long-term security impacts on Europe from a resurgent
Russia?

2.

What are the long-term security impacts on Europe caused by
instability in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea region?
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V.

Information Operations:
1.

VI.

Are the resources the Army is investing in information operations
yielding commensurate gains? How can we assess the impact of
information operations on the operational and strategic environment?
Without a mature assessment capability for information operations,
are the potential/actual impacts upon operations tangible and worth
the cost?

Strategic Communications (StratComm):
1.

How well does the Army at large understand and leverage the
importance and impact of the media? What needs to change for the
Army to get its story out?

2.

What is the optimal structure/organization to develop strategic
communication (StratComm) at the HQDA/ASCC level (OCPA/PAO;
CIG/CAG; Operational Effects; combination)? What mechanisms are
best suited for dissemination of StratComm?

3.

What structure should the ASCCs have to conduct effects assessments
in conjunction with their StratComm programs?

VII.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

VIII.

1.

Does the State Department command the requisite authority in
forming U.S. foreign policy, or do the Geographic Combatant
Commanders hold more influence than perhaps is appropriate?

2.

Does the U.S. adequately address global economics and transnational
crime in its NSS/NMS?

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.

IX.

Life cycle cost/ total ownership cost versus commercial leasing for
ground support equipment or other soldier support items; is leasing a
viable option?

Global War on Terror:
1.

What motivates individuals and groups living in wealthy countries to
support terrorism, or to become terrorists?
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2.

What are the most likely targets of terrorist attacks in Europe? What
strategic objectives would the terrorists fulfill by attacking these
targets?

3.

What fault lines exist between cultures in Europe, and on the
periphery of Europe that are sources of current and future terrorist
attacks within USEUCOM AOR?
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United States Joint Forces Command (J-2)
POC: Gayn Borland, DSN 836-6155
gayn.borland@jfcom.mil
1.

Homeland Security: Explore the need for an enterprise National
Homeland Defense Plan (involving both interagency and DoD—
something akin to a National Response Plan).

2.

Leadership, Personnel Management and Culture: Examine the issue
of understanding cultural intelligence (CQ) and its implications in
conflict and the war on terrorism.

3.

Heating Up: Global warming and its implications on U.S. national
security and diplomacy

4.

Pros and Cons of establishing an intelligence community lessonslearned data base
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United States Army Forces Command
POC: COL Chris Reddish (404) 464-7135
christopher.reddish@us.army.mil
G-1 COL Anita Schmidt (404) 464-7327
Anita.Schmidt@forscom.army.mil
G-1 MED COL Steven Kenney (404)464-7355
steven.l.kenney@us.army.mil
G-4 Will Coleman (404)464-7406
william.l.coleman@us.army.mil
CRO John Hughes (404)464-5328
john.hughes5@us.army.mil
CSG COL Chris Reddish (404)464-7135
Chris.Reddish@forscom.army.mil
CSG Bob Johnson (404) 464-7333
Robert.Johnson2@forscom.army.mil
CSG Paula Kuzma (404) 464-7618
Kuzmap@forscom.army.mil
I.

Global War on Terror:
What doctrinal or technological “gaps” must be addressed to enhance
land power employment in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? (CSG)

2.

What are the limits of land power within the GWOT? (CSG)

3.

If future “winners” and “losers” in the GWOT will be defined by how
well the Joint Force, adversary states, or transnational terrorists can
deny, disrupt or destroy the domains /elements of the extended battle
space of “war amongst the people”(i.e., political, military, economic,
social structures):
a.
How must operational land forces change to ensure the Joint
Force “wins”?
b.
What can other elements of the USG do in advance to ensure a
U.S. victory?
c.
What holistic view of metrics or benchmarks should be utilized
to determine whether or not the Joint Force is “winning or
losing” within any of those domains? (CSG)

		

1.
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II.

III.

4.

To what extent does the Nation dedicate resources to develop a
“partner-nation capacity building” capability across the Services
generally and in the Army specifically? (CSG)

5.

How should DoD’s visualization of the GWOT complex operating
environment be changed? What are the more significant structural and
interactive elements of the GWOT operating environment? (CSG)

Homeland Security:
1.

Considering 9/11 as a terrorist probing effort, what lessons have been
learned by an adversary in preparation for the next attack? (CSG)

2.

What emerging capabilities can enhance mission effectiveness of
Army units committed for disaster relief, particularly in terms of
communication and relief supply distribution? (CSG)

3.

How can Department of Homeland Security requirements be best
integrated into overall Department of Defense planning end force
requirement identification processes? (CSG)

4.

What is the most flexible response capability DoD can engineer for
responding to catastrophic events in the homeland? What are the pros
and cons of a national vice a regional response force? (CSG)

5.

How can DoD optimize the sourcing, training, deployment, C2
relationships, and employment of special purpose forces (i.e. CBRNE)
in support of NORTHCOM? (CSG)

Regional Strategic Issues:
1.

How can the Army improve training of soldiers and units for language
and culture awareness and astuteness prior to deployment into
theaters of operation? (CSG)

2.

How do the Combatant Commands determine Army Support to
other Services (ASOS) and multinational organizations within their
respective AORs? (G-4)

3.

What can be done to rationalize and optimize the multiple and varying
LOGCAP contracts in SWA? (CSG)
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IV.

4.

Given the requirement for an enduring presence in SWA, how can the
theater architecture be rationalized to include the proper role of the
ARFOR and the theater sustainment effort? Identify impediments and
recommend solutions. (CSG)

5.

How can we meet theater security cooperation demands from other
Combatant Commanders while meeting the tremendous demands
in CENTCOM? Is there a role for other governmental agencies or
institutions to fill this requirement? (CSG)

Military Change:
1.

Develop the rationale that informs the national discourse regarding
the imperative to operationalize the Reserve Component in order to
preserve the All Volunteer Force and to restore operational depth and
strategic flexibility. (CSG)

2.

Propose a mechanism to “fast-track” policy and legislative changes
that are needed to match the contemporary use of the Reserve
Component across the Services. (CSG)

3.

What force management policies or practices must change in order
to reduce the number of DUICs created when meeting operational
requirements? (CSG)

4.

How must/will the Army adapt when the Congressional
supplementals end and funding the Army’s high priority programs
becomes problematic? What more can the Army do to facilitate a
successful transition of Supplemental funding to the base budget?
(CRO)

5.

In January 2007, the SECDEF established a 12 month mobilization
policy. Provide a cost benefit analysis of that policy. Include a
consideration of variables such as the requirement to deploy multiple
units in a 12-month period, family support, soldier readiness,
employer support as you deem appropriate. Provide recommended
policy changes. (CSG)

V.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
1.

If implemented, will the recommendations in the Final Report of
the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves result in
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reforms required to operationalize the Reserve Components? Which
recommendations could result in the required reforms and which
“miss the mark?” (CRO)

VI.

VII.

2.

How can other elements of the U.S. Government partner with DoD
(“whole of government”) to achieve victory post-conflict in emerging
democracies? (CSG) What is DoD’s responsibility to enable our
governmental partners to realize their role generally during Full
Spectrum Operations and specifically Phase 0 (Shaping) and Phase IV
(Stability) operations? Who should take the lead? (CSG)

3.

How can the Combatant Commander both increase and improve interagency involvement in combat operations in theater and in the Army’s
planning and exercise programs? (CSG)

Land Power Employment:
1.

What “gaps” must be addressed to enhance land power employment?
(CSG)

2.

Given the enhanced capabilities and the changing tactics and
operations of all actors (combatants, institutions and other instruments
of civil government, and indigenous and non-indigenous personnel) in
the current theater of war, how can this new complexity of warfare be
better handled by U.S. forces? (CSG)

3.

In preparation for employment in complex operational environments,
how can the U.S. Army improve decisionmaking approaches through
the use of simulations, gaming or other training concepts? (CSG)

Land Power Generation and Sustainment:
1.

Should Joint Staff validated combatant commander requirements drive
ARFORGEN output or Service force structure /end strength (should
the process be supply or demand driven)? (G-1)

2.

Is the Army modular organization sufficient? Is there a need
reconsider the BCT as the lowest level of modularity? Is there a need to
improve the modular design of support units? (G-1)

3.

What can the Army do to better prepare troops, especially those
in Basic Combat Training, for the rigors and reality of a combat
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environment? Discuss relevant techniques for providing realistic
“Resiliency Strengthening” in both the AC and ARNG the BCT
ARFORGEN Cycle. Suggest how to infuse these techniques along
with the concepts of “Stress Inoculation” into the immediate predeployment phase of troops deploying to the CENTCOM AOR? (G-1,
MED)
4.

Provide analysis of how Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) impact
“Return To Duty” statistics. Include discussion on how “Length
of Stay” in WTUs correlates to either return to duty or separation
from service, as well as how “Average Length of Stay” compared
to diagnosis in regard to return to duty or separation from service.
Provide recommendations on policy/practices required to mitigate
unwanted separations. Provide an assessment of the effectiveness of
the WTU and propose alternatives. (G-1, MED)

5.

How should FORSCOM and AMC optimally manage equipment
training sets in and out of ARFORGEN? Do we need new business
practices to better manage this process? (CSG)

6.

Can ARFORGEN be utilized to justify and obtain resources? (CSG)

7.

How can the CENTCOM theater ARFOR effectively reduce stock piles
of equipment requiring retrograde to CONUS? (G4)

8.

How can the Army improve unit readiness through responsive
equipping strategies given the high operations tempo (current
operations, modularity equipment requirements, and future
operations)? (G4)

9.

Suggest how the Army Staff might reconcile establishing resource
priorities by rationalizing the proposed Joint Integrated Requirements
Priority List, the IRPL and DARPL? (CSG)

10.

How can the Army better integrate and synchronize the Army
Campaign Plan and ARFORGEN? (CSG)

11.

How could the Reserve Components best utilize TTHS accounts to
improve manning levels in operational units and to reduce the practice
of cross-leveling personnel in order to meet required unit manning
levels for mobilization? (CSG)
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VIII.	Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
1.
2.

IX.

What policy or personnel management practices must be changed in
order to significantly reduce the practice of cross-leveling personnel in
order to meet required unit manning levels for mobilization? (CSG)
Should the Department of Defense pursue forcing functions to limit
the growth in number and size of Joint Manning Documents? (CSG)

3.

How has transformation impacted Army traditions and culture
(change of command, reception operations, division HQ on different
deployment schedule than attached BCTs)? How has engagement in
protracted conflict facilitated and/or improved our transformational
efforts? (CSG)

4.

Is the operational Army structured to manage contracting while
deployed? (CSG)

5.

What can the Army do to improve company grade officer/noncommissioned officer retention? (CSG)

War and Society:
1.

In recognition of the assumption that the Nation will be in a condition
of persistent irregular conflict for a generation, what should the Army
do today to shape national security strategy to preclude a downsizing
of the U.S. Army that has followed the conclusion of all major
conflicts? (CSG)

2.

Has the Army fully transformed from Industrial-Age to InformationAge warfare? (CSG)

3.

What government incentives could be provided to encourage
employers to hire RC soldiers? How can the Army better “market” the
potential a RC soldier brings to a business in terms of productivity and
profitability given cyclical deployments under ARFORGEN? (CSG)
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North American Aerospace Defense Command
and United States Northern Command
POC: Robert H. Bogart (719) 554-0767
Robert.bogart.ctr@northcom.mil
J1 Mr. Roy (719) 556-0800
J2 Mr. John Schoch (719) 554-8500
J35 Ms. Cook (719) 556-0305; Mr. Winslow (719) 554-2283
J37 Mr. Reed (719) 556-8227
J5 Barry Cardwell (719) 554-2202
J6 LTC Ibarra (719) 554-4931
J7 Dr. Polson (719) 554-7182
J8 Mr. Evans (719) 554-6375
IC: Ms. Clymer; Mr. Loos (719) 556-0849
Standing Joint Force Headquarters—North: CDR Weaver (719) 554-7149
1.

How can DoD contribute to the ongoing traditional counterterrorism
coalition given that civil authorities (intelligence and law enforcement
services) have the lead role and have done the most post-9/11 work
to counter terrorists’ threats to the Homeland? Can DoD make a valid
contribution to these agencies while prosecuting the war on terror in
Afghanistan and Iraq?

2.

While we focus on tracking the vessel as a first step in Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA), what is required to track cargo and people? What is
required to determine the intent?

3.

What challenges would be involved in accepting Mexico into NORAD?

4.

How can the DoD influence the development of, effectively participate in,
and leverage the capabilities of the National Command and Coordination
Capability (NCCC) to ensure effective mission accomplishment?

5.

How can the U.S. Government, in cooperation with Canada and Mexico,
establish a North American Cyber Safe Zone, as detailed in the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, in order to protect commerce and promote
security in the region?

6.

What should the intelligence fusion capability between Canada, the United
States, and Mexico look like?
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7.

What are the consequences and/or benefits of changing the current
intelligence culture of “need to know” to a culture of “need to share”?

8.

NORAD has operated binationally in the air and space domain for 50 years.
With the establishment of USNORTHCOM and Canada Command looking
at similar Areas of Responsibility there is necessary interaction among the
three commands. Is there benefit in making NORAD more domain-inclusive
as a bi-national command (pick up maritime defense responsibilities, land
responsibilities, one or both)?

9.

Should NORAD dissolve and have USNORTHCOM and Canada Command
operate bilaterally in mutual support in all domains? What laws or policies
need to be adjusted or created for success?

10.

Climate change in the Arctic Ocean portends increased access to a
strategically-important region that borders the United States. Additional
international activity in the region to pursue economic, military, and political
aims suggests a future requirement for U.S. forces to operate routinely in
the region to conduct search and rescue, surveillance, and force projection
missions. Currently, the U.S. espouses no explicit policy regarding the Arctic
to guide military preparedness. What considerations should comprise the
framework of a coherent U.S. National Security Policy/Strategy regarding
the Arctic?

11.

According to current strategy and policy, homeland defense is a global
mission applied over an active layered defense, from the forward regions to
the homeland. All geographic combatant commanders, in the execution of
their responsibilities, are defending the homeland. Given this description,
what is the difference between homeland defense and national defense?

12.

How can Title 10 and Title 32 forces better achieve unity of effort in U.S. Civil
Support (CS) Operations?

13.

The Commission on National Guard and Reserves made several
recommendations regarding Title 10 force employment by the State
Governors during disaster relief operations. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of these recommendations?

14.

Should the National Guard paradigm be modified to restructure it to have
primary responsibility for CS operations? If so, what role should the Active
duty forces perform for CS operations?
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15.

What role, if any, should the Department of Homeland Security play with
respect to the National Guard?

16.

Identify the new technologies used by terrorist organizations, within
their cultural context, to facilitate the spread of their cause and draw new
recruits to their cause. Are current actions taken by the U.S. mitigating these
technologies? How does the use of these technologies differ between terrorist
organizations in U.S. versus those in developing countries?

17.

Seven years after 9/11, are USNORTHCOM and Department of Homeland
Security the right solution to provide U.S. homeland defense and security?
How might they be changed, adjusted or reorganized to improve their
effectiveness? Is there a better alternative to these two organizations?

18.

What is the proper role for DoD in providing support to civil authorities
for special events or in response to natural disasters? Is current policy in
providing support within the National Response Framework satisfactory?
Should DoD acquire capabilities for civil support (currently prohibited by
DoD policy) or should Homeland Security organizations such as DHS/
FEMA take the lead in this direction?

19.

Should the NGB be an operational command? What issues, such as unity of
command and unity of effort, would an operational NGB face conducting
multi-state domestic operations when each State National Guard force
is under the command and control of their respective State Governor? Is
NGB’s relationship with the NG of the several states optimal? How could
it be improved? Should the NG be transformed to focus on civil support/
emergency management (transfer warfighting capability to the Reserves) and
aligned with DHS? Would this solve the problem of training, equipping, and
organizing for two separate missions?

20.

How does the U.S. Government best organize for and execute the War of
Ideas (Strategic Communication)?

21.

Canadian Forces (CF) and Other Government Agencies (OGA) such as
Transport Canada have a responsibility for Maritime traffic as does the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and
the U.S. Navy (USN). Should all stakeholders pursue a common operational
picture of MDA for both the defense and security missions?

22.

High Altitude Platforms. Which platforms (high altitude airship, tethered
aerostat, other) meet NORAD and USNORTHCOM needs for a system
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to provide an emergency communications and/or wide area surveillance
capability during incident awareness and response?
23.

Capabilities-Based Assessment Methodology. Develop a methodology that
can be used in a standard CBA.
a.
What method should be used to estimate capability levels, gaps, and
excesses?
b.
How can disparate capabilities and their gaps be compared?
c.
How can this comparison be translated into a ranking of the capability
gaps regarding their importance?

24.

Command Risk Assessment Process. What are the implications and
interactions between the Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA) Process and the
Global Force Management (GFM) risk assessment?
a.	What, if any, are the defensible quantitative facets to risk assessment?
b.	How can the qualitative risk assessment facets be better articulated?
c.
How should the formalized risk assessment actions between the CRA
and GFM be defined and executed?
d.
How should differences in the CRA and the GFM be adjudicated?

25.

DoD Policy toward Civil Support. What are the benefits and limitations of
changing DoD policy to allow DoD to acquire capability solely to support
civil authorities?

26.

What threat does an empowered China, with significant and growing
economic and military capabilities, present to the United States and what are
the implications for NORAD and USNORTHCOM?

27.

What are the integrated responsibilities (Interagency, Active and Reserve
Components, and National Guard) for CBRNE incident assessment,
management, and response regarding C2 structure, timelines, capabilities,
requirements, etc.?
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United States Pacific Command
POC: COL Steve Mullins (808) 477-7588
steve.mullins@pacom.mil
The USPACOM list addresses some issues at the Tier 0 level which directly affect
us as a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). The remainder of the issues are
organized along the PMESIIE construct, first at the region-wide level, then at subregional level, as they apply.
USG TIER 0 ISSUES
I.

Interagency Process:
1.

How can we make it work at the national level to provide the needed
unified guidance to the departments and DoD GCCs?

2.

Is it feasible to establish “supported” and “supporting” interagency
departments?

3.

Unified Action: Can we / do we need to geographically align the
interagency’s subregions across the world?

4.

Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review: What should it fix/change?
How can we align it with other Interagency roles and missions? Can
DoD revise ours unilaterally?

5.

Measuring Crisis Management: What could be some qualitative and
quantitative approaches to evaluate programs and strategies during
complex, whole-of-government, multinational disaster management
activities?

6.

Handing off the ball: Explain the dynamics and challenges in
transitioning authorities/ responsibilities at various disaster stages,
from chaos and insecurity to full restoration of “normal” government.

7.

Analyze best practices in complex disaster management - East Timor,
Solomon Islands and Banda Aceh. Generate a comparative framework
for assessing elements of success across other cases.
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II.	Common Understanding of Our Strategic Environments:
1.

Common Terms of Reference. Do we need a common taxonomy to
describe global and regional trends? How does the lack of one hinder
our analyses and estimates?

2.

Globally shared estimates. How can we link strategic estimates? How
can we move from hard copy estimates to living, virtual, interactive
ones?

3.

Centers of Excellence. There is no standard. What should it be? Who
is the expert reach-back authority on what? How can we formalize,
define the scope of, and designate “Centers of Excellence”?

4.	Policies. What should be the U.S. energy security strategy—WRT Asia?
PACOM TIER I STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ISSUES
DIME Considerations
I.

Military:
1.

How should PACOM integrate its actions with international
organizations and NGOs?

2.	Should/how can PACOM actually generate interagency OPLANs?
3.	What might PACOM’s future (2020) military requirements be:
a.
OPTEMPO requirements?
b.
Force posture/access needs?
c.	Future CSL or FOS needs? How will we determine them?

		
		
		

4.

How can PACOM best help explain and justify our presence as a
member of Asia-Pacific?

5.

Design the “model U.S.” fleet for operating in the Asia Pacific region in
2025. What would this fleet look like?

6.

What are the prospects of a heightened U.S. military presence in East
Asia beyond 2015?

90

II.

Information:
1.

Universalization of strategic communication (public diplomacy) in the
21st century: Who has the advantage today? Can USPACOM get/stay
out front?

2.

How can we manage expectations during crisis management—the
interplay between government, media and publics.

PMESIIE Considerations
I.

Political:
1.

What might be the security implications (probability and consequence)
to PACOM or the region?
a.	The future and utility of the ASEAN Regional Forum?
b.	Any change in security alliances among various Asian states?
c.
The accession/growth of influence of key nations into regional
security alliances
d.
If the U.S. does not conduct effective strategic communications
with partners
e.	Potential emergence of a different ideology

2.

What governmental trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Which Asian states could fail?
b.	Which Asian states could democratize?

		
		
3.
		
		
		
		
		
4.
		

What political stability trends (probability and consequence) will
impact upon PACOM or the region?
a.	Market instability degrades ability to govern?
b.	Politically disenfranchised indigenous populations?
c.
Nonparticipatory governance?
d.
Transnational crime organizations? Assess trends and propose a
regional response.
e.
Resource nationalism impact on international business relations
between states?
What ethical trends (probability & consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.
Willingness/ability of states to address human trafficking?
b.	Willingness/ability of states to address corruption?
c.
Erosion of public confidence in governments?
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5.
		
		
II.

Military/Conflict:
1.

		
		
		
		
		
		
2.
		
		

III.

What geopolitical trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Russia’s actions in Asia?
b.	Chinese checkbook diplomacy without strings?

What conflict related trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.	Emergence of new anti-U.S. Governments?
b.	Emergence of rogue powers, terrorist networks?
c.	Continued low-tech threats from nonstate actors?
d.
Hi-tech threats from nonstate actors?
e.
Agreement on confidence and security building measures
(CSBMs)?
f.	Successful border security among nations?
g.
The risks to international trade in ethnic, sectarian and religious
conflicts?
What military related trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Formation of an alliance and coalition that includes adversaries
who oppose U.S. interests?
b.	Effective interoperability between states in the region?
c.
Which Asian militaries will significantly improve
professionalism?

Economic:
1.

		
		
		
		
		
		

What economic trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.
States’ economic policies and sustainable growth that addresses
poverty and income equality?
b.
Persistent economic obstacles to democratization among our
partners?
c.
Transnational market instability/market crash?
d.
States’ fiscal discipline or lack thereof?
e.
Competition for access to Africa’s energy?
f.
Instability from economically disenfranchised/impoverished
populations?
g.
Uncontrolled intra- or transnational economic migration?
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h.

Market instability and resulting impact on international business
investment?
i.
Persistence of corruption and impact on international business
investment
j.	Donation “fatigue” on the part of donor nations?

		
		
2.
		
		
		
		
		
IV.

What fiscal/budgetary trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Adequacy or inadequacy of nations’ defense/security spending
vs. investment?
b.
The “costs” of terrorism?
c.
The “costs” of corruption?
d.
The “costs” of illicit activities?
e.
The “costs” of energy dependency?

Social/Cultural:
1.

		
		
		
		
2.
		
		
		
3.
		
		
		
		

What demographic trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Rural-urban flight in unstable states?
b.	Growing gender imbalance in states such as China?
c.
Generational changes in attitudes?
d.	Demographic obstacles to democratization?
e.
Mass and/or persistent starvation?
What sociological trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Failure to curb human trafficking?
b.	Climate change that displaces peoples?
c.
Income disparity?
d.	Educational obstacles to democratization?
What cultural trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.	Indigenous religious extremism/fundamentalism?
b.	Externally/foreign sponsored Islamist movements?
c.
Ethnic/tribal/clan animosities that instill fear/solicit support for
unscrupulous leaders?
d.	Cultural obstacles to democratization?
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4.	How can PACOM work with multinational firms to encourage:
a.	Engaging in operations in failed states?
b.
Observing/enforcing human rights?
c.
Mitigating corruption?

		
		
		
V.

Informational:
1.

		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
VI.

What infosphere trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.	Proliferation and distribution of info technology in poorer states?
b.	Telecommunications expansion and ability to inform
population?
c.
Telecommunications expansion and inability of governments to
misinform populations?
d.
Impact upon PACOM’s Strategic Communication?
e.
Ability of PACOM to measure how well we are achieving our
desired Phase 0 effects?
f.
On democratic processes?
g.
Responsiveness and vulnerability to hi-tech state and nonstate
actor threats?
h.	Ability to mitigate adverse consequences of natural disasters?

Infrastructural:
1.

		
		
		
		
		
		
2.
		
		
		
		

What ground, air, or sea LOCs trends (probability and consequence) will
impact upon PACOM or the region?
a.	Ease of travel within developing states?
b.	Ease of transnational migration/emigration?
c.
Logistics of/tracking of arms or human or narco-trafficking?
d.
Proliferation of fossil fuel vehicles?
e.
Border security?
f.	Democratic processes (such as elections)?
g.
Maritime security?
What scientific and technological trends (probability and consequence)
will impact upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Emergence of alternative/bio fuels?
b.
Affordability of renewable energy?
c.	Stability through domestic and shared ISR?
d.	Developments to help prevent or mitigate effects of natural
disasters?
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e.

		

f.

VII.

Developments to mitigate instability from agricultural or water
challenges?
Increased security relationships between U.S. and partners
through S&T projects?

Environmental:
1.

		
		
		
		

What environmental trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Regional climatic change/warming?
b.
Droughts—agriculture, hunger?
c.
Potable water scarcity?
d.	Demand for and supplies of energy/resources?

NORTHEAST ASIA-PACIFIC REGION STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
I.

Political:
1.

		
		
		
		
		
		
		
II.

What political trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.	Japan’s role and future relationships, including an isolationist
Japan?
b.	The future of the Japan-U.S. security relationship?
c.	South Korea’s desire for an expanded subregional role?
d.	Russia’s future role and future relationships?
e.	China’s future external role and future relationships?
f.	China’s involvement in Africa? What should we plan?
g.
China’s potential for liberal democracy: What should be the
agenda for the next decade?

Military:
1.

		
		
		
		
2.
		

What military trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.
U.S. -Japanese alliance: Way ahead?
b.
NE Asia multilateral cooperation?
c.	China’s military and space transformation?
d.	Successful Mongolia Defense Reform?
What conflict trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.
Nepal’s stability?
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III.

b.
c.

Economic:
1.

		
		
		
IV.

North Korean ambitions?
China and Taiwan?

What economic trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.	Chinese economic agendas and responsible interactions in
Africa?
b.	China’s rising appetite for energy from regional nations?
c.
Russian economic agendas in Africa?

Informational:
1.

		
		

What informational trends (probability and consequence) will impact
upon PACOM or the region?
a.
Telecommunications expansion and NK or PRC’s populations’
ability to be informed
b.
Telecommunications expansion and impact on NK or PRC’s
ability to control information

SOUTHEAST ASIA-PACIFIC AND OCEANIA REGION STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENT
I.

Political:
1.

		
		
		
II.

What political trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.	Outlook for internal stability in Timor and Bangladesh?
b.
Burma’s governance?
c.
The future role of China in SE Asia?

Military:
1.

		
		

What military trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.
China’s power projection capability to achieve greater influence
b.
Maritime security capacity in the Strait of Malacca and tri-border
region (Sulu/Celebes Sea)
c.	Future of U.S. alliance with Australia and New Zealand
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III.

Environment:
1.

Assess the impact of global warming in the Asia Pacific region in terms
of irregular human migration. What are the implications of the whole
migration of Oceanic state populations and low lying coast states (e.g.,
Bangladesh) moving to “higher ground?”

SOUTH ASIA-PACIFIC REGION STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
I.

Political:
1.

		
II.

What political trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.
India’s role as a rising Asian power, and its expanding
capabilities and interests

Military:
1.

		

What military trends (probability and consequence) will impact upon
PACOM or the region?
a.	India’s future large future arms purchases

SELECTED POTENTIAL TOPIC AMPLIFICATIONS
1.

Within the Asia Pacific region, four enduring insurgencies exist—Southern
Philippines, Southern Thailand, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Compare and contrast
these four insurgencies. What factors make them so resilient to government
intervention? Are any of these factors common to all four insurgencies?
How have the governments of Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Nepal
responded to these factors?

2.

Assess the insurgency in Southern Thailand. Identify the sources of conflict,
and draft a national security plan for addressing the insurgency, including
core, defensive and offensive strategies. This blueprint for success should
include discussion of the role that regional organizations such as ASEAN
and ARF might play, as well as regional powers including the United States.

3.

The global balance of power is shifting from Europe to Asia. For the past 50
years, NATO has served a strategic role in ensuring a peaceful Europe. No
such mechanism exists in Asia-Pacific. Discuss the desirability and feasibility
of implementing a NATO-like organization in Asia Pacific.
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4.

Educating senior leaders about comprehensive crisis management. What is
needed for curricula, educational practices and supporting technologies to
educate non-specialist leaders to integrate prevention, preparation, response
and recovery aspects of disaster management?

5.

Partner, Policeman or Nanny: What is the role of regional organizations in
assisting nations to develop capabilities to deal with disasters at home?

6.

The U.S. should be able to not only acknowledge China’s peaceful rise, but
also the prospect for power sharing with China and other nations. Suggest
possible future power sharing arrangements between the U.S. and other
nations.

7.

China’s economic strategy. Besides a qualitative assessment/analysis of
where China is headed with its international economic strategy, it seems
reasonable to undertake a “mapping” (location and type) of Foreign
Direct Investment by Chinese Government-owned enterprises in South
and Southeast Asia and in Africa. Analyze these investments to provide
insight on China’s economic strategy. Going one step further, with respect
to investments in South and SE Asia, mapped investments should indicate
whether China has a grand strategy to optimize production in those regions
and to create an integrated set of regional economies.

8.

U.S. DoD outsourcing. Focus on testing the efficiency and effectiveness
of outsourcing. Analysis could further explore what types of outsourcing
contracts are being used by DoD. One hypothesis is that “incentive
contracts” represent the most cost-effective method of outsourcing. Research
how much more efficient DoD outsourcing could become if the prevalence of
incentive contracts increased.

9.

Develop taxonomies to ensure the comprehensiveness of Political, Military,
Economic, Socio-cultural, Information, Infrastructure, and Environment
systems analysis. By providing analysts with a tabulation of all potentially
important considerations, taxonomies could serve as guidance and/or check
lists, and even as research tools or plan scoping aids. Is there a specific set of
well-defined steps that could be followed? Can the process be automated?
Should elements of the taxonomies vary from country to country—i.e., Third
World vis-à-vis industrialized nation?
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United States Southern Command
POC: LTC Rafael Gavilan (305) 437-1457
Rafael.Gavilan@hq.southcom.mil
1.

Can the U.S. build and maintain positive relationships with existing as well
as newly elected governments in the region who oppose U.S. policies? If so,
how? (either broad, regional solutions or more pointed recommendations for
single nations)
a.
What specific role can regional mil-to-mil engagement play in
engaging these governments?

2.	Assess the types of threats the region will face circa 2015-2020.
3.

Third Border Initiative: Successes and Shortcomings. Which Caribbean
countries have made the most positive contributions to border security;
which are lagging? Where do the greatest opportunities for regional mil-tomil or mil-to-law enforcement reside? Where does USSOUTHCOM fit in?

4.

Examine the eventual restoration of U.S.-Cuba mil-to-mil relationships
(for example, survey applicable lessons from the restoration of mil-to-mil
relationships with Eastern European states following the end of the Cold
War).

5.

Epidemiology and major health threats to the region and their impact on the
regional, political and economic stability.

6.

A study of the strategic culture in Venezuela: What historical, cultural, and
demographic factors determine why Venezuela reacts the way it does and
what can that tell us about its reaction to future situations? Is the strategic
culture changing? Why or why not?

7.

Demographic study of the region: What are the trends 5/10/15 years out?
What will be the effects of those trends in each of the subregions?

8.

Analysis of the 2006 (and when it comes out the 2007) Latinobarometer poll:
What does it mean for the U.S. military and for U.S. policymakers?

9.

A study of the strategic culture in Brazil: What historical, cultural, and
demographic factors determine why Brazil reacts the way it does and what
can that tell us about its reaction to future situations?
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10.

Latin America: Is an arms race picking up steam? Who are the regional actors
attempting to achieve superiority? Are competing regional military alliances
being contemplated?

11.

Examine the most successful instances of U.S.–Latin American engagement/
cooperation (government-sponsored or not) of the 20th and 21st centuries.

12.

Identify structure/composition of Cuban industries. Consider senior level
individuals’ and agencies’ military and regime affiliations. This will aid in
planning for HA/DR efforts. Provide updates by industry.

13.

Analyze the history and the impacts of extra-hemispheric actors (both state
and nonstate) in the region.

14.

How can the U.S. negotiate basing rights in partner nations with
governments that may not support our regional policies (for example, a
Cooperative Security Location [CSL] in Manta, Ecuador)?

15.

Colombia-Ecuador: What is the potential for border issues to lead to armed
confrontation? Do Plan Colombia and Plan Ecuador complement each other,
or are they a roadmap for border conflict?

16.

Assess the deliberately transnational nature of contemporary Latin American
populist movements and their impacts on regional governability and
security.

17.

Unified Command Plan (UCP) and its inherent seams: Is there a better way
to organize combatant command theaters?

18.

What is the future of democracy in Latin American nations with significant
indigenous populations?

19.

Identify strategies to eliminate or significantly reduce illicit trafficking
throughout the Western Hemisphere.

20.

Assess the impacts of the human trafficking problem in Latin America.

21.

Examine and present frameworks that will serve to engage and/or defeat
enemies that employ asymmetric warfare. (The study should encompass all
types of actors: those from outside the region as well as those from within.)
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22.

Assess the relationships between transnational threats and those threats
traditionally viewed as internal security challenges. Do threats traditionally
viewed as internal security challenges possess a transnational component?

23.

Examine successful models for reducing state corruption.

24.

Should the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the mission responsibilities of the
Unified Commanders be revised?

25.

Assess present and future U.S. dependence on Latin American energy
sources (including, but not exclusively, Venezuelan and Mexican petroleum).

26.

Is there a discernible trend away from inter-regional relations? If such a
trend can be established, does it have precedents and what have been the
results?

27.

Examine predictive models that forecast the migration of coca cultivation in
response to eradication efforts. What are the implications for national policy
formulation and strategic security planning?

28.

Provide literature review (5-8 pages for each country) describing challenges
to the judicial systems of listed priority countries (top four listed—Colombia,
Venezuela, Brazil, and Paraguay). What are requirements for effective
judicial reform, specifically as it pertains to improving overall security?
Overall security of each partner nation and the region rely on a solid
cooperation between security forces and the judiciary. (E.g., Colombia
is transforming its judicial system; it is over burdened and considered
inefficient, and the demobilization process will create more challenges.)

29.

Trace the evolution (changes and growth) of regional military
professionalization since the mid-1960’s (also changes and growth of civil
military relationships).

30.

Viability of ethanol production for achieving energy security in CENTAM
and select Caribbean nations (Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Barbados). Use open source information to determine if sugar cane ethanol
is a better economic use of land suitable for sugar production. Determine
comparative rates of return by researching relative production costs, yields
per hectare (lbs of sugar, gallons of ethanol), and market values of these
commodities. Assume the price of ethanol is inflexible to a major expansion
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in the supply for ethanol. Research amount of available land for potential
sugarcane ethanol production versus national consumption. Determine
labor intensity (employment potential) from these two activities (sugar
production vs ethanol production) on a per-hectare basis. Note: This research
will produce preliminary data to indicate whether there are significant
benefits to energy security from ethanol production. In the affirmative,
follow-on research could be conducted to produce an array of inter-agency
recommendations for promoting ethanol production in these subregions.
31.

What are the future USAF contributions to theater security cooperation for
emerging nations? How can the world’s most advanced air and space team
contribute to strategic alliances with our Western Hemisphere neighbors?

32.

Examine the security implications of CAFTA-DR and Central American
regional integration initiatives, such as those proposed by the Central
American Integration System (SICA). (Example: border control/security
issues)

33.

Assess the “total costs” of terrorism and other illicit activities (governability,
security, economics, etc.)—not only the obvious costs, but also the less
tangible ones such as the erosion of public confidence in governments (at all
levels) due to corruption, etc.

34.

What reforms are necessary to make Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
beneficial to all sectors of society? How can nations seek ways to benefit
and create sustainable long-term growth using FTAs as a tool for economic
development?

35.

Assess the varying degrees to which most nations in the Western
Hemisphere have paid a price in the GWOT.

36.

Examine the range of economic policies and their results in key countries
throughout the region. Assess these policies with respect to their ability to
provide long-term sustainable growth that addresses poverty and income
equality while maintaining fiscal discipline.

37.

Analyze defense/security spending and social investment by country over
the past 5 years (10 years if possible).
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United States Special Operations Command
POC: Mr. John Provost (703) 571-9679
john.provost@socom.mil
1.

Are we fighting one global insurgency or regional insurgencies along a
common theme?

2.

USSOCOM, DoD, and the interagency—collaboration in the war on terror

3.

Clarifying the lines under the authorities of Title 10 and Title 50 with respect
to intelligence activities and the implications in terms of prosecuting the war
on terror outside designated combat areas

4.

Global posturing of all Special Operations forces—specifically synchronizing
integrated training prior to deploying components as an integrated SOF task
force.

For additional SOF-related topics see the USSOCOM Research Topics List
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United States Army Special Operations Command
POC: Mr. Tim Flynn (910) 432-6891
flynnt@soc.mil
Mr. Harry Hottell (910) 432-1995
hottellh@soc.mil
I.

Global War on Terror:
1.

Networks: DoD lacks capacity for developing ethnographic
information as a weapon against hostile networks. While formerly
addressed to a minimal extent in the SOF community, the entire force
needs this training and ability; how should it be done?

2.

There is a great deal of discussion of Information Operations, but
many real doctrinal and practical issues remain in its employment.
How can we turn the discussion into practice?

3.

Electronic Warfare is a serious deficiency in the Army, prompting the
Vice Chief of Staff to issue instructions on building this capability.
How can the Army’s EW capability be increased and synchronized
with the other Joint players?

4.

Military role in developing partnerships with allies in war on
terrorism. The Army’s role in developing these partnerships (USASOC
G-2)

5.

Military contributions to information operations in war on terror
(USASOC G-2)

6.

How can SOF better coordinate with and support other U.S.
Government agencies in strategic communications and information
operations? (USASFC)

7.

Who within the U.S. Government should have the lead and
proponency for information operations, and what should DoD’s role
be? (USACAPOC)

8.

How do we prosecute the war on terror in the GCC and U.S.
Government seams? What special command structures are required? Is
the JIATF structure appropriate? (USASOC G-35)
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9.	Study the willingness to exploit surrogates to further U.S. foreign
policy (USASOC G-3X)
10.	Sustainment of the war on terrorism including:
		
a.
How the Army and Joint Forces will support and conduct a
large-scale, long duration irregular warfare campaign spanning
several countries or regions. (USASOC G-8)
		
b.	Full spectrum operations in irregular war:
			
(1)
Do DoD’s counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities allow the
U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives
given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and
related nonstate actors?
			
(2)
Do DoD’s counterterrorism capabilities allow the U.S. to
accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives given the
asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate
actors?
			
(3)
Do DoD’s unconventional warfare (UW) capabilities
allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military
objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda
and related nonstate actors?
			
(4)
Do DoD’s foreign internal defense (FID) capabilities
allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military
objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda
and related nonstate actors?
			
(5)
Do DoD’s stability, security, transition and reconstruction
(SSTR) capabilities allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOTrelated military objectives given the asymmetric threat
posed by al-Qaeda and related nonstate actors?
			
(6)
Do DoD’s civil-military operations (CMO) capabilities
allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military
objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda
and related nonstate actors?
			
(7)
Do DoD’s psychological operations (PSYOP) capabilities
allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military
objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda
and related nonstate actors?
			
(8)
Do DoD’s information operations (IO) capabilities
allow the U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military
objectives given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda
and related nonstate actors?
			
(9)
Do DoD’s intelligence operations capabilities allow the
U.S. to accomplish its GWOT-related military objectives
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c.

		

d.

given the asymmetric threat posed by al-Qaeda and
related nonstate actors?
Do current Army capabilities support the roles and missions
necessary to conduct full spectrum operations in irregular
warfare against asymmetric opponents? Do current Special
Operations capabilities support the roles and missions necessary
to conduct full spectrum operations in irregular warfare against
asymmetric opponents? (USASOC G-8)
Study the relationship between DoD and DoS as the war on
terror expands beyond OEF and OIF. Who is the lead/focal
point for the combined DoD and DoS operations? (USASOC G-8)

11.

What the influence of religious beliefs and religious radical groups is
in the present development of the war on terror (Chaplain)

12.

Examine the context of the war on terror and evaluate the associated
risk of defining a strategy that potentially fights the “tool” and not the
people, ideologies and movements that employ terror as a means of
propaganda or a method to influence political change (75th Ranger
Regiment)

13.

Examine the roles of nonstate actors in challenging the authority and
sovereignty of the established nationstates (75th Ranger Regiment)

14.

The challenge of synchronizing the UN, NATO and other regional
security forces in support of the war on terror (75th Ranger Regiment)

15.

Prioritize the information war. The challenge of influencing or
challenging Muslim fundamentalist ideology (75th Ranger Regiment)

16.

How we can refine processes and approvals needed for the successful
execution of clandestine operations? (75th Ranger Regiment)

17.

Evaluate the methods to improve SOF human intelligence capabilities
to fight terrorism in restricted and denied countries. (75th Ranger
Regiment)

18.

How current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq—and their potential
outcomes—will affect regional security in the greater Middle East and
East Asia (75th Ranger Regiment)
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II.

III.

19.

How to build and maintain coalitions in a manner that does not dilute
the will of America to take decisive action in the international arena?
(In some cases, success will require the United States to have a low
profile.) (75th Ranger Regiment)

20.

Define U.S. policy with respect to preemptive, preventive and
retaliatory measures in support of the war on terror. (75th Ranger
Regiment)

Homeland Security:
1.

Does DoD need to reexamine Posse Comitatis and traditional roles in
response to 9/11 and future homeland security threats? (75th Ranger
Regiment)

2.

Enhancing situational awareness without becoming a police state.
Evaluate measures required to preserve liberties and institutions
central to American culture. (75th Ranger Regiment)

3.

Execution of war-gaming exercises at the national level to establish
operational working relationships and identify critical vulnerabilities
(75th Ranger Regiment)

4.

Evaluate legislation required in support of the Office of Homeland
Security. Consider Presidential empowerment of a Chief Executive.
(75th Ranger Regiment)

Regional Strategic Issues:
1.

Study the implications of strategic water control to the economic,
political and military stability of critical regions. (USASOC ARNG
Advisor)

2.

North Africa and the Middle East. What is the U.S. long-term strategy
towards Hamas as a legitimate governing body? (USASOC G-3X)

3.

How do we—and who does this (i.e., the UN)—professionalize
regional security forces in areas currently not identified as central
battlefields in the war on terror? (75th Ranger Regiment)

4.

Examine the role of the media in rebuilding failed states (venue for fair
representation of information). (75th Ranger Regiment)
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5.

IV.

Examine the need for justice and reconciliation programs within the
process of rebuilding governments of failed states. Examine impacts
on continued coalition operations within this construct. (75th Ranger
Regiment)

Military Change:
1.

The probable impact of fog and friction in the Future Force and
suggested lubricants (USASOC ARNG Advisor)

2.

Integration of traditional law enforcement tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTP) into military TTP. Such “cross-over” skills are
needed to target terrorist rings and support networks. (USASOC G-2)

3.

How do we streamline the POM process to make it more responsive to
immediate needs as we continue to prosecute the war on terror? (75th
Ranger Regiment)

4.

Determine the effects of technology on the Principles of War. Has
technology truly enabled smaller combat formations, or is the
individual soldier, and the ability to mass when required, still as
important as ever? (75th Ranger Regiment)

5.

Considerations with respect to actions directed against enemy
computers and networks (75th Ranger Regiment)

6.

Method to compress time associated with cultural change that fosters
innovation and flexibility in a time of war (75th Ranger Regiment)

V.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
Revision of Foreign Assistance Program (circa 1961) in support of
the National Security Strategy. Reduce from 30 objectives to a less
cumbersome, more focused effort. (75th Ranger Regiment)

2.

International recognition for emerging states (or nonstate actors). (75th
Ranger Regiment)

3.

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Irregular Warfare Execution
Roadmap (USASFC)
a.
Implications of the document on Army Special Operations
Forces and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne)
(USASFC)

		

1.
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b.

		

c.

VI.

VII.

Analysis and study of what is required in mission sets,
organizational structure, force structure, equipment, technology,
and stationing to conduct “long-duration, low-visibility and
multiple” irregular warfare campaigns (USASFC)
Integration of a long-duration irregular warfare campaign with
Joint, conventional, and multinational forces (USASFC)

Landpower Employment:
1.

Given current demographic and social trends, can SOF capabilities
and doctrine support operations against asymmetric opponents in
restricted and urban environments? (USASOC G-8)

2.

What are the roles for, and the implications of, using surrogates in
urban warfare to support GWOT national objectives? (USASOC G-8)

3.

What is the role of SOF in stability, security, transition, and
reconstruction operations? (USASOC G-8)

4.

Can Future Force sustainment capabilities as currently envisioned
support noncontiguous operations in separate nations as part of the
global irregular warfare campaign in support of GWOT objectives?
(USASOC G-8)

5.

Should unity of command or unity of effort be the governing paradigm
for interagency operations? (USASOC G-3X)

6.

A measure to increase DoD influence or communicate with the State
Department with respect to infrastructure improvements in failed
states (i.e., improve utilities in cities and rural areas) (75th Ranger
Regiment)

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.

Does current logistical planning doctrine support planning
requirements for simultaneous, dispersed/distributed combat
operations in protracted conflicts in multiple countries and regions?
(USASOC G-8)

2.

What are the logistical implications for current U.S. capabilities to
support surrogate forces employed by the U.S. during irregular war in
support of GWOT objectives? (USASOC G-8)
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3.

How can the current U.S. Army modular concept (i.e., centered on
the Brigade Combat Team) support irregular war as it is conducted
simultaneously in multiple regions and countries? (USASOC G-8)

4.

Identify unique force protection capabilities required to conduct seabasing operations. (75th Ranger Regiment)

5.

Role of industry in support of the “Long War.” Examine the
relationship of the U.S. economy and extended military operations.
Can industry increase efficiencies in this regard? (75th Ranger
Regiment)

VIII.	Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

IX.

1.

Maintaining the necessary cultural awareness and linguistic
competence to deal with multiple active and potential conflicts within
the wide-ranging Islamic world (USASOC G-2)

2.

Developing imaginative leaders who are able to produce creative
solutions to complex problems (USASOC G-3X)

3.

Study the impact of service members not paying Federal taxes
(USASOC G-3X)

4.

Evaluate the existing Joint Planning models with respect to both
deliberate and crisis action planning. (75th Ranger Regiment)

5.

How can we develop more adaptive leaders? What is the feasibility of
incorporating “social intelligence” into soldier and leader development
and education? (75th Ranger Regiment)

War and Society:
1.

Assume there will be no major technological advancements in alternate
fuels that would lower U.S. dependence on oil. How high will fuel
costs have to be and/or how low will fuel supplies have to be before
the low costs of foreign labor are offset and production of goods made
in the United States (clothes and electronics, for example) becomes
economically feasible again? In other words, when will the costs and
availability of transportation begin to work against a global economy
and for a regional economy, and push the United States toward an
isolationist policy? (USASOC G-35)
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X.

2.

Prioritize “Public Diplomacy” in the foreign policy process. Grant
interviews to foreign media. (75th Ranger Regiment)

3.

Strengthening of public opinion research (including within foreign
countries) (75th Ranger Regiment)

4.

Development of rapid response capability to respond to
misinformation (75th Ranger Regiment)

5.

Expanding and empowering the roles of ambassadors and military
liaison elements (75th Ranger Regiment)

6.

Sustaining foreign exchange programs and providing visibility at the
local and national levels (75th Ranger Regiment)

7.

Development of message campaigns with support of the private sector
(75th Ranger Regiment)

Other:
1.

Military working dogs (MWD). What is the DoD position on contract
dogs in offensive operations? What agency sets the standards for
contract dogs? Is the current inventory of MWDs sufficient to support
all war on terror and Homeland Security requirements? (USASOC
G-35)

2.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat. Can technology defeat
IEDs? Is counter–IED a force protection question or is it offensive
operations? What agency is responsible for writing counter-IED
doctrine? Is the MWD (Special Search Dog or Patrol Explosives
Detector Dog) the appropriate tool to defeat IEDs for mechanized
units? (USASOC G-35)

3.

Asymmetric Warfare. This is associated with IEDs, but of a greater
scope. Is asymmetric warfare simply management, training and
coordination of actions in response to threats? What is the offensive
(vice reactive or defensive) posture of asymmetric warfare? Is irregular
warfare simply the continually changing nature of warfare, the
“revolution of military affairs,” or is it the future of war? Is the real
problem one of semantics? Are U.S. forces trapped in a status quo
mentality, or are they ready to redesign themselves to confront the
current threat at the expense of confronting a peer foe in the future?
(USASOC G-35)
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Explore the second and third effects of the AC/RC Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations split. (USASOC Futures Center)

5.

Explore the advantages of moving RC SF units from the NGB to the
USAR. (USASOC G-35)

6.

Can science develop robotics that protect or reduce our vulnerability?
(75th Ranger Regiment)

7.

Where can “lesser technologies” improve efficiency? (75th Ranger
Regiment)

8.

Who should control Civil Information Management (CIM) and have
the lead for it in the different theaters? Study how to develop a
Common Operating Picture for CIM. (USACAPOC)

9.

After nearly 20 years, is it time to reexamine Goldwater-Nichols in
view of the following questions? (USASFC)
a.
Does Goldwater-Nichols maximize Army Special Operations
Forces (ARSOF) and integration in the interagency and
multinational spectrum? (USASFC)
b.
What are the relationships in ARSOF and other government
agencies, while facing 21st century challenges and defeating
enemies in the war on terror? (USASFC)
c.
What is the impact of command climate/human relations
environment on retention and recruiting?
d.
How can equal opportunity (EO) programs be tailored and
leveraged to create a positive human relations environment/
command climate?
e.
Do deploying/deployed EO advisors have the appropriate
training and are there enough per unit in consideration of
supporting reserve units and civilians on the battlefield?
(Many reserve units have EO advisor positions as required,
but not authorized. Therefore they never receive the 10-week
qualification training).

		

4.
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United States Strategic Command
POC: Marilyn Bombac (402) 294-8543
BOMBACM@stratcom.mil
I.

Global War on Terrorism:
1.	National Implementation Plan and the way ahead for DoD/SOCOM
2.

Counterproliferation initiatives

3.

Interoperability with interagency

4.

Deterrence and nonstate actors:
a.
In the event of a serious military threat to the CONUS, will
nuclear deterrence remain the ultimate guarantor of our
security? What are the challenges involved with nuclear
deterrence as related to nonstate actors? From a policy
perspective should/can/will the U.S. hold state actors
responsible for actions of NSAs originating/operating from their
borders (either knowingly or unknowingly)?
b.
What new deterrence capabilities (beyond legacy nuclear
deterrence capabilities) do the U.S. military or U.S. Government
at large need in today’s increasingly global security
environment? How should the military posture its capabilities to
deal with increasingly asymmetric threats from both nationstates
and NSAs?

		

		

5.	Nation and rogue state sponsorship of terrorism
6.	Countering ideological support to terrorism
7.

Proliferation Security Initiative

8.

Combating WMD: Develop a complementary proliferation-risk vector
chart that characterizes states of proliferation concern on scales of
both physical and political/environmental attributes. The research
effort should define meaningful increments on the attribute scales and
identify associated metrics for characterization.
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II.

Homeland Security:
1.

Missile Defense—theater and global. Develop an analytical framework
for use by regional-level defense planners, to assess bottom line
effectiveness of combined offensive and defensive capabilities for
preventing successful missile attacks on defended assets and areas.

2.

QDR—Global Deterrence

3.	What deters the U.S. and how does that impact security decisions?
4.

Nonconventional threats to U.S. security. Establish the salience of
emerging non-conventional threats for U.S. military strategy. These
involve the challenges posed by global jihads, including the possible
use by radicals of weapons of mass destruction

5.

Missile warning

6.	Impact of the integration of air, cruise and ballistic missile activities/
tasks
III.

Regional Strategic Issues:
1.

Interdependence on allies and friends

2.

Information sharing

3.

National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy/Regional
Strategic Issues. How to integrate and apply DoD effects to deter
and dissuade potential adversaries from creating, proliferating and
using weapons of mass destruction. The research should include
the application of cyberspace forces and operations, information
operations and strategic communication to deter specific state actors/
decisionmakers (examples include North Korea, Iran and Syria). The
research should also consider how to integrate the desired effects with
the regional combatant commander’s strategy and potential/required
interagency actions.
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IV.

Military Change:
1.	Transforming from asset to requirements-based capabilities
2.

QDR force construct and sizing

3.

Impact of BRAC

4.	Army Guard and Reserves transformation to conduct cyberspace
operations

		

5.

There are assertions that we should move to a joint combatant
command staff that is 60-70% civilian and 30-40% military. What
impact will significant civilianization of the command staffs have on
the U.S. military? Given an increasing civilianization of the military
(command staffs in particular), what actions should be taken to
prepare for this eventuality?

6.

Is it time for Goldwater-Nichols II? This project should consider the
manner in which all components of the DoD coordinate with the
interagency—direct coordination, DIRLAUTH, or only through OSD.

V.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
1.	Integrating Information Operations—vertically and horizontally
2.	Leveraging and integrating existing analytical capabilities
3.	Operations in cyberspace/netwarfare/NETOPS
4.	Way ahead for Strategic Communications/Information Operations
VI.	Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
1.

Leveraging government/agency expertise— Joint Functional
Component Commands at STRATCOM

2.

Using collaborative tools—changing culture from “need to know” to
“need to share”

3.

Establishing distributed collaborative, interdependent organizational
environment
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4.

VII:

VIII.

Study the statistical inverse correlation between NSPS pay bands
with the ability of AFPC to identify qualified applicants for sensitive
positions.

War and Society:
1.

Role of nuclear weapons in deterrence

2.

Emerging powers

Intelligence:
1.

Ways to gather forensic data on an enemy quickly and accurately in
order to prosecute them

2.

Does the Intel cycle change when attack/defend actions take place in
seconds?

3.

Is the current Target System Analysis process capable of producing
relevant Intel in time?

4.	Is nuclear/kinetic targeting different from nonkinetic/cyber targeting?
IX.

Technology/Cyberspace:
1.

Computer processing and its effects on decision calculus in a subsecond environment

2.

The impact, both cost and operational, to the Warfighter of not having
a standard DoD collaboration tool/process

3.	Foreign use/permeation/securability of Wi-Fi
4.	Organizing for presentation of cyber forces to the COCOMs
5.	What are the major trust issues inherent in cross service sharing of
data?
6.	What are the major trust issues inherent in multinational sharing of
data?
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7.

What levels of data should be provided to each level of command?
How do we determine what is useful from what is distracting?

8.	How long will it take for legacy systems to adopt netcentric tenets?
9.

How can we ensure situational awareness data is not intercepted or
stolen by adversaries? Blue force tracking is invaluable to commanders
but dissemination to red could result in our own culmination.

10.

What would a strategic roadmap for Information Technology systems
look like, and what are the barriers to developing a consolidated DoD
roadmap? How would this relate to an overarching IT services and
systems catalog?
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United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/
Army Forces Strategic Command
POC: Mr. James G. (Sam) Lee (256) 955-4774
James.lee@smdc.army.mil
1.

In the context of persistent conflict, assess the ability of existing national
security space capabilities to responsively meet the needs of the land
component in stability operations and less-than-general-war scenarios.

2.

Should the Army develop and acquire small satellites dedicated to the
tactical level?

3.

Should the Army view small satellites as unmanned space vehicles and
develop, acquire, and operate these to meet the unique requirements of its
forces, just as it operates unmanned aerial vehicles to meet the needs of the
tactical land forces?

4.

Should the Army view high altitude comms and ISR as similar unmanned
aerial vehicles and develop, acquire and operate these to meet the unique
requirements and needs of the tactical land forces?

5.

Assess the Army role in the space and high altitude domain against the
Army role in aviation; should the Army develop tactical space and high
altitude ISR and communications dedicated to support at the brigade and
lower echelons.

6.

What niche technologies can be brought to bear to augment current national
security space capabilities for disadvantaged users such as SOUTHCOM and
AFRICOM?

7.

What are the implications of the inability to deny adversary space based ISR
and communications on the ability of the land component to maneuver and
protect the force?

8.

What are the effects of denying the adversary space based ISR and
communications on the ability the land component to maneuver and protect
the force?
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9.

Can space control be relevant to tactical units under current policy
constraints?

10.

As the Army depends more on space-based capabilities to support
persistent conflict, what is the best way to conduct requirements and combat
development within the Army?

11.

Assess impact and mitigation strategies of adversary use of commercial ISR
and communication on the land component in stability operations?

12.

Assess political implications and advantages/disadvantages of expanding
binational and multinational partnerships for missile defense in Europe and
the Pacific.

13.

Assess the geopolitical and security implications on NATO regarding
positioning missile defenses in Eastern Europe.

14.

Assess the challenges for effectively integrating and conducting information
operations and cyber warfare in the era of persistent conflict.

15.

Army Operations in Cyberspace --- tools, CONOPS, ROE

16.

How can integrated architectures across the vertical domains of space, high
altitude, and air increase the overall persistence and availability of ISR
products and communications?

17.

Is the threshold between Title 10 and Title 50 impacting the ability to develop
and employ space-based tactical ISR capabilities?

18.

Should the Army be designated as the executive agent or lead service for
Global Ballistic Missile Defense?

19.

Should the Army be designated as the lead service for all land-based ballistic
missile defense capabilities?
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The Defense Intelligence Agency
POC: James E. Lightfoot (202) 231-1917
James.Lightfoot@dia.mil
I.

II.

III.

Global War on Terror:
1.

The spread and role of radical Islam and international terrorist group
capabilities

2.

International counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and worldwide
perception of U.S. power and CT actions

3.

How best can the United States counter adversary use of the Internet
as a means of propaganda and communications?

Homeland Defense:
1.

Homeland defense and homeland security cooperation in anticipating,
assessing, and countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats
and consequences

2.

Avenues for information sharing among intelligence agencies, Federal,
state and local law enforcement officials

3.

Examine current laws and statutes that enhance or impede information
sharing, coordination, and cooperation among homeland defense and
homeland security agencies

4.

Weigh the military’s role in responding to natural disasters in the
United States—testing and improving interagency collaboration in
homeland security

Regional Strategic Issues:
1.

Identify the significance (in North Africa/Middle East, Asia-Pacific,
Southwest Asia) of the presence of militant Islam; anticipate internal
and regional instability in view of the U.S. global defense posture
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IV.

2.

Assess national strategy, security policies, and decisionmaking in the
Caucasus and Asia

3.

Examine U.S. role in promoting ethnically plural polities inclusive of
politically and economically disenfranchised indigenous populations
in Latin America

4.

Interpret regional strategic goals and ambitions of North Korea and
China and their ability to achieve them through military and economic
capabilities

5.

Explore advanced infrastructure and network analyses for use by U.S.
planners, policymakers, and warfighters

6.

Characterize the role of Army/ground forces exercises in enhancing
U.S.-Russian relations.

7.

Identify the implications of merging crime, government, and
intelligence services personnel and practices in Russia

8.

Explore the implications of Muslim population growth within Russia
for Russian military (manpower, training, roles and missions)

9.

Assess efficacy of (select) allies’/partners’ armies, experienced in
peacekeeping operations, now doing “warfighting” in Afghanistan

National Security Strategy:
1.	Should DoD continue to rely on commercial hardware and software?
2.

How does DoD ensure supplier assurance when the complexity and
size of software programs have surpassed the ability to reach high or
moderate assurance that malicious code has not been embedded?

3.

Proliferation of sophisticated, malicious, cyber knowledge and the
asymmetric vulnerability of the United States and its allies to its
employment: What international partnerships can create an effective
export-control regime?

4.

How can the maintenance of U.S. moral and ethical values by our
government’s representatives abroad be managed so as to prevent the
practice of those values from aggravating the current and future threat
environment in countries of interest?
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V.

5.

What happens if the GWOT ends? How can the U.S. benefit from the
greater capabilities of sharper foreign security services?

6.

How can the U.S. retain a technological edge even when other
countries become centers of technological innovation?

7.

How can the U.S. propagate synchronized strategic communications in
cyberspace if our footprint there is declining?

8.

How can the U.S. positively develop its international reputation as
world leader in national security?

9.

How can the U.S. deal with multiple nuclear-capable rogue nations?

10.

How does the U.S. deal with an evolving international situation where
scores of nations may acquire the capability of creating fissile material
that could be diverted for nuclear devices or weapons?

Leadership: Examine how DoD and service intelligence agencies are
modifying training, education, management, and leadership principles to
meet new Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence
Reform Act requirements.

VI.	Underground Facilities as a National Security Challenge:
1.

The construction and employment of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets
(HDBTs) facilities by potential adversarial nations and nonstate
organizations is growing each year. Whether those nations and nongovernment organizations are classified as rogue, major, or emerging
powers or terrorist groups, they use underground facilities (UGFs) and
HDBTs to protect and conceal WMD, ballistic missiles, leadership, and
activities that constitute serious threats to U.S. national security. The
growth and sophistication of UGFs and HDBTs is especially notable
among nations with mature WMD programs. Denial and deception
operations complicate detection and characterization of UGFs, and
the facilities themselves commonly frustrate assessment of the UGFs’
functions. Of grave concern is what these countries and nonstate
entities have learned from U.S. attack tactics and weapons used against
underground targets over the last decade in the Balkans, Afghanistan,
and Iraq. Their new and modified facilities incorporate features that
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make them more survivable against U.S. weapons. Moreover, these
countries are exporting their underground construction techniques
and construction equipment. What can be done to counter the
proliferation of UGFs and HDBTs among America’s adversaries and
the commensurate improvement in methods of producing, hardening,
and concealing them?
2.

VII.

VIII.

Detection and analysis of these facilities is the sole responsibility of the
Underground Facility Analysis Center (UFAC). The UFAC integrates
analysts, collection managers and strategists, R&D experts, and
program managers from DIA, NGA, and NSA with engineers from
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to meet its mission end-to-end.
This intelligence and engineering integration is unique and has proved
highly successful. It provides outstanding coordination and analysis.
What more should be done?

Combat Operations Support:
1.

How best can the United States use human intelligence in areas of
active confrontation, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan?

2.

How can the Intelligence Community best support warfighters and get
feedback on the effectiveness of intelligence products provided?

Acquisition: What are the benefits and drawbacks of using contractors,
civilian employees, and active or reserve military in the Intelligence
Community and what criteria should be used to ascertain which should be
used in a specific position?
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United States Transportation Command
POC: Ms Diana Roach DSN 779-1535
Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil
1.

How do the capabilities provided by USTRANSCOM’s Joint Task Force-Port
Opening (JTF-PO) Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) fit in the continuum
of theater opening operations and complement the Sea Port of Debarkation
(SPOD) theater opening capability? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.
Roach@ustranscom.mil)

2.

How can a Joint Force Commander best decide when to use third party
logistics providers versus Service organic capabilities? (Ms. Diana Roach,
DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

3.

How should DoD establish, monitor, and enforce performance standards for
intra-theater distribution? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@
ustranscom.mil)

4.

How can we consolidate Army and Defense Logistics Agency inventory to
improve support to the warfighter? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.
Roach@ustranscom.mil)

5.

Recommend potential improvements to redeployment processes for the Joint
Force. (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

6.

How can DoD use commercial forecasting models and processes (e.g.,
collaborative planning forecasting replenishment (CPFR) model) to improve
end-to-end Joint distribution operations? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535,
Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

7.

How do we institutionalize the planning and modeling of the theater
distribution network as part of the Adaptive Planning process? (Ms. Diana
Roach, DSN 779-1535,
Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

8.

How should DoD use service-oriented architectures (SOAs) to improve
interoperability across the logistics information domain? (Ms. Diana Roach,
DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

9.

Provide recommendations for improving DoD global supply chain
performance based on Time Definite Delivery (TDD). (Ms. Diana Roach,
DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)
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10.

What information is required for logistics visibility to/at the “last tactical
mile?” How should that information be provided (i.e., CONOPS with
roles/responsibilities of COCOMS, Services, and National Partners [e.g.,
USTRANSCOM and DLA])? (Lt Col Mark Wyrosdick, DSN 779-1132,
mark.wyrosdick@ustranscom.mil)

11.

Identify COCOM capability requirements for a real-time Common Operating
Picture for Deployment and Distribution (COP D2). (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN
779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

12.

How does the DoD build and enforce a single, multi-echelon distribution
prioritization system? (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN 779-1535, Diana.Roach@
ustranscom.mil)

13.

Recommend how to forecast supply requirements. (Ms. Diana Roach, DSN
779-1535, Diana.Roach@ustranscom.mil)

14.

Determine a method for logistics integration with multinational, interagency
organizations, nongovernment organizations and civilian contractors. (Mr.
Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil)

15.

How do we develop a customer booking process that drives the customer to
focus on level of service versus selecting a mode (service levels—x days vs.
transport mode—air, surface)? (Ms. Paulette Pardue, DSN 779-4518, paulette.
pardue@ustranscom.mil)

16.

What is the role of logistics and distribution in Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) and Security Cooperation? (Mr.
Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil)

17.

How should DoD apply the Non-linear Supply Chain, system-of-systems
approach to modeling supply chain management? (Mr. Lance Carpenter,
DSN 779-3740, lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil)

18.

How can Combatant Commands that support OEF and OIF on a daily basis
best plan and execute a joint training program in order to prepare for future
operations? (Mr. Pete Zielinski, DSN 779-1471, peter.zielinski.ctr@ustranscom.
mil)
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19.

What is the optimum sealift siting strategy to support the National Military
Strategy? (Mr. David C. Lyle, DSN 325-5530, david.c.lyle@navy.mil)

20.

What is the capability of U.S. flagged and Effective U.S. Controlled
(EUSC) commercial sealift tankers to provide support to DoD contingency
operations? (Mr. David C. Lyle, DSN 325-5530, david.c.lyle@navy.mil)
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United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
POC: Mr. Larry Abercrombie (757) 788-5821
Lawrence.abercrombie@us.army.mil
I.

Global War on Terror:
1.

What lessons have future adversaries learned from OIF, OEF, and
the 2006 Middle East Hezbollah conflict about how to use strategic
communications and information operations?

2.

How do we establish, resource and measure the relative effectiveness
of nonkinetic effects versus lethal effects?

3.

How will we preclude an adversary from manipulating national will
through the media and internet? What proactive measures can we
take?

II.	Homeland Security/Homeland Defense/Civil Support:

III.

1.

Alternatives to using military forces in support of homeland security
and implications for the Reserve Components

2.

What capabilities should the Army possess to execute the Homeland
Defense (HLD)/Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
missions?

3.

What are the capabilities required to conduct WMD Elimination
Operations?

4.

What are the operational constraints of providing medical support for
Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions?

5.

Which nations or nonstate groups are likely to employ WME and what
are the most likely targets?

Regional Strategic Issues:
1.

What existing or emerging states and nonstate entities have the ability
and the will to challenge U.S. strategic and national security objectives?

2.

What are the political trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving
the conditions of the future operational environment?
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3.

What are the economic trends—global, regional, and domestic—
driving the future Joint operational environment?

4.

What are the social trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving
the conditions of the future operational environment?

5.

What are the cultural trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving
the conditions of the future operational environment? Trends in
religion, information and PMESI?

6.

What aspects of an adversary’s approach to irregular warfare will
require an integrated DIME response?

7.

What states/nonstates have the potential to emerge as a military peer
or near-peer competitor?

8.

What states/nonstates have the potential to emerge as economic peers
or near-peer competitors?

9.

Where will competition for scarce resources lead to instability
and/or violent confrontation? What will be the U.S. role in such a
confrontation?

10.

Which nations or nonstate groups are likely to employ WME and what
are the most likely targets?

11.

What ongoing efforts have the potential to significantly increase the
ability to feed the growing world population?

12.

How will the hydrological effects of global warming and climate
change (e.g., melting ice caps, rising oceans, desertification, water
scarcity) in the next 10 to 20 years impact security in Africa and the
Pacific?

13.

How will legal and illegal immigration impact the Future Modular
Force and its allies?

14.

How the Future Modular Force should be to deal with failed and
failing states, provinces, autonomous regions and/or mega-cities
across combatant command AORs.
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15.

How will state or nonstate entities with, or access to, space, high
altitude (HA), cyber, and other technologies use those capabilities
against U.S. and multinational land component forces in 2015?

IV.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

V.

1.

What are the effects of changes to NSS/NMS on the Army’s force
structure, systems, supporting elements, and the resulting resource
implications?

2.

Reassess the Army’s roles and missions and their impact on the QDR

3.

Appropriate roles for Active and Reserve Components in support of
building partnership capacity

4.

The Army’s contribution to developing a national strategy and
narrative

5.

What are the possible implications of persistent conflict for the
National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the
Quadrennial Defense Review?

6.

How will competition between surging economic powers over limited
resources affect NSS/NMS?

Landpower Employment:
1.

Effective combination of GPF and SOF mission sets to execute FSO in
conjunction with interagency and coalition forces

2.

Ways to better align of military and interagengy planning processes to
improve unity of effort

3.

What are the strategic and operational benefits of developing
high speed shallow draft platforms that enable deployment and
sustainment of land forces?

4.

How will the employment of Future Force lethal / non-lethal Directed
Energy capabilities impact the Army across the full spectrum of
operations?
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5.

Do future force operational concepts adequately address adversary
integrated anti-access strategy and ensure the capability to deploy?

6.

What vulnerabilities, if any, do future forces have against effectively
employed strategic communications like those employed during OEF/
OIF and Israel-Hezbollah conflict?

7.

Do future modular force concepts adequately account for continued
military technological dominance over future rising competitors such
as China and Russia?

8.

How will future modular forces optimize cyberspace in 2025 in order
to assure U.S. Army and Land Component center of gravity?

9.

What are the implications of distributed and non-contiguous expanded
operational environments (distance) on Army Aviation?

10.

What are the aviation lift and range requirements to support air
movement and vertical maneuver in Future Operational Environments
(FOE)?

11.

How do elements of space control or mitigate near peer threat intent/
capability to deny access to friendly space products and services in
2015 timeframe?

12.	New approaches to allied and coalition engagement in Irregular
Warfare
VI.

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.	Future Force Generation requirements for Full Spectrum Operations
2.

To what extent can reducing the Army’s fuel consumption and its
class V bulk weight permit reductions in sustainment organizations,
infrastructure and operations?

3.

What processes are required for Army to identify remaining economic
useful life (REUL) of individual tactical wheeled vehicles (TWVs), over
mid-future term, based on a vehicle’s OPTEMPO and maintenance
history in support of Full Spectrum Operations?

4.

What are the ways and means required to reset Army units in core
competencies?
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VII.	Leadership, Personnel Management and Culture:

  

1.

What leadership skill-sets are most important in JIIM environments
and how can the Army accelerate learning to get personnel proficient
in JIIM operations?

2.

How can the Army build and retain the future All Volunteer Force?

3.

How can the Army provide the knowledge, skills, and abilities
required in the future All Volunteer Force?

4.

How can the Army provide competent leadership capable of dealing
with future operations?

5.

How can the Army address the significant moral-ethical challenges it
will face in the future?

6.

How can the Army sustain a high OPTEMPO with the current human
capital policies?

7.

How can the Army meet future demands for holistically fit soldiers?

8.

How can combat training centers and operational deployment
experiences be leveraged to maximize development of leadership
competencies?

9.

Expanding the military recruiting market (officer and enlisted)
to include legal, non-green card holding immigrants—legalities,
implications, and long-term impact on sustaining the All Volunteer
Force

10.

Assessing the health and sustainability of recruiting for an All
Volunteer Force—resource challenges of incentivizing the prospects to
serve during a period of protracted conflict

11.

Reconnecting America with its Army through an effective, centralized
and fully integrated strategic communications (to include marketing
and advertising) strategy. Will future national propensity to serve in
the Army continue to decline and, if so, what are the incremental steps
necessary to reverse the decline or increase the available accessible
population to meet the needs of a growing Army without sacrificing
the standards the Army currently enforces?
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12.

Adapting initial military training to compensate for health and
education problems in America

13.

Developing culturally attuned soldiers and leaders, with the right
language skills to meet the demands of the Future Operating
Environment (FOE)

14.

How to adapt the Army’s soldier and leader development strategy
(during and after initial military training) to address the cultural
understanding and targeted language proficiency requirements to
meet the demands of today’s contemporary operating environment
and beyond?

15.

How does the Army develop long-term capacity to provide the unique
and critical advanced non-warfighting skills required to effectively
execute Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
operations—Should the Army develop an “extended” force (e.g.
civilian reserve corps) to meet those needs?

16.

Are biometric technologies suitable for identity and behavioral
management in support of full spectrum operations; and how will
those technologies be implemented?
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United States Army Combined Arms Center
POC: MAJ Sunset Belinsky (913) 684-9347
Sunset.belinsky@us.army.mil
I.

Leader Development:
1.

How should the Army train leaders to make the transition from
conventional to unconventional operations in COIN?

2.

How can leaders at the operational level effectively integrate
conventional and Special Operations Forces?

3.

How can leaders sustain and improve soldier morale and unit cohesion
in COIN operations?

4.

What is the role of military education in a time of war? How must this
change to meet the demands of the current conflict and beyond?

5.

How does/should an asymmetric environment impact small-unit
leadership?

6.

Case studies: Training indigenous forces – successes and failures;
lessons learned from recent advisors’ experiences.
a.	How do you make advising a “top priority” assignment?
b.
What are the challenges in advising at ministry/national levels?
How can they effectively be met?
c.
How does cultural awareness help the organizational leader
meet challenges in COIN?

		
		
		

II.

7.

How should leaders approach the challenge of balancing technology
with the human element?

8.

How can the tools that come with a network-enabled force be applied
to leader development?

JIIM—Interagency Emphasis:
1.

How can the military operate with the “whole of government” at
various echelons?

2.

How do organizations at division and above conduct “campaign
planning” for COIN, Security Force Assistance, and Stability
Operations?
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3.

How can we apply the lessons of previous military operations in Africa
to the COE and beyond?

4.

How can we apply lessons of successful and unsuccessful
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes?

5.

How can operational-level leaders leverage integration and
coordination with international organizations while avoiding pitfalls?

6.

How has the interagency process worked in the past? How should it
change?

7.

How can the lessons from DOS PRT and DoD interoperability be
applied to future planning and execution?

8.

What are the roles of interagency organizations in security force
assistance operations: reality vs. potential?

9.

What are the lessons learned about JIIM Integration from large-scale
training/equipping missions?

10.

What are the lessons foreign forces (host nation and partner/ally)
learned from OIF and OEF?

11.	What are the implications of being a U.S. military ally and partner?
III.

Information Superiority:
1.	How should soldiers engage with Web 2.0 media capabilities?
2.

		
		
		
		

 hat should an officer know about the media?
W
a.
Historical case studies on the impact of strategic
communications. What have been the impacts of strategic
communications in the past?
b.	How can information operations in COIN be improved?
c.
How has the U.S. Army successfully used embedded reporters
to achieve its communications objectives? What are the areas for
improvement?
d.	How do information operations working groups operate
effectively?
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3.
		

4.

How can we learn from shaping change in political cultures in postwar situations (de-Ba’athification/de-Nazification)?
a.
How should military reconstruction efforts be applied as an aid
to civil affairs?
b.
How should metrics be used to define and evaluate performance
in long-term COIN conflicts?
What does an officer need to know about negotiations?

5.	What are cyber-warfare tactics? How can they be used for and against
us?
IV.

Battle Command:
1.

		
		
		

How can battle command methodologies be applied in tactical and
operational decisionmaking?
a.
How can leaders maximize effectiveness and minimize
turbulence while attaching and detaching units in combat?
b.
How will the Army bridge the current to future force battle
command?
c.
What are the capabilities and functions required to enable the
commander to develop and maintain situational awareness and
understanding?

2.	What are effective knowledge management techniques for battle
command?
V.

COIN:
1.

How will we improve COIN strategy based upon the battles in Iraq
(Mosul 2003-2008; Baghdad: The Surge; Anbar Province)?

2.

How should logisticians support COIN?

3.

In a “Long War,” under COIN environment conditions, how do U.S.
and Coalition forces, working with HN security forces, apply the
precepts of a “Clear-Hold-Build” strategy, to leverage all elements of
U.S. national power and multinational partners?

4.

What are the implications of COIN for military ethics? What are the
ethical challenges faced by combat advisors? How can advisors be
better prepared to meet these challenges?
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5.
		
		
		
VI.

What is the military role in filling the capacity gap in Security Force
Assistance operations?
a.
How can lessons learned from past Foreign Internal Defense
(FID) campaigns be used to improve Security Force Assistance
planning in the contemporary environment?
b.
How can conventional headquarters (e.g., BCT, DIV, CORPS)
be modified to effectively execute large-scale Security Force
Assistance missions (e.g., MNSTC-I, CSTC-A)?
c.
How should the Reserve Components be factored in to largescale Security Force Assistance missions?

Conflict Termination:
1.

		
		

How can military governments posture themselves to support
transition to civilian government?
a.
How should the Army approach wartime planning for conflict
termination?
b.
What are the considerations for fielding and training a new
national army and police force in occupied territories?
c.
How should the Army plan for withdrawal?
d.
How has/should the Army proceed with organization
transformation during or after a conflict?
e.
How has conflict been successfully and unsuccessfully
terminated using a transition from combat to dialogue?

2.	How has the advisory effort in Iraq evolved?
3.	How has the advisory effort in Afghanistan evolved?
4.
		
		
		
  5.

Has history provided knowledge of military withdrawal from ongoing
conflict?
a.
British withdrawal from the former Ottoman Empire (in Turkey)
in 1922-1923.
b.	The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-1989.
c.	The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.
Post-Iraq War Army:  How should the organizational officer play a
role in reconstitution?
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VII.

Transition to MCO:
1.

		
		
2.

How should the Army approach transitioning conventional forces
back to MCO from COIN?
a.
How can the Army maintain a strategic MCO capability while
executing COIN?
b.
How can units reset and prepare for MCO in a window
shortened to 12 months?
What are the roles of the operating force and the generating force in
maintaining full spectrum capabilities in the modular force?

3.	What is the impact on readiness of the Artillery secondary mission?
VIII.

Operations and Other:
1.

How can we determine current and future roles of Army aerial
reconnaissance, manned and unmanned?

2.

What are the pros and cons of ground vs. aerial precision fires?

3.

What is the impact of unit reorganizations in wartime? How can it be
mitigated?

4.

How has Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A) been implemented as
the IED targeting process?

5.

How can suicide bombers be defeated using planning, detection, and
prevention?

6.

What changes can be implemented in training the military transition
team (MiTT)?

7.

How can we understand and define the “human terrain” mission of
the MiTT?

8.

How can we apply future biometric technologies of improved
matching and robust identity analysis?
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9.

What are the lessons learned for robot applications in offensive and
defensive operations?

10.

How does America’s National Guard play its role in border states to
protect against a naval/land invasion?

11.

How do foreign armed forces approach cultural training?

12.

How can Red-Teaming be used to identify and exploit enemy
weakness?

13.

Who in the chain of command is responsible for war crimes?
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United States Army Materiel Command
POC: Paul Mui (703) 806-9110
paul.mui@us.army.mil
I.

Homeland Security:
1.

The viability of a ground centric (Army) Sustainment Support
Command integrating U.S. Army Reserve assets

2.

Opportunities for technology transfer from the military to the
Department of Homeland Security and/or dual-use technologies

3.

Army support for domestic disasters

4.

Are the contracting vehicles responsive enough to determine when
the government should step in and sustain a commercially procured
weapons system with limited fielding? (E.G., UH-72A LUH or ARH)

II.	Realizing the Potential of Network Centric Warfare:
1.

Evaluate new information assurance requirements in a net-centric
army or analyze effects of a transforming army at war on information
assurance.

2.

Strategic implications for combat service support operations given
planned mix of FCS systems and current systems that will equip the
BCTs of the near future

3.

Operational and cost benefit opportunities from leasing of Combat
Support/Combat Service Support equipment to include: cost
effectiveness, impact on national security/military operations, logistics
management of leased equipment (safety implications, transportability
implications, supportability considerations)

4.

Implementation of sense and respond logistics concepts integrated
with AIT technology, demonstrating improved warfighter support
from supply chain management, fault isolation, and maintenance
technical data access and rights of usage for logistics
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5.

Increasing and changing role of contractors in forward areas
(interacting with military force)

6.

Strategic and logistical planning for increasing numbers of contractors
who will accompany the military force

7.

Maintaining Army industrial support (organic/private) for
transformation

8.

The role of the Army’s organic manufacturing base in transformation

9.

Evaluate the demands of increased bandwidth requirements and the
ability of technological improvements to meet those demands

10.

A DoD-wide data strategy enabling true interoperability

11.

Extend the network to the soldier by using latest industry wireless
technology

12.

Test and implement Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology
across the Army

13.	Develop COOP strategies and capabilities across the Army
14.

Going deeper into an information landscape involved in a very real
cyber-war

15.

Battlefield systems interoperable with other current systems and future
systems

16.

Provide comprehensive information assurance and information
security in AMC Information Operations

17.

Realize the full potential of information sharing through continued
development and modernization of applications and service oriented
architectures connecting to LandWarNet

18.

Move logistics infrastructure toward digitization, miniaturization,
virtualization, personalization, and wireless

19.

Employ a secure, collaborative, web-enabled, and tailorable Enterprise
Architecture intended to integrate and leverage AMC’s mission
planning and execution capabilities
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20.

Structure the AMC enterprise as a networked organization that
features task focused, adaptive teams that facilitate efficient and
parallel thinking behavior

21.

Provide a Business Intelligence Center concept that would maximize
the use and availability of command wide data, enabling real time
data analysis and decisionmaking. Leverage information technology
(IT) innovation and Knowledge Management (KM) to achieve decision
superiority by transforming AMC processes, applications, and data
into net-centric capabilities that accelerate information sharing

22.

Compare actual effects versus planned effects of the Army’s
Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program (I3MP)
on AMC’s information technology network and posture at the 30
special installations.

23.

Evaluate the role of service-based architecture approach in enhancing
information dominance and decision superiority for Army and Joint
warfighters and logisticians.

III.	National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
1.	The impact of raw material for Class V production
2.	Viability of a CONUS ground-centric sustainment/support structure
3.	Risk of offshore production of tires, electronics, ball bearings, etc.
4.

LOGCAP/other augmentation agreements as a part of DoS and DoD
strategies

5.

The impact of certain strategic materials only being available from
foreign sources

6.

The impact of declining rotorcraft technology investment in the U.S. as
compared with foreign governments and industries

7.

The impact of multinational corporate teams and/or foreign-owned
corporations providing military materials and/or expertise
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8.
9.

IV.

Does the current acquisition model meet the war replacement
requirements?
What is the potential impact of repeated rotations on acquisition,
sustainment, replacement, and modernization of Army and USMC
weapons systems and materiel despite announced increases over time?

Landpower Employment:
1.

LOGCAP and other similar instruments in stabilization and
reconstruction operations

2.	Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
3.	Joint applicability of Army weapon systems
V.

Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
1.

Implications of “sea-basing”

2.

Impact of all civilians (government and contractors) on the battlefield

3.

Implementing “sense and respond” logistics in an Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) environment

4.

The role of the Army’s industrial base (organic/private) in supporting
landpower generation and sustainment

5.

Joint Theater Logistics Management

6.

Development of a national level Global Logistics Command

7.

Establishment of a single Army Logistics Enterprise

8.

The Army planning, budgeting and funding schema for new
systems in light of the extended contractual periods associated with
performance-based logistics

9.

Logistics operations in dispersed/distributed combat operations
against predominantly insurgent forces

10.

Changing materiel requirements as operations transition from combat
to stabilization to reconstruction/nation-building
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11.

New requirements for the organic industrial base given the changing
force structure and nature of conflict

12.

Implications for reliance on the commercial industrial base given
changing force structure and nature of conflict

13.

Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army

14.

Joint applicability of Army weapon systems

15.

Methods to reduce reliance on contractor support on the battlefield

16.

Implication of centralized/single fact to warfighter nontactical
maintenance

17.

Implication of central control of all Reset

18.

Requirements for, and implications of, an Army logistics component of
a Joint Logistics Command

19.

Desirability of single control of logistics systems from factory to
foxhole—acquisition, fielding, maintenance, distribution, etc.

20.

Assess how the new Active and Reserve Component force generation
models will change the way the Army manages, maintains, and
accounts for materiel. Consider both Title 10 and Title 32 requirements
for the respective components.

21.

The emerging growth of radio frequency identification technology and
the required uses and security implications for DoD

22.

What are the role and impact of contractors on the battlefield?

23.

What are the role and impact of nongovernmental organizations on the
battlefield?

24.
		
25.

Will the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) enhance supply
chain management?
Assess how to implement BRAC decisions while not impacting
readiness.

143

26.

Consider the difficulties created within the prepositioned stock
program by how quickly the equipment needs of the Army change.

27.

What is the military’s role in controlling environmental impact on the
modern battlefield?

28.

Assess the implementation of the National Security Personnel System
(NSPS).

29.

Assess whether indemnification is still a good strategy for GOCOs
when using performance-based acquisition principles.

30.

Has the integration of Automated Identification Technology (AIT) into
logistics tracking systems used for visibility and accountability of Class
V, VII, and IX lived up to Army/DoD expectations during the most
recent deployments into Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines? If not,
what have been the shortcomings?

31.

Transformation of the Army’s Requirements Process focusing on Joint
warfighter readiness.

32.	Logistics Transformation—Reduce Footprint
a.
Distribute supply nodes dynamically across the battlefield
b.
Robust and flexible transportation networks—leverage Joint
capabilities to share
		
c.	Situational awareness of requirements, demand, and location of
forces
		
d.	Net-centric environment where IT provides seamless
connectivity
e.
“Wal-Mart” like efficiencies
		
f.	Develop, create, and put into use a tracking system—FedEx and
UPS
		
g.	Actualize the Rapid Fielding Initiative and Rapid Equipping
Force
		
h.	Adopt CBM+ across the Army—export successes from Army
Aviation
		
i.	Predictive and ‘smart’ supply management
33.	Support the Army Structure Transformation—Think Expeditionary
		
a.
Supply and sustain an increased number of soldiers (Active force
at least 547,400)
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34.
		
		
		
		
		
35.

b.

Support expansion and modular conversion (FY 07—13) of AC
and ARNG BCT and AC
c.
ARNG, USAR multifunctional and functional support brigades;
include readiness and availability
d.	Deploy and employ logistics forces simultaneously
e.	Evolve supply methods to enable modular conversion
f.
Develop modular logistics organizations complementing overall
modular Army structure
g.	Reset APS and ASF and convert into modular structures
h.	ARFORGEN—Review and properly equip units
i.
Role of security assistance and expanded use of U.S. Army
Security Assistance Command (USASAC)
j.
Directly connect the warfighter to the logistics environment—
flatten the logistics chain
k.
Robust and flexible transportation networks
l.
Prepare for a possible increase in the use of sea basing for
strategic logistics support
m.	Reduce or eliminate demand; shrink size of supplies.
n.
Replacement for fossil fuels
o.	Super reliable, self repairing machinery and electronics
p.
Replace food with pill or tablet
q.
Way to recycle and reuse body waste
r.	Predictive logistics through data/trend analysis for real-time
support
Contractors on the Battlefield
a.
Examine statutory and regulatory implications of contractors in
the fight.
b.
Are the contractor tasks captured and translated into soldierbased maintenance in a timely matter?
c.
Examine contractor labor levels and applications in adjusting
Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) for weapons system
sustainment.
d.
Are the transitions from PBL contractor to retail logistics (at the
weapon system) addressed in automation initiatives?
e.
Examine LOGCAP current capabilities and enhancements that
duplicate contractor missions.
Assess the impacts of DoD and DA regulations on GOCO facilities.
Consider the effects of such requirements on the factors of production
and the feasibility of carrying out all tasks on installations that are
personnel and resource deprived.
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36.
		
		
37.

VI.

VII.

Assess the efficiency of the Army structure to support the acquisition
life cycle:
a.
Assess the impact of RDECOM, LCMCs, FCS, multiple TRADOC
representatives, the Rapid Equipping Force on Readiness and
expedition fielding.
b.
What effects do multiple process owners, multiple customers
and overlapping functions have on morale and productivity?
Determine the opportunities and challenges associated with
developing a Federated Army Net-Centric Sites (FANS) operating
model to conduct Joint Command, Control, Communications,
Computing and Information Technology (C4IT) interoperability
testing.

Global War on Terror:
1.

Overarching, integrated analysis of terrorism funding, including
narco-terrorism, sale of diamonds, etc.

2.

Technological advances and/or dual-use technologies that can bolster
border protection and homeland security

Military Change:
1.

Analyze of the issues associated with implementing the Army’s data
strategy and products to improve NETOPS functionality.

2.

Analyze of Multi-Level Security (MLS) issues for systems being
developed for the Future Force.

3.

Discuss IPV6/IPV4 translation issues and implementation pilots/
demos required.

4.

Develop strategic options for providing an acceptable level of
protection for information systems and networks using fewer
resources. The problem is balancing the manpower, time and materiel
costs of protecting U.S. information systems from enemy exploitation
so we can provide an acceptable level of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability for the information in U.S. operational and tactical systems
and networks with the requirement to conserve scarce resources.
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5.

Assess the impact of the growing requirements to use wireless
technology to communicate on and off the battlefield.

6.

Weapons: Look closely at a new individual weapon (e.g., rifles and
machine guns). To any soldier under fire, the ability to save his own
life, and those of his colleagues, begins, and often ends, with the
individual weapon (rifle, pistol or bayonet-knife). For the long term,
we must look at electronic, electro-magnetic and laser weapons. For
the short term, replace the M16 rifle. The M16 rifle first appeared in
1957. It was a marginally effective weapon then, and its successors
have not been much better. Increase use of the Mossberg 12ga military
shotgun, the M240 machine gun (7.62 NATO), the M2 .50 cal heavy
machine gun, a .45 cal pistol, the Barrett .50 cal sniper rifle and the M24
sniper rifle.

7.

Radios: Every soldier should be equipped with a personal
communications device of the future. Just as every cop on the beat
has a hand-held radio, every member of a squad should possess a
communications device sophisticated enough to allow every soldier to
remain connected to every other soldier in his squad, and if needed,
beyond. If possible, the device should provide data as well as voice.

8.

Protection: Technology exists today to equip light infantry with
an exoskeleton—essentially a robotic suit powered by a small gas
engine that a soldier can strap on his arms and legs. Computers and
sophisticated hydraulics sense and amplify muscular movements in
his arms and legs. In the interim keep body armor relatively light and
reliable.

9.

Mind and Body: Greater attention must be given to the selection,
bonding, and psychological and physical preparation of close combat
soldiers if they are to perform well in the dangerous, unfamiliar and
horrifically desolate terrain and weather in places like Afghanistan and
Iraq. Modern science offers some promising solutions.

10.

IEDs and Beyond: Adapt to protect against future threats. IEDs and
other threats will change. The enemy will improve capabilities to
disrupt soldiers. Look at protecting against the growing threat to
helicopters.

11.

Night Vision: Do whatever it takes to keep the U.S. in the lead. Make
sure we continue to “own the night.”
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12.

VIII.

Lights: Weapon mounted and personal lights are essential in urban
operations. Develop such items with sufficient power to support long
duration missions.

Force Management and Leadership:
1.

The Arming of Civilians: What are the implications from an
international law perspective and what protections/safeguards exist
for the individual?

2.

Deployment Incentives: What compensation should be provided to
deploying DACs, including necessary legislative changes (i.e., tax
exemptions, recruitment bonuses, increased life insurance, etc.). What
can be done to encourage more civilians to deploy in the face of an
aging workforce? What recruitment and retention incentives should be
considered for emergency-essential personnel?

3.

Special Needs: What special needs exist for civilians and contractors
who are deploying or on the battlefield? The CONUS Replacement
Center (CRC) does not have enough uniforms in unusual (larger) sizes
to allow everyone to deploy in a timely manner.

4.

Disciplinary and Performance Issues: How should disciplinary and
performance issues be handled for deployed DACs? AR 690-700,
Chapter 751, states that the on-site chain of command has the authority
and the discretion to initiate appropriate administrative action against
a civilian employee for misconduct or disciplinary issues. Generally
speaking, the easiest course of action is to send the employee back to
the home station, many times with no documentation of the infraction
or problem. This often results in no action being taken because the
home station does not have the information necessary to take the
disciplinary or performance action.

5.

Post-deployment issues: What physical/psychological services should
be available to DACs and contractor employees for injuries suffered on
the battlefield, including post traumatic stress syndrome, etc.?

6.	Attracting and developing senior civilian leadership
7.

Conduct a feasibility assessment on matrixing AMC’s C4IT capabilities
into technical Center of Excellence designed to provide services back to
the command.
148

8.
9.

What would be an effective strategy to shift program requirements
from supplemental back to their base funded program?
What are the critical elements required in a justification/impact
statement on shifting programs/requirements from supplemental to
base funding?

10.

Chemical warfare destruction
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United States Military Academy
POC: Dr. Thomas Sherlock (845) 938-2864
Thomas.Sherlock@usma.edu
I.

Homeland Security; U.S. Army:
1.	Securing the southern border of the United States from illegal
immigration
  2.

Ramifications of the North American Defense Agreement

3.	Budgetary politics: the problem of allocating funds for homeland
security
4.

Evolution of civil-military relations

5.	Motivations for service in the U.S. armed forces
6.	Growth of the gap between the U.S. military and American society
7.	The level of civilian support for the war on terrorism: key
determinants
8.	The nature and quality of American patriotism and nationalism
9.

The state of the military as a profession

10.	Best practices for the U.S. Army in post-hostility operations
11.	Best practices for the U.S. Army in the war on terrorism
12.	Best practices for the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency strategy
13.

The process of military reform: What are the components of a
successful strategy?

14.	Preemptive versus preventive war: evolution and legitimacy of
concepts
15.	The evolution of the Army Field Manual: key determinants
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16.
II.

The reform of military education to better encompass language and
culture training.

International Issues:
1.	The roots of anti-Americanism: regional variations
2.	The utility of public diplomacy; best practices
3.	Democratization as a response to terrorism: promise and limitations
4.	The threat convergence of WMD proliferation and terrorism
5.	The use of information warfare tactics by violent nonstate actors
6.	Internet-related challenges to U.S. grand strategy and national security
7.

Cooperation between the United States and the EU (also individual
countries) in the war on terror

8.

The erosion of Latin American democracy over the past
decade: undermining U.S. security interests in the region

9.

The anti-American message of Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. How
strongly does it resonate the region? How does Venezuala undermine
U.S. interests in the region?

10.

To what extent does Chavez control the political process in Venezuela?
Develop metrics to gauge the strength of organized and diffuse
opposition to Chavez. Evaluate the strength of civil and political
society. What are the prospects for democratization under and/or after
Chavez?

11.

The prospects for stability and democratization in Cuba over the next
decade: the roles of the Cuban Army and foreign investment

		

12.	The growth of Islamic radicalism in Latin America: determinants
13.	The growth of Islamic radicalism in Africa: determinants
14.

Identification of the sources of liberalization in the Arab world: the role
of intellectuals, the middle class, NGOs, and international pressure
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15.

Sources of democratization in the Muslim world: case studies in Asia
and Africa

16.

The interpretation of Muslim scripture as a support for political and
cultural liberalization

17.

Evaluate the utility of Turkey as a model for democratization for other
Islamic nations.

18.

Political reform in Morocco and Kuwait as models of “reform from
above” for other Islamic countries

19.

Explanations for the strength of moderate Islam of Mali. Why have
Wahhabi or jihadist movements failed to strike deep roots in Malian
society?

20.

Assess the ability of Indonesia, the largest Islamic nation, to contain
Islamic radicalism and institutionalized democratic institutions.

21.

Hezbollah: estimating the growth of its influence in Lebanese politics
over the next 5 years

22.

Palestinian and Israeli politics: prospects for an authentic two-state
solution

23.

Prospects for defeating insurgency in Afghanistan under NATO

24.

Prospects for democratization and state-building in Afghanistan

25.

Social, political, economic, and cultural obstacles to democratization in
Iran

26.

Best practices for the U.S. Army in nation and state-building in Iraq.
The components of an American “Plan B” in Iraq: What does Iraq
and the immediate region look like in terms of America’s role if
reconciliation and stabilization fail?

27.

Measuring the prospects for state failure in Pakistan: develop metrics

28.

Identify the relative political strengths in Pakistan of liberals and
Islamists
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29.

What are the political interests of the Pakistani military as a corporate
body?

30.

Deescalation of tension between India and Pakistan: How durable?
What are the prospects for a settlement in Kashmir?

31.

Identify the factors that support a closer political and military
relationship between India and the United States. How durable are
these factors?

32.

What is the state of Indo-Chinese relations? What are the prospects for
political and military rivalry?

33.

Politics of oil in Africa. Threats to the free flow of oil to the United
States

34.

The prospects for state- and nation-building in Nigeria under the new
government

35.	Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan: prospects for successful
democratization
36.	Ukraine and Georgia: prospects for membership in NATO
37.

Russia’s response to “regime change” on its borders. Assess the
growth and durability of Russian political, military, economic, and
cultural influence in the Near Abroad, particularly Central Asia.

38.	Evaluate Russia’s contributions as a partner in the war on terror
39.	The growing estrangement of Russia from the West: the role of the
siloviki
40.

I dentify policies that might enable the West to influence Russian
behavior

41.

Gauging the stability of Chechnya: Has separatism and radicalism
been contained or have they metastasized to surrounding republics?

42.

Instability in Daghestan: Identify the causes; weight the prospects for
worsening crime and political unrest.
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43.

Politics of leadership succession in Russia: Assess the “liberal
credentials” and policy preferences of President Medvedev; evaluate
his ability to push through an agenda that challenges the Putinists.

44.

Politics of oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and
western China

45.

The politics of succession in Kazakhstan: What institutional forces are
likely to play a role after Nazarbayev’s death or retirement?

46.

The prospects for political stability and political reform in
Turkmenistan

47.

Problems of human security as obstacles to building sound states and
promoting democratization

48.

Evaluate the roots of the current food crisis and the prospects for a
second “Green Revolution” to alleviate global economic distress.
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
POC: Paul Seguin (202) 761-8982
Paul.B.Seguin@hq02.usace.army.mil
1.

Sustaining U.S. Contractor Support versus “Capacity Building”: Much of
the engineering design and project management, and all of the construction
work for USACE-managed programs is performed by contract. During the
early stages of foreign contingency operations, the U.S. Government typically
calls on major elements of the American engineering and construction
industry to provide rapid support. Such firms often accept such work, with
all its uncertainties, hoping to later qualify for long-term work in a given
theater. Policy that mandates maximizing contract awards to local firms, and
training them for greater capacity, provides disincentives for U.S. firms to
gamble early on contingency contracts, either by declining to bid at all or to
build in short-term profits by bidding for significantly higher payment. How
can this contradiction be addressed to the benefit of U.S. national security?

2.

Efficiency versus Effectiveness: Both the institutional and the operational
Army have seen significant pressures for enhanced efficiencies, doing
more with less. Carried to an extreme, efforts in this direction lead to an
Army that is 100% efficient, with all of its personnel and other resources
fully employed performing current tasks. This leaves no surge capability to
respond to unforeseen contingency requirements. How can we balance our
requirements to provide adequate surge capacity to win our Nation’s wars
(effectiveness) as a “not-for-profit” organization with demands for business
efficiency?

3.

Strengthening the Scientific and Engineering Capacity Available To Serve
the Army and the Nation: At a time when science and technology continues
to play an ever-increasing role in transforming society and warfare, the
numbers of scientists and engineers graduating from our colleges and
universities nationwide continues to decline. What can the Army do to
promote and encourage larger numbers of our youth to pursue technical
degrees, whether as civilians, as members of ROTC, or within USMA?

4.

Civilian Deployments to OCONUS Contingencies: DoD is currently
changing or adjusting personnel recruiting, transfer, and other incentive
policies to encourage more civilians to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan in
support of GWOT. The problem of maintaining adequate civilian staffing in
support of U.S. national security policies has grown as the elapsed time has
gone to being measured in years rather than months, and as roles for civilian
participation have increased. How critical will it be to solve this problem as
the Long War drags on, perhaps for decades?
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Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
POC: LTC David Egbert (703) 602-3045
david.egbert@ocar.army.pentagon.mil
1.

Examine the current process for health assessment and follow-up care of
Army Reserve soldiers returning from combat theaters. Post-deployment
health assessment and follow-up care for these soldiers presents challenges
for the health care community in general. Study should identify the existing
shortcomings and the recommended policy, regulatory and legislative
enablers to improve the provision of post-deployment care to soldiers,
including those in remote areas where TRICARE availability is limited or not
available.

2.

Examine the provision of medical and dental care to Army Reserve xoldiers.
Medical and dental readiness shortfalls are significant contributors to the
non-deployability of AR xoldiers. Ensuring recurring and assured access to
AR capabilities in an environment of persistent conflict requires that those
shortcomings are overcome. Examine the current process for the provision
of care to Army Reserve xoldiers and recommend solutions to improve their
medical and dental readiness throughout the ARFORGEN cycle, including
soldiers residing in remote locations. Study should address the following
questions/points:
a.
Based on the ARFORGEN model and historical data, what is the
projected cost to Army to institute pre-mobilization medical and dental
care to RC Soldiers?
b.
Based on historical data, what is the projected cost savings the Army
could realize by providing required corrective medical and dental care
pre-mobilization vice at the mobilization station?
c.
Should limitations be placed on pre-mobilization medical/dental
benefits for RC Soldiers?
d.
What barriers (e.g. legal, policy, regulatory, legislative) currently
exist that preclude the provision of medical and dental care prior to
mobilization?
e.
What are the “quick-wins” that can be identified for immediate
implementation to improve medical and dental readiness in the Army
Reserve and what are the costs and benefits associated with each?

3.

Examine and determine opportunities to more effectively recruit and retain
health care professionals into the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve is
experiencing challenges in attracting and retaining health care professionals
across the force. To address these challenges, examine current initiatives
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and management practices and propose solutions to the current recruiting
and retention issues impacting the Army Reserve. Research/study should
identify the policy, regulatory and legislative barriers, and enablers to
achieving recruiting and retention goals for health care professionals in an
Operational Reserve in an era of persistent conflict.
4.

Examine current practices for manning the force as an operational reserve.
In a time of unprecedented employment of its forces, the Army Reserve—
like the other services—is challenged to recruit and retain soldiers to man
its formations. The future security environment will be characterized by
persistent conflict across the spectrum of operations. Manning an operational
reserve in an environment of persistent conflict will require a new portfolio
of management tools and practices. Study/research should address the
following:
a.
Identify the projected long-term effects of persistent/sustained conflict
on the ability to recruit soldiers to man an operational reserve.
b.
Identify the projected long-term effects of persistent/sustained conflict
on the ability to retain sufficient numbers of soldiers to man an
operational reserve.
c.
Identify the best mix of prior service and nonprior service soldiers to
adequately man an operational reserve.
d.
Identify a menu of incentives that could enable the Army Reserve to
sufficiently man an operational reserve.
e.
Identify current practices that are obsolete in an environment of
persistent conflict as they relate to manning an operational reserve.
f.
Identify the “quick-wins” that can be identified for immediate
implementation to increase recruiting and retention rates in an
operational reserve.

5.

Examine and assess the potential long-term effects of utilizing the Army
Reserve as an operational force and the impact of that use on recruiting and
retention rates over the long term. Identify potential initiatives to reverse
negative trends that might emerge as a result of operationalizing the RC and
develop a strategy for their implementation. Research/study should identify
the policy, and regulatory and legislative enablers required to implement
initiatives.

6.

Examine the change in paradigm from a strategic to an operational reserve in
an effort to identify and quantify the point at which military responsibilities
and duties become too demanding for part-time citizen-soldiers. At what
deployment/operations tempo point does the concept of an operational
reserve begin to negatively impact unit readiness? Study/research should
identify mitigation options, their costs and a strategy for implementation.
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7.

Examine DoD-wide credentialing programs as they relate to manning the
force as an operational reserve. Current credentialing programs allow for
the determination of a civilian Standard Occupation Code (SOC) based on a
Military Occupation Code (MOC) but not the reverse. As such, these current
programs serve largely as a transition benefit for separating soldiers rather
than as a recruiting tool for potential new soldiers. An effective credentialing
program that provides for accelerated accession into the Reserve
Components could mitigate recruiting challenges currently facing the force.
Study/research should address the following:
a.
Identify the barriers and enablers associated with expanding existing
“credentialing” programs to make them a benefit to potential NPS
candidates.
b.
Determine if there is value added in executing a “proof of principle”
and if so quantify the scope of that effort and recommended civilian
target.
c.
Identify the “quick wins” that could be implemented immediately to
improve manning in the Army Reserve.

8.

Examine opportunities to expand Army Reserve participation in
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. IMET is a
grant program established by Congress as part of the Arms Export Control
Act of 1976. IMET grants enable foreign military personnel from countries
that are financially incapable of paying for training to take courses offered
annually at U.S. military schools. IMET is designed to accomplish two
primary goals: (1) help strengthen foreign militaries through the provision
of skills necessary for the proper functioning of a civilian controlled
professional military, and (2) serve as an “instrument of influence” through
which the U.S. shapes the doctrine, operating procedures and the values
of foreign militaries. In its current state, IMET is an Active Component
function. Study/research should address the following:
a.
Identify opportunities for the Army Reserve to build relationships
through IMET that could translate into future Security Cooperation
missions conducted by the Army Reserve.
b.
Determine if Army Reserve participation in IMET would lead to an
increased partnership capacity with a foreign nation’s RC.
c.
Identify existing barriers to increasing Army Reserve participation in
IMET and recommend a strategy—along with critical enablers—to
implement.

9.

Examine opportunities to leverage Army Reserve core skill sets for
participation in security cooperation missions. The Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) does not apportion forces specifically for security
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cooperation missions. Forces employed for security cooperation missions
come from forces assigned to a COCOM’s AOR or forces that are temporarily
deployed for engagement activities. The Army Reserve does not have a
formalized mechanism to source forces for recurring participation in security
cooperation missions. Study/research should address the following:
a.
Determine benefits afforded to the Army Reserve through
participation in security cooperation missions.
b.
Recommend a strategy for sourcing security cooperation missions and
determine if such missions are supportable using the ARFORGEN
construct.
c.
Identify the barriers and critical enablers (e.g. policy, regulatory,
legislative) to implement the strategy for the Army Reserve.
d.
Identify “quick-wins” that could result in increased Army Reserve
participation in security cooperation missions.
10.

Examine the current Full-time support (FTS) program in the Army Reserve
and its ability to support an operational reserve. FTS in the Army Reserve
is a critical readiness enabler for an operational reserve. In its current form,
the FTS program is not configured in a manner that results in predictable
and assured recurrent access to ready Army Reserve forces. Examine the
current FTS program in the Army Reserve and determine its ability to
provide optimal support to an operational reserve in an era of persistent
conflict. Research should identify initiatives and strategies to transform the
FTS program to better support an operational reserve as well as the policy,
regulatory and legislative enablers to transformation.

11.

Examine the impact of the redesignation of Army Civil Affairs (CA) and
PSYOP forces as part of the conventional force. A recent DEPSECDEF
decision has re-designated selected Army CA/PSYOP forces as conventional
forces rather than SOF. Study/research should address the following:
a.
Determine whether the Army has responded adequately to this
reintegration effort with regards to doctrine, policy, programming,
concept and materiel development, training, equipping and
sustainment (both pre-mob and post deployment).
b.
Propose solutions to identified deficiencies.
c.
Develop a strategy to ensure the ability of the now-conventional CA
and PSYOP forces to meet the demands of an operational reserve in an
era of persistent conflict.

12.

Numerous countries are considering creating/restructuring their Reserve
Components as part of security sector reforms. Analyze this process, either
from a general perspective (the theoretical benefits of different RC structures,
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historical analysis of past reforms) or by looking at specific countries and
their likely strategic choices. Identify opportunities for the Army Reserve
to engage foreign militaries in this process and develop appropriate
engagement strategies.
13.

Examine the challenges associated with cross-cultural communications.
Cross-cultural communications on the ground present significant
challenges for Joint Force commanders. Study/research should focus on the
development of solutions to these challenges including the determination
of the best mix of heritage speakers and career linguists across the force
(Active, Guard, Reserve, contractor and civil service) and strategies for the
development and delivery of cultural/language familiarization training.
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National Guard Bureau
POC: Colonel Douglas J. Curell (703) 607-9127
douglas.curell@us.army.mil
1.	What are the appropriate roles and missions for the Army’s components?
a.	The ARNG as part of the operational force?
b.	ARNG’s state role in addition to federal role?
2.	What is the future force structure of the Army National Guard?
a.
Considering only the needs of state governors in domestic operations,
many critics have suggested that the ARNG should predominantly
consist of CS/CSS force structure. However, the Constitutional
basis for the National Guard is as armed militia for the governors,
so “trigger pullers” were arguably intended by the Framers of the
Constitution. This legacy of combat arms in the ARNG continues to
this day
b.
Are the ARNG’s 28 BCTs, 8 Combat Aviation Brigades, and other
structure enough?
c.
Role of ARNG’s maneuver enhancement brigades and CS/CSS
brigades in war and domestic operations
3.

What is the future of the All Volunteer Force?
a.
Although the ARNG has achieved personnel strength of 350,000
troops, will Army resource the ARNG with equipment to accomplish
its missions?
b.
How will continued deployments/mobilizations affect the ARNG’s
ability to remain a viable State and Federal volunteer force?

4.	How can the Army National Guard personnel system transform?
a.
Will the ARNG receive resources to further automate its personnel
system with DIMHRS, iPERMS, etc.?
b.
How will new 12-Month Mobilization Policy affect the management of
ARNG soldiers?
5.	What is the future of training simulation in the Army National Guard?
a.
Located in Indiana, the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC) is
a self-contained training environment. The 1,000 acre site was turned
over to the Indiana National Guard in July 2005 and has been evolving
into a full-immersion contemporary urban training center.
b.
ARNG Aviation forces regularly use a combination of individual and
collective training equipment to keep aviation skills sharp
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c.

The BCTC at Fort Leavenworth also uses simulation training to
prepare combat brigades and battalions for the warfighting and other
operations
d.	How else could simulation be utilized to maximize training in the
ARNG?
6.	How should the mobilization and deployment processes be changed?
a.
The new 1-year mobilization is an appropriate change. Coupled with
this new 1-year mobilization are efforts to increase pre-mobilization
training and reduce post-mobilization training.
b.
How will new 12-Month Mobilization Policy affect the management of
ARNG forces?
7.	How can the National Guard expand the State Partnership Program (SPP)?
	The National Guard’s SPP links a particular state with a particular foreign
nation to promote and enhance bilateral relations with that nation. It
nurtures dependable collaborative partners for coalition operations in
support of the Global War on Terror. There are 51 countries currently linked
to 44 states, 2 territories (Puerto Rico and Guam), and Washington, DC. SPP
seems to be a good way for a U.S. Governor to support overseas COCOM
Theater Security Cooperation plans and overseas U.S. Embassy efforts
without actually having to send Guard forces out of state. Does SPP present
an economical way for the United States to assist partner nations while
simultaneously freeing more Active Component forces for warfighting and
expeditionary missions?
8.


How
should the ARNG develop commission and warrant officers?
Although the ARNG develops warrant officers in ways similar to the Active
Component, the ARNG must allow warrant officers to maintain civilian jobs.
What challenges does this present?

9.	How should the ARNG implement the Army Force Generation Model? In
April 2007, the DARNG approved the latest array of ARNG forces in the
ARFORGEN template. With ARNG forces plugged into the ARFORGEN
model, the ARNG is already executing. How can the ARNG balance
ARFORGEN execution with domestic operations, which are difficult to
predict?
10.	Future ARNG Force Structure: What can the ARNG sustain?With 350,000
personnel, the ARNG has sufficient personnel strength to sustain its current
force structure. Will the Army permit the ARNG to grow?
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11.

I mpact of the Global War on Terror on officer and NCO career development.
Deployments have admittedly forced some individual officers, NCOs, and
soldiers to defer their professional schooling. However, the schools can be
rescheduled for these individuals. It is not a serious problem for the Guard.
One must also keep in mind that for most Guardsmen and Guardswomen,
their military careers are second careers. Guardsmen and Guardswomen
have always had to schedule their military professional schooling around
events in their civilian careers. Can the Army and the ARNG better
accommodate ARNG Officers, NCOs, and soldiers in terms of professional
development and schooling?

12.

What levels and forces will the ARNG require to fight the war on terrorism
for 10 to 20 years? The ARNG currently has sufficient forces to fight the
Global War on Terror and perform its other missions during the decade
ahead. However, the Guard could easily grow. One should remember that
ARNG forces include unique units such as civil support teams (CSTs), which
are ideal for protecting the homeland against acts of terror. How should the
ARNG grow to best support the Global War on Terror and perform its other
missions during the decade ahead?

13.

Can the ARNG continue to provide its own replacements for extended
periods under the current Partial Mobilization Authority? There is no policy
requiring the ARNG to replace its deployed units with other ARNG units.
ARNG forces are sourced as part of the “Total Army” forces. The needs
of the Army and the availability of all the Army’s forces will continue
to determine what forces are provided by the ARNG. When the Army
determines that an ARNG capability is required, the Partial Mobilization
Authority serves as authority to mobilize the ARNG forces. Should the
Army try to replace ARNG units in theater with other ARNG units to best
implement the new 12-Month Mobilization Policy?

14.

What is the State Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) role and interaction with
NORTHCOM? Each of the 50 States, Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands,
and the District of Columbia has its own Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ).
The JFHQ provides the Governor and the Adjutant General with planning
and staffing capability for contingencies. In an emergency situation, the
Governor and Adjutant General typically exercise command and control
through the JFHQ and the JFHQ actively coordinates all the activities within
the state or territory. Unless ARNG forces have been federalized, they are not
subordinate to NORTHCOM. To the contrary, federal forces typically come
in to augment National Guard and other first responders at the request of a
state’s governor. How can NORTCHOM best support a State’s JFHQ during
a domestic operation?
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15.	What is the impact of remobilizing ARNG soldiers for a second deployment?
Repeated deployments are admittedly stressful for Guard members, their
families, and their employers. Nevertheless, the ARNG continues to meet
missions, and the personnel strength of the ARNG is good. For the long
term, it is important to provide as much predictability as possible for Guard
members, their families, and their employers. For the individuals and units
that endure extended deployments or suffer from insufficient dwell time
between deployments, incentives should be provided. How can the Army
and ARNG best provide predictability to ARNG soldiers, employers, and
family members?
16.

Define requirements and resourcing criteria for the ARNG in each
ARFORGEN cycle.For ARFORGEN to work properly, units must be
resourced properly. Early in the ARFORGEN cycle, ARNG units need to
have their equipment so that they can train with it. As a unit progresses into
the later stages of the ARFORGEN cycle, additional training days have to be
built into the schedule. In the final stages of the ARFORGEN cycle, personnel
stabilization policies must be utilized to keep trained personnel in the unit.
Will the Army and the Nation resource the ARNG to meet the requirements
of ARFORGEN?

17.

What is the National Guard role in a post-Katrina Homeland Defense
environment? The ARNG forces in each state and territory are still the
first responders. This will not change for at least two reasons. First, while
the Active Component forces are consolidated on relatively few federal
installations, the ARNG is already “forward deployed” in each state and
territory. Second, the ARNG is immediately responsive as it provides
capabilities directly to the Governor on scene. How can the ARNG best
support the Governors and first responders in a crisis? Will the Army and
the Nation resource the ARNG to meet the requirements Homeland Defense
missions?

18.

Will the ARNG’s role in the operational force present so many training
requirements and mobilizations that individuals will stop volunteering to
serve in the ARNG?

19.

NGB currently provides NORTHCOM with information and assists in
planning for possible NORTHCOM support to first responders during
domestic emergencies. What should be the relationship between the National
Guard Bureau, ARNORTH, and NORTHCOM?
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20.

What are some of the systemic processes that inhibit National Guard units
from increasing their readiness posture? What can be done to correct these
systemic inhibiters?

21.

Since the ARNG has hit its FY13 objective end strength 4 years before it is
scheduled, what end strength level can the ARNG achieve and how can that
level provide additional capability to the Army? What is the impact to the
Army of the ARNG growing beyond 358,200?

22.

There has been a great deal of discussion since the Committee on the
National Guard and Reserve’s report about Strategic Reserve versus
Operational Reserve. What is the definition of an operational reserve? How
does this different reserve component construct better serve the nation
as a portion of the military element of power. How can this be used to
leverage domestic power in a manner similar to the concept of the “Abrams
Doctrine”? Does this new construct provide an additional continuing tool for
the nation to use in international engagement in operations other than war?
(POC: David K. Germain, Deputy Division Chief, ARNG Plans, Readiness
and Mobilization Division (703) 607-7372.

23.

The Secretary of Defense has mandated a one year mobilization period for
Reserve Component units. How can pre-mobilization preparations including
personnel, training and logistics be used to minimize not just training, but
total time at the mobilization station, thus maximizing “boots on the ground”
mission execution for a unit’s mobilization cycle? What does “right” look like
in these pre-mobilization preparations: time of sourcing, time of alert, unit
stabilization, training time for traditional RC soldiers prior to mobilization,
etc? With the correct preparations, is the Cold War concept of a mobilization
station still necessary? POC: David K. Germain, Deputy Division Chief,
ARNG Plans, Readiness and Mobilization Division (703) 607-7372.

24.

Within current force structure allowances, end strength allowances and
funding constraints, what statutory, regulatory, fiscal, policy and procedure
changes can be made to ensure that an Army National Guard unit attains
the highest personnel readiness (P1) by the day of mobilization (M-Day)
and achieves maximum deployability from assigned soldiers prior to
deployment? POC: David K. Germain, Deputy Division Chief, ARNG Plans,
Readiness and Mobilization Division (703) 607-7372.
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